Opponents of gay marriage often cite the “definition” of marriage in defense of their opposition. They state that “marriage” IS defined as being “between a man and a woman”, thus gay marriage is not “marriage”.
Recently, I heard someone offer the point (ostensibly in defense of the possibility of gay marriage) that just because the definition of marriage “is” between a man and a woman, does not mean that it “ought” to be so. Presumably, proponents of gay marriage may often use this type of argument to promote their position.
However, I find this argumentative tactic by gay marriage proponents (insofar as its used) to be highly problematic. First of all, the proponents, insofar as they rely on the above argument, find themselves on inhospitable ground. By invoking the Humean “is/ought” distinction, the gay marriage proponents thereby commit themselves to both an untenable and counterproductive vision of normativity (“ought”), i.e. a metaphysical one (it is possible that the invocation of the question could be designed to merely provoke a limited skeptical reaction in the listener). By invoking the possibility of speculating as to what “ought” to be the definition of marriage–as a question wholly distinct from the social-historical (empirical) question of how marriage “is” defined–the proponent has opened the door to a metaphysical conception of “ought”.
This is distinctly problematic in two ways. First, by considering “ought” as something distinct from necessarily normative descriptions of what “is” (a form of normativity that is empirically tenable), the proponent has taken normativity and placed it in the metaphysical domain (a form that is untenable). And, of course, such a move leads to the completely and necessarily unanswerable question of what “ought” anything to be or not (this isn’t the middle ages). Secondly, by moving the concept into that domain, the gay proponent has moved onto the familiar home terrain of his/her opponent–the cultural-religious traditionalist. The traditionalist has the resources of thousands of years of metaphysical blather (and the cultural capital it commands) on which to base his/her argument for why gay marriage “ought” to be prevented (whereas the proponent has relatively little in terms of volume and cultural capital by comparison).
By contrast, a more plausible conception of normativity recognizes a totally different characterization of the gay marriage argument vis-a-vis the definition of marriage. This conception initially involves the recognition that the definition of marriage as a description is a historically mediated form of empirically identifiable normativity, i.e. when one says the definition of marriage “is” such-and-such, such a statement necessarily means that it “ought” to be such-and-such (according to the speaker/writer). This is the only form of normativity that makes any sense, given that one disallows the tenability of (1) any wholly non-normative “pure” description and (2) any non-descriptive (i.e. metaphysical) form of normativity. Thus, in some sense (though they presumably do not mean it in this way), the gay marriage opponent is initially correct in citing the current definition of marriage (what it “is”) as a normative stance on the definition of marriage (what it “ought” to be). In other words, in the modern era, the only meaningful sense of the term “ought” is captured within our culturally/historically-mediated descriptions (“is”). To say that marriage “ought” to be defined as it “is” appears as a redundancy.
However, given this, the gay marriage proponent now has a relatively easy road. Once this version of normativity is accepted, the traditionalists position that marriage “ought” to be defined as such (which is accurate) becomes easily seen as a wholly arbitrary position contingent on particular historical developments in human society–as opposed to some richly metaphysical account (ordained by God, or “nature”, or whatever). And since the opponents’ success appears strongly correlative with the sustainability of these metaphysical accounts (in fairness, this obvious correlation may not turn out to be causally amenable to the recommendations herein), the loss of them would appear to severely weaken any impetus to prevent a particular group (gays) from obtaining privileges which generally do not practically impact those outside their group.
mr.mes271-
Interesting but, I think, rather confused. For example, the post ends with the qualification “…the loss of them would appear to severely weaken any impetus to prevent a particular group (gays) from obtaining privileges which *generally do not practically impact those outside their group*” (asteriks added). This seems to smuggle in notions of “metaphysical normativity,” which, it is proposed, are “untenable and counterproductive.” Why should we care whether the actions of one group practically impact other people *unless* we have a concrete notion of how things “ought” to be (that is, of course, ethics). Perhaps this just shows how difficult it is to extricate ourselves from allegedly stifling notions of “ought” and objective moral prescriptions. You seem to take it for granted that notions of “metaphysical normativity” are relics of the middle ages (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronological_snobbery …?)
Alas! Andrew, you introduce a claim to a fallacy- namely, a form of improper reasoning- into a discussion with one who rejects logical form and any notion of proper reasoning. You may yet reach an impasse with Mark (Mes 271).
I am, however, inclined to concur with your assessment of Mark’s repackaged (in the post-modernist verbiage) moralizing.
On your reference to “Chronological Snobbery,” see also Horror Victorianorum, which was coined by the late philosopher of science David Stove.
Aaron,
I do admit to being possessed of something similar to a Horror Victorianorum (I actually cited that in a paper I wrote, in response to the open letter denying Derrida an honorary degree–the writers were possessed with a similar though different “horror” in their descriptions), though not because of any “chronological snobbery” (broadly speaking, I prefer antiquity to the middle ages). My horror reflects my generally Nietzschean perspective on life-affirming value orientations. Stove is typical of the English-speaking perspective that prefers a painfully conservative unfolding of affairs (i.e. as slow as possible and with as little change as possible). I say “painfully” in irony, since this conservatism appears to result from a motivation to avoid pain, though the pathological avoidance of such leads to a minimization of pleasure which itself is the more significant condition of “pain” as I see it.
Andrew,
I say that the loss would “appear to weaken” the position of the opponents, i.e. a tentative claim/proposition subject to empirical testing. I did not say that “we” (on the opposite side of the debate) “should” care about one group interfering with the other (or that we would), and that this motivates “our” opposition to the gay marriage opponents. Instead, I offer the hypothesis (subject to empirical observation) that if there is no deeply metaphysical reason to care to interfere, then there will be no interference. I’m not saying that anyone “should” care that gays are being interfered with (the gays themselves will care, and that is enough), i.e. I’m guessing that no one “will” care unless they are an interested party, and gay marriage opponents appear (I stress “appear” to emphasize its tentative status) to lose any likely interest in the absence of traditional metaphysical notions. Of course, as I pointed out above, this appears to rely on a heavily cognitive account of human action which may turn out to be misguided (hence my comment previously about the obvious correlation not lending itself to my causal account).
Aaron,
Will you allow for the presence of a little irony in a statement that castigates someone for “moralizing” while they chide the same for not following “proper” reasoning…?
🙂
Mark,
The irony is merely superficial; for, while logic and ethics are indeed normative, the foundations of the former are far more certain and objective than those of the latter.
For that matter, I may claim with some degree of confidence that without logic, ethics (to include your flavor of virtue ethics) is incoherent.
I hope my comments have not taken us too far afield from the intentions of the original post.
Aaron,
Just to clarify, since this comes up repeatedly, I am not opposed to “logic” per se insofar as it can and often does have a limited heuristic value–just opposed to the role it may play in authoritarian discourse (I rely generally on Quine’s view–or what I take to be his view–of “analytic” statements in Two Dogmas).
I am sorry but I think I got a bit lost on this one. The gay concern about marriage equality is clearly a human rights issue and I don’t see you (or any of your blog commentators) recognizing this. Marriage, as gays argue for it, is merely a conceptual example of how inequality functions in our society. I (hetero) can marry, you (homo) cannot! It is not marriage gays search for as much as it is equal rights. Dignity, really! Specifically, the goal is, obviously, that we begin to see gays not as gay first and then people, but simply as other humans who are morally equal to us. The fact that you are constructing a philosophical argument that centers on semantics rather than the root of the gay concern seems to underscore my point. I think you are downplaying the real issue. I might even go so far as to suggest that some may interpret this as post slightly condescending.
As for the ‘is/ought’ concern, let me now play along for a bit since, structurally, your post is really good. I will claim that marginalizing others based on their race, gender, or sexual preferences, is wrong and it ‘ought’ not to take place. We know this intuitively but we also know this because history has proven to us that stratifying our society in such a manner is not in the best interest of neither society nor the people who live in it.
Philosophically (and morally) we can defend ‘ought’. We can do this because without ought, we would have no ethics at all! After all, we cannot know about how we can live our best lives if we have never considered the pros and cons of our current human experiences. In order to consider matters of moral concern, we have to use ideal theory and thought experiments that necessarily will involve “should’ and ‘ought’.
Culture is always in the process of redefining itself. It does so because it is not completely ‘normative’ (to use a word that you fellows like to say). Rather it is a concept that changes around the people who live in it. By the time we can get around to a definition, it will have already changed. There was a time for example that called for a certain type of marriage and people would rightfully claim: That is the way it ‘is’! But, we know now that those were the good old days (good riddens) and that at least in the US and most of Europe, constant change, new impulses and lifestyles drives us now to consider what ought to be.
Based on all of this, we can derive the logical conclusion:
1) Marriage is between a man and a woman.
2) Changes in our culture have changed the norms and beliefs within which we establish rules and laws.
3) We have agreed that we are to treat all humans equally (UN Declaration of Human Rights, US Constitution, and all that good stuff).
4) We can establish, as a fact, that a large section of the human race is denied equal human rights because of their sexual orientation.
5) Based on 2, 3, and 4, a redefinition of what constitutes marriage appears to be warranted.
6) We can conclude therefore “that that just because the definition of marriage “is” between a man and a woman, does not mean that it “ought” to be so.”
Ciao! Linda
Related article in The Advocate called “Gay is the New Black”.
Find it here: http://www.advocate.com/exclusive_detail_ektid65744.asp
Linda,
I have said this in one of Mark’s previous posts, but it warrants reiteration. I oppose same-sex marriage. I do so, however, for the same reason why I oppose opposite-sex marriage: namely, I reject any legal recognition, and thus oversight, of romantic relationships between consenting individuals by a governing body (whether church or state).
Any such social and/or otherwise economic “benefits” that may be derived from legal marriage may just as easily be obtained via private contractual agreements.
Now, after the above caveat, let’s address your concern that “[i]t is not marriage gays search for as much as it is equal rights.”
I often find that the “equality” argument is unpersuasive. Consider the following.
You note correctly that you (hetero) have a legal right to marriage; however, you fail to observe that T.J. (homo) also has a legal right to marriage. In fact, you are both, and quite “equally” at that, constrained by the same prohibition: one may only marry another of the opposite-sex; only, you choose to exercise that right, while T.J. does not. Seems “equal” to me.
You may respond that I use the term “equal” cavalierly- in particular as it pertains to civic rights- but I do not think that I do. Rather, my use of the term is quite natural. What I think you find so very “unfair” about current marriage laws is the fact that consenting adults are not permitted to marry other consenting adults, but rather are prohibited for poor reasons, namely, reasons of sex, family relation, existing marital status, etc.
I partake in that concern, but I do not think legalizing same-sex marriage is an adequate solution. It is not enough to plead that the government grant legal recognition to certain marital configurations. I instead think we should rid ourselves of legal marriage and undue government involvement in the lives of individuals.
You mention “dignity,” as it relates to the marriage issue, is of particular concern for gays. I find this, well, humorous and sad. If one requires some government validation of one’s romantic affairs in order to feel “dignified,” then one mustn’t think to highly of him/herself. Of course, the social approbation of same-sex marriage may have negative effects for homosexuals, but legal recognition of same-sex marriages will not rectify this. (I think this is where Mark’s post is most useful.)
Finally, if we are to have this legal institution that we call marriage (and it appears that we will for some time) then, all things considered, I would have to support same-sex marriages, but also incestuous and polygamous marriages, too.
The normative thing that ought to be is that I ought to live in a society that supports my views of how a society ought to be structured.
🙂
The strategy has been “working”??? The state of California (arguably the most “liberal” state in the USA by a wide margin) voted to deny gay marriage in a statewide election (arguably b/c there was a higher black turnout–b/c of the Obama election–and black voters are far less sympathetic to the gay cause b/c, surprise surprise, they tend to be more religiously moralistic on issues of sexuality, and of course this is quite ironic given the black situation vis-a-vis civil rights within the living memory of a great deal of those very same voters).
To say nothing of the fact that the gay fight for marriage rights is dangerous (though not necessarily bad) insofar as it may (I stress may) rely too heavily on the traditional heterosexual model of monogamous sexual relationships that the gay movement initially resisted (i.e. during the Gay Liberation Movement of the 1970’s, a cause I enthusiastically support and would welcome a return to).
“We grow up with the heterosexual model, but we don’t have to follow it. We should be developing our own lifestyle. There’s no reason you can’t love more than one person at a time.” –Harvey Milk
Mark,
I agree entirely.
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1295.xml?ReleaseID=1194
As of July 2008 (the most recent I could find), Americans oppose gay marriage 55%-36%. Barely little more than 1/3 of Americans polled could express support for the idea.
Looking back over the last 15 years, at several different surveys on this issue, I couldn’t notice any significant overall trend in favor of increasing support for gay marriage and declining opposition.
Mark,
To most observers, and in particular many “professional” pollers, the success of Proposition Eight in California came as a surprise. I think this sense of surprise indicates that perhaps most people are not prepared to support same-sex marriages and that our faith in the “progressiveness” (I do hate that term, but I use it for a lack of a better one) of the American electorate is misplaced.
Andrew,
You say, “[p]ublic opinion has shifted, and will no doubt continue to shift, in favor of same sex marriage… .” Indeed, in relation to certain historical contexts- say, from 1950s America to now- public opinion has shifted toward more support for same-sex marriages; nevertheless, this is certainly not saying much, for the causal factors responsible for this shift are rather complex and themselves contingent upon other factors, in particular many (I would say primarily) non-moral factors. Therefore, to assert that this change is due mainly to moral concerns is tenuous at best.
Hence, I have no faith that support for same-sex marriages will continue to increase. (Thus, I have doubts.) What I do not doubt, though, is that the government will remain the instrument through which certain segments of society marginalize and oppress others. The same-sex marriage issue is merely one example; there are numerous others.
This is what concerns me in the gay marriage fight when it’s framed as a struggle for human rights:
“homosexuality is not born of nature or nurture, but is socially constructed. When doctors created the profusion of perversions, they unwittingly produced the models that gave rise to gay, lesbian, and other sexualities…these identities are themselves a form of oppression…when a person accepts the label homosexual or heterosexual, possibilities of pleasure are foreclosed and sexual freedom is surrendered.”
In the human rights struggle, the definitive identity as a particular “type” of person is rigidly constructed (and internalized by those who find themselves subject to the classification), and such a construction limits the (potentially) infinite possibilities that we as individual selves generally retain.
Now, it does remain an open question as to how the bisexual, the polyamorous, the pansexual, the transsexual, etc. will fare if the gay marriage fight is successful. Perhaps, these other marginalized groups will gain additional strength by the addition of gay to the traditional hetero model (which could have the overall effect of weakening the hegemony of the traditional–or any other hegemonic–model of sexuality). It is my concern, however, that they will lose ground, as homosexual monogamous marriage (on the traditional model) becomes subsumed within the new “norm” (which is identical to the previous “norm” with only a small modification).
I think Aaron agrees somewhat with this point, though he chooses to frame it in terms of juridical (law, rights, the state, etc.) power.
Scratch that last sentence, not coherent.
Mark,
I don’t view your concerns as being at odds with my own. I think you highlight a very important social phenomenon, while I am primarily concerned with the use of political force and economic oppression via government and quasi-governing authorities.
My worry with the same-sex marriage proponents is that they seek to include themselves within the game of legally recognized marriage, when in fact they should reject it. By not rejecting legal recognition of personal relationships, they ipso facto legitimatize government’s oversight of personal relationships.
I am not sure you and I are at odds, but rather are focusing on a different phenomenon.
atbrenner,
The fact that the majority of Americans will remain unconvinced by this Foucauldian discussion of ‘sexual identity’ says nothing about the content or nature of the discussion itself. It takes only a moment’s reflection to acquaint oneself with the myriad of things that Americans would and have had difficulties accepting or being convinced by, and this is due to the fact that people seem most easily convinced by things in which they already believe. I think this aspect of the discussion is entirely relevant and worth pursuing, because it rests at the heart of what these debates concern. By what strange happenstance have we come to subsume our identities under what is ultimately only an incidental and minor aspect of the staggering variety of habits, preferences, and desires that humans possess?
Understanding that a person is gay carries no more (and probably far less) of an indication of “who” that person is that understanding that he/she is an avid reader of Orwell or listener of Guns ‘n Roses. Your casual reference to ‘sexual identity’ articulates a passive and inculcated acceptance of the supposed legitimacy of this kind of identity, when ultimately it is only through the peculiarities of cultural unfolding that these ‘types of people’ have arisen. Rather than being a man who listens to GNR and reads Orwell and enjoys sex with other men, he is now understood *and understands himself* as a homosexual who reads Orwell and listens to GNR; the title of his identity might just as easily have been his literary or musical preferences.
Even if the commentary is directed toward how homosexuals orient themselves with regards to their rights to marry and this issue is put in the periphery — probably precisely because it would be unconvincing to most Americans — this does nothing to undermine the point. And if we recognize this point, then it becomes clear, to me at least, that when the metaphysical notions that have shaped the discourse concerning homosexuality begin to dissolve, so too does the foundation upon which all discriminatory justifications have been built. The choice to critically interject here, rather than at the level of identity construction, is a strategic one, that may well allow for a more developed public discourse concerning identity templating as the absorption of this ‘type’ into the norm only serves to further the propagation of these rigid and opposing ‘types of people’.
“While I take your points, in this contexts I doubt they’re very relevant.”
“When we’re talking about so-called ‘gay marriage’ . . . ‘sexual identity’ is very much the topic of discourse.”
I agree that “sexual identity is very much the topic of discourse” which is why my previous post centered around a discussion of it, and so I’m having a hard time understanding how a discussion concerning sexual identity can be both the topic of discourse and irrelevant.
If you think that the discussion should be focusing on what can or should be done given that these types exist, regardless of their genealogy, then that seems reasonable; which is why I noted that concentrating on this aspect, which takes these identities as facts of the social world, was a strategic one that would probably prove more viable. My post was directed toward your dismissive comments regarding these “extreme views” concerning sexual identity, where you implied that because most Americans wouldn’t be amenable to these ideas, we should table them completely.
If we understand sexual identity (not necessarily at all sexual preference) as a social phenomenon, then this may contribute to the overall discourse about the ‘place’ for homosexuals, given that the metaphysical resources that are relied upon to discuss the ‘nature’ of homosexuality no longer apply.
I recall reading a survey from 2006 (I can’t find it but will post it when I do) that noted that less than one-third (33%) of male homosexual relationships are explicitly committed to the practice of sexual monogamy. So I would counter that monogamous (i.e. “traditional”) sexual relationships could be considered the “extreme” view within the gay community (hence the central importance of the Harvey Milk quote).
It is true that my original post was about the “pragmatic” effectiveness of pursuing different rhetorical tactics in the gay marriage fight. Thus, I am skeptical about the moralizing “human rights” tactics of liberal (in the classical sense) humanists and “progressive” religious folk insofar as I consider that particular terrain to be the long-standing home turf of the traditionalists (which is naturally to their tactical advantage). However, it seems fair to say that my “pragmatic” concerns probably betray a more fundamental concern.
What does it mean to say that “homosexuals” deserve to be given the same “rights” that “heterosexuals” currently enjoy? What does it mean for the bisexual, asexual, polysexual, transsexual, pansexual, etc.? Further, what does it mean for the individual who does not find themselves adequately represented by any of these “official” categories (myself)? Or, most crucially, what does it mean for the supremely advanced individual who resists the very possibility of type-categorization, who experiences their life as an always indeterminate becoming?
Is one instead required to accept unquestioningly the ready-made binary label (homosexual/heterosexual) authoritatively given by an “expert(s)”? Or, even more perversely, is one required to laboriously question themselves to eventually arrive at some deep, essential and irrevocable sexual truth about oneself? And further, if that “truth” does not conform to the binary (due to the person’s ability to think critically beyond what’s given) does one have to then create a term for that particular “type” of person, then find voluminous “scientific” evidence that supports the “legitimate” ontology of such a type, and then plead humbly for the “right” to be treated equally on this exhaustively defined basis?
An entertaining double standard:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/8376937.stm
An ally:
http://againstequality.org/