Since we at the Florida Student Philosophy Blog have recently returned to class, we thought you should too. We would like to thank all those who submitted, and we hope that you find the current selection as engaging as we did. Courses (or posts if you prefer) are organized by major subject, so go straight to your specialty or feel free to survey the catalog.
On Analytic v. Continental Philosophy
Instructor: Gualtiero Piccinini (Brains)
Course Description: In this class Piccinini demonstrates that the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy is still an important one. The difference may not be a pronounced as history has made it out to be, but it is still useful for philosophy to note the dissimilarities (even if many philosophers today do not clearly fall into either camp).
METAPHYSICS & EPISTEMOLOGY
Stop Your Quining!!!
Instructor: Richard Brown (Philosophy Sucks!)
Course Description: Was Quine’s dismissal of the analytic/synthetic distinction correct? In this course Richard Brown seeks to defend the distinction and does so with a comedic twist.
Knowability and Dialetheism
Instructor: Aidan McGlynn (The Boundaries of Language)
Course Description: In a previously published article, it is claimed that an omniscient being would necessarily be a dialetheist, that is one who believes that there are true contradictions. In his course, Professor McGlynn shows how one could come to this conclusion but why ultimately he does not accept it.
Knowledge and Evidence, contra Williamson
Instructor: Trent Dougherty (This is the Name of This Blog)
Course Description: This class will show the complex relationship between knowledge and evidence. Dougherty takes and externalist approach to knowledge in this post and also draws an interesting distinction between our common use for evidence and what our analysis of it ought to be.
The Illusion of Superficially Contingent a priori Knowledge
Instructor: Nate Charlow (Go Grue!)
Course Description: This course will focus on Hawthorne’s “Deeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge.” Particular attention will be paid to analyzing Evans’ Julius case as a paradigm example of superficially contingent a priori knowledge.
Pure Math, Applied Math, and A Priori Truths
Instructor: Jacob Wintersmith (Winter’s Haven)
Course Description: It is sometimes thought that a rational proof is enough to justify a scientific theory. However, by examining the theory of general relativity as an example, you will learn that a mix of rationalism and empiricism may be the best way to prove a scientific theory.
There Are Two Books On My Desk
Instructor: Tanasije Gjorgoski (A Brood Comb)
Course Description: Is the fact that there are two books on Professor Gjorgoski’s desk an objective truth? This course examines how one can come to know (in the strict sense) about the existence of things. Considering that trying to solve this problem totally in terms of physics would be nearly impossible, Gjorgoski gives a phenomenological account in support of his belief.
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND / PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Three Reasons to Mistrust Reports about Ongoing Conscious Experience
Instructor: Eric Schwitzgebel (The Splintered Mind)
Course Description: Most people are quite confident about their ability to accurately introspect. They believe they can correctly determine and report their ongoing or recent conscious experience. This course presents three reasons to mistrust reports about ongoing conscious experience.
Haslanger and Refereeing Procedures
Instructor: Jender (Feminist Philosophers)
Course Description: Can unconscious gender schemas work to disfavor women philosophers? Do the schemas for ‘philosopher’ and ‘woman’ clash? Might journal editors and referees, who may have conscious egalitarian beliefs, be unconsciously biased against the submissions of female philosophers? Drawing upon work by Virginia Valian and Sally Haslanger, which suggest that unconscious schemas may disfavor professional women and women philosophers, this course inspects the procedure of anonymous refereeing and editing in philosophy journals.
ETHICS / ACTION THEORY / MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Midwest Studies in Philosophy: “Philosophy and the Empirical”
Instructor: Eddy Nahmias (The Garden of Forking Paths, cross-listed at Experimental Philosophy)
Course Description: This course will engage a number of new surveys on Free Will and Moral Responsibility with an emphasis on the claim that “Determinism is not intuitively threatening to FW and MR…”
HISTORY OF PHILOSOHPY
What is the importance of the Phenomenology of Spirit’s Preface?
Instructor: Thom Brooks (The Brooks Blog)
Course Description: This course will focus on the significance of the preface of Hegel’s Phenomenology in light of Yirmiyahu Yovel’s new translation and commentary.
Reid’s ‘Same Shop’ Argument
Instructor: Avery Archer (The Space of Reasons)
Course Description: In this course, students will gain an insightful and detailed analysis of Reid’s argument concerning our belief in the external world. Reid argues that we can not help but believe in the external world, this belief was given to us by nature. His reasons to doubt it’s existence come from the same place as his reasons to believe. If he (Reid) wrongly believes, it is not his fault. Professor Archer’s argument is best left to his words, “since no cognitive faculty is in anyway privileged above the others, they all stand or fall together.”
Berkeley and Merleau-Pontey
Instructor: Bryan Norwood (Movement of Existence)
Course Description: We recommend this course be taken synchronously with PHH3600. In this course Norwood seek to illuminate the interesting distinctions that can be drawn between Berkeley’s ontology and Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of phenomena.
A General Sketch of Berkeley’s Program
Instructor: John DePoe (Fides Quarens Intellectum)
Course Description: Based on readings from Berkeley’s Dialogues and Principles Concerning Human Understanding this course will attempt to outline and engage Berkeley’s “master argument.”
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
The Moving Light of Time
Instructor: TBA (Daylight Atheism)
Course Description: This course aims to show why we should reject the common notion of time. We begin by posing some problems that arise when one thinks of time as “flowing” and move into some of Einstein’s issues with simultaneity. By the end of this course you may find that our sences are not as reliable as they seem to be.
If you missed the first colloquium of the fall term — Manuel Vargas discussing issues in action theory and issues in Latin American philosophy — you can catch it here.