… a review and discussion of Searle’s new book is available at the GFP, as is an interesting discussion of Searle’s claim that “we cannot escape the presupposition of freewill.”
– Rico Vitz
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March 7, 2007 by Rico Vitz
… a review and discussion of Searle’s new book is available at the GFP, as is an interesting discussion of Searle’s claim that “we cannot escape the presupposition of freewill.”
– Rico Vitz
On page 41 of Searle’s Freedom and Neurobiology could someone clarify something for me. Second paragraph ‘that there is a striking difference between the passive character of perceptual consciousness and the active character of what we might call “volitional consciousness” is he saying that the active character of perceptual consciousness is called volitional or that the difference between the passive character of perceptual consciousness and active perceptual consciousness IS a state called Volitiional?
It is just that the absence of perceptual consciousness in the active statement part is curious enough to cast a cloud of misunderstanding over that paragraph.
Can you clarify it for me?
Regards, John
I also question his statement about the passivity of ‘passive perceptual consciousness’. Looking at a skyline or river or another natural phenomena is hardly passive. Intentionality is present and that to me suggests an active role even if it might be somewhat psychological. The brain would have causal reason to change states and other physiological movements would occur, ie looking, smelling, hearing. Are these not ‘active’ or volitional aside from the psychological?