Excellent news: Michael Rea (Notre Dame) and Laurie Paul (UNC-Chapel Hill) have accepted our invitations to be the plenary speakers for the 14th annual Northeast Florida Student Philosophy Conference. The conference will take place October 9, 2010.

Get your papers ready. The CFP will be out in the spring.

You and your friend are in Lolitaville in search of Vladimir Nabokov’s recently released and incomplete novel, The Original of Laura, and happen upon two bookstores: R and L. You know without a doubt that the sole copy of Laura in Lolitaville is in one (but only one) of the two bookstores, but are unsure which exactly. You also know that whichever bookstore you enter, your friend will enter the other; which is problematic, because you really want to read the book before s/he does.

Now let us presume the population of Lolitaville consists of exactly two types of people: inveterate liars and uncompromising truthtellers, both of which are utterly indistinguishable from each other. All you know is that liars must lie and truthtellers must tell the truth. Let us further presume that each and every inhabitant- whether liar or truthteller- knows exactly which bookstore has Laura for sale. Now, you must ask a question and time permits you to ask one and only one to one and only one inhabitant. To complicate matters, the question must be polar (i.e. answered by either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’).

Alas! the question: Given the above conditions, what question would you ask in order to know, without a doubt, which bookstore you ought to enter?

P.S. For those with whom I have before discussed this, I challenge you to find another answer besides the one expected above.

Congratulations to the members of UNF’s Ethics Bowl team (Andrew Brenner, Brock Moore, Edgar Aroutiounian, Ted Locke, and Aaron Kenna) who advanced from the Southeast Regional competition this weekend to the national Ethics Bowl, which will take place in Cincinnati in March 2010.

Congratulations, as well, to USF-St. Petersburg, the U.S. Naval Academy, the University of Alabama-Birmingham, UCF, and (especially) to the regional winner, Eckerd College, with whom UNF advanced.

14TH ANNUAL PACIFIC UNIVERSITY

UNDERGRADUATE PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE

April 16-17, 2010

Pacific University, Forest Grove, Oregon, USA

Keynote speaker: Alvin Plantinga (Notre Dame)

The 14th annual Pacific University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference will
be held April 16-17, 2010 on the campus of Pacific University, in Forest Grove, Oregon. The purpose of this conference is to provide a forum for the presentation of philosophical work of undergraduates to their peers. Papers are required to be of philosophical content, but there are no specific restrictions on subject matter within the arena of philosophical discussion itself. Papers should be approximately 3000 words (10-12 pages). Electronic submissions, including paper and abstract (Word documents), should be sent to boersema@pacificu.edu.

Submission deadline is FEBRUARY 1.

Final decisions will be made by February 28. Volunteers for paper commentators are also welcome.

This is strictly an undergraduate conference, with only undergraduates allowed on the conference program. The single exception is the keynote speaker. Past keynotes speakers have included: Paul Churchland, Hilary Putnam, John Searle, Keith Lehrer, Catherine Elgin, John Perry, Hubert Dreyfus, and Jerry Fodor. This year’s keynote talk following the conference banquet will be by Alvin Plantinga (University of Notre Dame).

The conference schedule will be as follows:

Friday, April 16:

Registration 4:00-6:00 pm
Conference banquet 6:00-7:30 pm
Keynote talk 7:30-9:00 pm

Saturday, April 17:

Breakfast 7:00-8:00 am
Registration 8:00-9:00 am
Paper sessions 8:00-1:00
Conference luncheon 1:00-2:00
Paper sessions 2:00-6:00

Travel and lodging information can be found by going to the conference web site.

Registration costs: $40, payable at the conference. Three meals will be
provided: Friday night banquet, Saturday breakfast and lunch.

For further information, contact Professor Boersema via email or by phone (503 352 2150) or at the address below:

Department of Philosophy
Pacific University
2043 College Way
Forest Grove
OR 97116

Gene Witmer, Chair of the Department at the University of Florida, offers the following update on their graduate program. (HT: Leiter Reports)

In May 2008, the severe budget crisis at the University of Florida resulted in an initial decision on the part of the upper administration to eliminate a number of doctoral programs, including the Ph.D. in philosophy. The Department of Philosophy at UF is quite grateful for the ensuing outcry against this decision, as it helped motivate the administration to reconsider its decision and opt for a temporary suspension of admissions instead. As a result of these events, however, there is now, apparently, a fair amount of confusion and misinformation abroad about the status of the graduate program at UF. This note is meant to clarify matters, especially for potential new graduate students.

 

The upshot of the budget reductions in the spring and summer of 2008 was that admissions to the Ph.D. portion of the graduate program were temporarily suspended. The graduate program is, however, divided into an initial M.A. portion, meant to be completed in two years, and a later Ph.D. portion. **Admissions to the M.A. portion have not been suspended**, and admissions to the Ph.D. portion are expected to resume in the fall of 2012.

As things now stand, the department plans to admit and support financially a new class of graduate students seeking the M.A. starting in the fall of 2010. Students who begin the program at that time will be in a position to complete the M.A. in two years and apply to continue into the Ph.D. We are confident that the temporary suspension of admission to the Ph.D. will end at that time, thus allowing students admitted in 2010 to make a smooth transition to Ph.D. level graduate work. The department is committed to bringing our M.A. students to the completion of their degrees and helping them prepare for advancement to the Ph.D. program.

While the events of spring 2008 were disruptive, and college budgets everywhere are very tight, the situation for philosophy at the University of Florida is starting to improve. A new Dean at the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences has demonstrated a firm and consistent support for the Department and has made clear his commitment to rebuilding the program. The Department is in fact hiring this year, despite the severe strains on academic budgets; the advertisement for a tenure-track position in ethics will appear in the November issue of the JFP.

The budget reductions effected in 2008 stipulate that after the three-year suspension of admissions the College may request that admissions be reopened. The Department has every reason to believe that admissions will at that time resume.

Congratulations to Andrew Brenner whose “‘Of Miracles’ — What, Precisely, Was Hume’s Point?” was featured in the most recent edition of the Philosophers’ Carnival.

Belated congratulations to Aaron Kenna whose “A Note on the Semantics of First-Degree Entailment” was featured in the previous edition.

Simon Blackburn responds to the query sent to academics by the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). The query was part of BIS’s review of postgraduate education provision in the UK.

Submitted for your consideration, a hastily written polemic. I would like to see what others think of this situation.
David Hume begins Part X of his “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,” the famous “Of Miracles,”by noting, and showing his approval of, an argument against transubstantiation propounded by Dr.Tillotson. Hume writes:

“Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane” (Hume 1974: 387)

Was Hume’s argument a success? Well, that depends: which argument? There has been perhaps as much contention and debate surrounding the correct interpretation of Hume’s “Of Miracles” as there has been of its merit or lack thereof. One of the main interpretive controversies: is Hume’s argument a priori, ruling out in principle the evidential identification of miracles, or a posteriori, simply maintaining the thesis that in fact no miracle reports enjoy strong evidential support (for an example of the former view see Earman 2000; for an example of the latter view see Fogelin 2003). Which, if either, of these views is correct?

My thesis: both these views are correct. There is so much confusion on the topic simply because Hume contradicts himself. Is this reading of Hume uncharitable? Consider:

“But in order to increase the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvelous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist.
A miracle is a violation of a law of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined” (Hume 1974: 391)

What is Hume saying here? In the first part of the quote he seems to concede that, in principle anyway, testimony to the occurrence of a miracle could amount to a proof (note that, for Hume, the term “proof” simply denotes “such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition” — Hume would never say that the epistemic probability of the occurrence of some matter of fact, as opposed to some logical or mathematical demonstration, was strictly 1), but that this proof would encounter an opposite proof, also deriving from our experience, of the hitherto observed course of nature (dead men don’t rise, etc.). But then Hume moves on to say that this opposite proof, derived from the “firm and unalterable experience” of the conformity of the world to some law of nature, is “as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.” The proponent of some miraculous event will have to maintain then that the evidence for the occurrence of some miraculous event surpasses the opposite proof from our past observations of the course of nature – which, I reiterate, is supposed to be “as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.” But how, if this kind of evidence can be marshaled for a purportedly miraculous event, can this event retain the appellation “miracle”? By definition the evidence against the occurrence of any miraculous event is as strong as can be imagined.

This a priori reading of the text follows fairly naturally from many parts of “Of Miracles” (“This may, indeed, be the majority view” – Fogelin 2003: 34). Unfortunately, other parts of Hume’s essay are not amenable at all to this reading of the argument. Take, for example, the following, from Part II of “Of Miracles”:

“In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that the testimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy. But it is easy to show, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence” (Hume 1974: 393)

“Upon the whole, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavor to establish” (Hume 1974: 401)

These quotes seem a bit more reserved than the one I cited earlier. In fact, they seem to have dropped the a priori nature of the argument entirely, retreating to the simple claim that in fact no miracles have been supported by such testimony as to render them probable (that the several alleged miracles Hume examines are all straw men shouldn’t be too surprising – after all, how could Hume, in a mere 17 or so pages, argue that no miracles have ever been well attested to by the evidence?) Regarding the second quote, Earman notes that editions of Hume’s Enquiry published prior to 1768 read that “no Testimony for any kind of miracle can ever possibly amount to a Probability, much less to a Proof” (Earman 2000: 45; emphasis added). Note the change from “can ever possibly amount to a probability” to the more reserved “has ever amounted to a probability.” This change is just, I suppose, more obfuscation on Hume’s part. Indeed, Hume can’t seem to stick to a single thesis. Soon after the second quote above Hume writes:

“When, therefore, these two kinds of experience [that testifying to the general reliability of human testimony and that testifying to the laws of nature] are contrary, we have nothing to do but subtract, the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the principle here explained, this subtraction, with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion” (Hume 1974: 401)

“No human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion” (emphasis added). The a priori reading of Hume’s argument is back in full swing. Yet, later in Part II, Hume proceeds to describe a scenario in which we would in fact be justified in accepting, on the basis of testimony, the occurrence of a miraculous event (the eight days of worldwide darkness). We’re back at the a posteriori reading of Hume.

Has Hume contradicted himself? Very probably. At any rate I should expect more clarity from such a celebrated philosopher and such an oft cited essay.

Works Cited
Earman, John. Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000. Print.
Fogelin, Robert J. A Defense of Hume on Miracles. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003. Print.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. The Empiricists. Anchor Books, 1974. Print.

Congratulations to FSPB contributor Andrew Brenner (UNF) for winning the FPA’s Award for Outstanding Undergraduate Philosophy Paper! Andrew will present his paper — “Aquinas on Eternity, Tense, and Temporal Becoming” — on Friday, November 13th at 5:00 P.M. at the FPA’s second plenary session.

I came across this website just recently and thought it was worth sharing with any community of thoughtful people.

www.ted.com is a collection of brief lectures (between 5 and 10 minutes) on topics ranging from environmentally friendly construction to evolution. Each themed section presents a pretty eclectic selection of presenters, like this section on ‘How the Mind Works’, which contains lectures from Daniel Dennet, Stephen Pinker, Philip Zimbardo, and even the current first lady. Though the lectures may be short and simple, they do provide a certain kind of intellectual entertainment that isn’t always easy to find. Enjoy!

Congratulations to FSPB contributor Jen Zamzow (Arizona) on the publication of her article, “Variations in Ethical Intuitions,” in Philosophical Issues! Here is the abstract:

Philosophical theorizing is often, either tacitly or explicitly, guided by intuitions about cases. However, recent empirical work has suggested that philosophically significant intuitions are variable and unstable in a number of ways. This variability of intuitions has led naturalistically inclined philosophers to disparage the practice of relying on intuitions for doing philosophy in general and for doing moral philosophy in particular. In this paper, we introduce into the debate some neglected naturalistic reasons to be optimistic about intuitions, focusing especially on ethical intuitions. Philosophers of science have long celebrated the importance of diversity for scientific progress. Similarly, we argue, we should celebrate the diversity in ethical intuitions. In science, diversity leads to greater recognition of errors and background assumptions; something similar is likely true for ethical theory. In addition, we argue that there is a natural psychological explanation for why diversity would lead to improved reasoning in individual scientists – disequilibrium and motivated reasoning stimulate sharper criticism and evaluation. The cognitive virtues afforded by disequilibrium and motivated reasoning would also extend to reasoning in the ethical domain. Thus, there are good reasons for moral theorists to welcome the variations in ethical intuitions.

On Saturday, November 7th, the Second Annual Pediatric Bioethics Conference will take place at UNF. The conference is free for students. Here is the announcement:

The UNF Blue Cross, Blue Shield of Florida Center for Ethics, Public Policy and the Professions in conjunction with The Florida Bioethics Network and Wolfson Children’s Hospital present the Second Annual Pediatric Bioethics Conference. The conference will take place 7:30 a.m. – 4 p.m. on Saturday, Nov. 7th at the UNF University Center. This conference will include sessions on understanding issues in pediatric bioethics, understanding the concept of “futility” and the challenges of transitioning from pediatric to adult care. The conference is free to all students and breakfast and lunch will be provided. For further information, please contact the Ethics Center at 620-1330.

ALL students and Philosophy and Religious Studies faculty and staff are invited to this conference FREE of charge. Everyone attending is required to fill out a registration form. Please visit www.miami.edu/ethics/fbn for a printable registration form. Please indicate that your admission will be FREE. For more information, contact the Florida Bioethics Network at 305-243-56723 or email a.sun@unf.edu

In the event that information about this Post Doc didn’t make it into the most recent Jobs for Philosophers, here it is:

General Information on the Killam Postdoctoral Fellowships

Izaak Walton Killam Postdoctoral Fellowships are awarded annually at Dalhousie University to recently graduated scholars of superior academic research ability in any discipline. Awards are tenable for two years and include travel costs, a research grant, and a conference travel allowance.

Application Deadline

The deadline for receipt of completed applications and all supporting documents in the Department is December 15th. (Please allow sufficient time for delivery.) In years where the 15th falls during the weekend, the deadline will be the following Monday.

All application documents must be forwarded to:

Killam Postdoctoral Fellowship Committee
c/o the Chair of the Department to which the candidate is applying
Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
Canada, B3H 4H6

More information is available here.

Dialetheists, notably Graham Priest and, apparently, Walt Whitman, contend we may, under certain circumstances, ascribe truth to contradictions. A dialetheia is by definition a proposition, p, that when conjoined to its negation, ~p, produces a true evaluation, such that (p & ~p) is true. Dialetheism, then, rejects the so-called law of non-contradiction. An impetus for this controversial position lies in the desire to incorporate extended liar sentences within a natural semantic framework. By including extended liars, a unified and coherent, albeit contradictory, structure may be established, which for Priest is an advantage, since a meta-language need not be introduced; to the contrary, the current object-language need only be semantically reflexive. In short, rather than, for instance, resolving liar paradoxes with a consistent meta-theoretical treatment and say they are neither true nor false, and deal with the difficulties that follow therefrom, one may permit within the object-language predicates of the form, ‘both true and false’ and, further, ‘neither true nor false’. Thus, its proponents argue dialetheism allows for a seemingly more natural, non-adhoc, solution to liar paradoxes. In fact, a principal criticism by Priest of consistent meta-language treatments of liars is that they [meta-languages] are unable to express what is quite obviously expressible.

There are, however, difficulties; many in fact, though one in particular, the peculiar truth condition of the negation, is especially problematic. Consider the following. In classical logic, each propositional parameter {p, q, etc.} is given a standard truth-value, either true (1) or false (0)- never neither, never both- and assigned an evaluation, which may be represented as ‘v’. The logical operators are functions on inputs (formulae), which when properly applied return appropriate outputs (evaluations). For instance, the negation operates in the following way:

v(~p) = 1 iff v(p) = 0, and, v(p) = 1 iff v(~p) = 0.

The use of the classical negation converts a false evaluation into a true evaluation, and back again upon subsequent applications. Therefore, if some formula of the type (~p & p) were true, then ~p would be true and not true at the same time and in the same manner, which is impossible, but would nevertheless lead dialetheism into trivialism. To avoid this criticism, a dialetheist may interpret (~p & p) as false and true, respectively, rather than not true and true. In fact, in first-degree entailment (FDE) [a dialetheic logic] a false evaluation is distinguished from a not true evaluation. To make such a distinction, an evaluation in FDE is a relation between formulae and truth-values instead of a function, like above. For instance, if some formula relates to false (0), it may not be not true, that is, it may also relate to true (1) [a purported case would be a liar sentence: ‘This sentence is false’]. Hence, the criticism is not at all definitive for it conflates a ‘not true’ interpretation with a ‘false’ interpretation, precisely what FDE does not do. (Historical note: Priest contends equating ‘not true’ with ‘false’ is a relatively recent result of modern logic, thanks to Frege and Russell & Whitehead.) Furthermore, Priest remarks, the criticism begs-the-question because the matter at hand is precisely whether true contradictions may obtain, therefore one may not say true contradictions do not obtain because they are impossible.

Whether the criticism from negation begs-the-question or not, it is not at all clear dialetheism entirely avoids the criticism. (Or, as I see it, the essential feature of the criticism.) In fact, the criticism, to the point, is that dialetheism, in order to construct a coherent semantics, must employ the classical negation; namely, it must use precisely that which it has rejected. To bring this out more fully, let us begin anew.

Isabel is a dialetheist; Anele is not. Isabel makes the following statement: Brisbane is the federal capitol of Australia (B). Anele thinks Isabel is wrong, and asserts ~B. However, as Anele is well aware, Isabel is a dialetheist, and may thus hold (B & ~B) to be a dialetheia. In other words, Isabel may hold: v(B & ~B) = 1, and, v(B & ~B) = 0. If, as is most probable, (B & ~B) were not a dialetheia, how may Isabel express as much to Anele? She could assert ~(B & ~B), translated, it is not the case that (B & ~B) is a dialetheia. However, how is Anele to be sure that Isabel does not hold ~(B & ~B) & (B & ~B) to be a dialetheia? Isabel, again, could assert, ~[~(B & ~B) & (B & ~B)]. This, though, will not do. For how is Anele to be sure Isabel does not hold ~[~(B & ~B) & (B & ~B)] & [~(B & ~B) & (B & ~B)] to be a dialetheia, and so on ad infinitum.

A dialetheist must for obvious reasons bring this regress to an end, and it is at this point we again encounter the distinction Priest would like to make between denying a proposition and asserting the negation of a proposition, that is, a proposition being ‘false’ and ‘not true’, respectively. We see this distinction in the semantics of FDE, where formulae are related to: True and false (b), neither true nor false (n), true and not false (1), or false and not true (0). In denying a formula, B, one claims B relates to (0) but may also relate B to (1), so in denying the truth of B, one could be asserting B is both true and false. Similarly, in negating B, though it does not relate to (1), it need not also relate to (0), hence B may be neither true nor false; so, to negate B is not deny B. The semantics are thus far easy enough. However, a dialetheist is at pains to assert B is true and not also false (likewise for ‘B is false and not also true’). For it is at least consistent with dialetheism that B may, per above, be true and false (or neither true nor false). It is not enough for a dialetheist to assert B is true only because it is true and only true; such a move would beg-the-question. Rather, the dialetheist must employ some consistent negation that excludes a true interpretation from one that is false, or else s/he would be unable to construct a coherent semantics; what is more troubling, dialetheism would result in trivialism. On the other hand, if a dialetheist were to employ a consistent negation, then the entire dialetheist program would fastly become suspect.

P.S. I never did like Whitman.

[ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: MOVING TO THE FRONT (FROM AUGUST 15)]

Epistemic agents claim to know that-P within a context of competing alternative propositions, {A1, A2… An}, all of which would be as equally consistent with the facts as P, but necessarily exclude P, such that:

If some one member of {A1, A2… An} were true, then that-P would be false.

Thus, in order for S to know that-P, s/he must also know that not-{A1, A2… An}, which means S must be able to exclude {A1, A2… An}. If S cannot, then let us say S’s belief that-P is not knowledge. This is called the Underdetermination Principle (UP). Now, as noted above, vis-à-vis P there exist many alternatives. Indeed, in a manner of speaking, there exist an infinitude of logically possible alternatives to P; some of which- perhaps many- are unable to be excluded by S, e.g. dream-state and brain-in-the-vat arguments. If S cannot exclude all the possible alternatives to that-P, then how can s/he claim to know that-P? Quite simply, the skeptic says S cannot, and in the chance that S does possess a true belief, s/he does so merely accidentally. However, one proposed solution to this difficulty, and one that has become rather popular, is the relevant alternative theory of knowledge (RT). RT has it that epistemic agents need only exclude the relevant alternatives to that-P, and not every logically possible alternative, in order to claim properly to know that-P. To see it in action, consider the following.

A bird alights atop a branch relatively close to S’s position. To facilitate the argument, let us presume the following: (i) The environment within which S operates is optimal for visual perception, and, (ii) S is a shrewd field ornithologist. Thus, from the above, S justifiably believes the bird before her/him is a cardinal (C). However, someone may have painted a robin to appear as a cardinal (PR), which if were the case, S would be unable to differentiate C from PR.

RT purports that in one context (1) S does know C. That is to say, S is able to discriminate cardinals from bluebirds, Scarlet Tanagers, finches, robins, and like birds, and thus s/he may and can exclude those alternatives. What is more, within (1) PR is not a relevant alternative with which S need concern her/himself. If a skeptic insists otherwise, S need only respond that all s/he means by “know” is that s/he can accurately distinguish between contrary visual perceptions; nothing more, nothing less. So, in (1), deductive closure upholds (CP), as we see:

S knows that C
S knows that C logically entails not a bluebird, Scarlet Tanager, finch, robin, and like birds.
Therefore, S knows that not a bluebird, Scarlet Tanager, finch, robin, and like birds.

In another context (2), which is concurrent with (1), PR is a relevant alternative, and the truth of C entails its falsity. However, S does not know that not-PR; hence, S does not know C is true relative to not-PR. In this instance, (CP) is invalid, as may be observed:

S knows that-C
S knows that-C logically entails not-PR
However, S does not know that not-PR

We see that (CP) fails and thus leads to skepticism about contingent propositions. So, in order to prevent skepticism, many proponents of RT reject (CP). Implicit in the rejection of (CP) by most adherents of RT is the assumption that in order for one to know that-P, one must have evidence for that-P. Thus, if S does not have evidence that not-PR, then S may not properly claim to know that not-PR. But as we have seen from (1) all an agent need do in order to properly claim to know that-P is to eliminate all relevant alternatives within a specified context; and there seems to exist contexts in which PR is not a relevant alternative; similarly, there seem to be contexts wherein PR is a relevant alternative. In this way Dretske may implore us ‘to think of knowledge as an evidential state in which all relevant alternatives (to what is known) are eliminated’ (1981). Thus, from this, we may conclude that when the epistemic context changes, what is meant by the verb ‘to know’ also changes. If we so conclude, then we may in many circumstances avoid skepticism.

What are relevant alternatives? In brief, they are logically possible alternatives that are not irrelevant (I presume here irrelevant to be synonymous with not-relevant). Recollect that an alternative to that-P is some proposition that describes a state of affairs consistent with the given data, and if true, necessitates that not-P. Recall further that for that-P there exist some infinite set of logically possible alternative propositions {A1, A2… An}. Hence, a relevant alternative is a member of the set of all non-irrelevant alternatives {R1, R2… Rn}. Nevertheless, a skeptic may yet agree and insist that all logically possible alternatives are relevant. So, a further definition is required.

Alvin Goldman (1976) provides a useful delineation between irrelevant and relevant alternatives, ‘idle’ and ’serious’, respectively. An alternative, R1, is relevant if S has good reason to think R1 obtains. Accordingly, an alternative, IR1, is irrelevant if S does not have good reason to think IR1 obtains. Dretske (1970) himself seems to provide a similar definition in ‘Epistemic Operators’ when he says, ‘A relevant alternative is an alternative that might have been realized in the existing circumstances if the actual state of affairs had not materialized.’ A further reading of Dretske indicates that what he means by ‘might’ is that some alternative state of affairs is nomologically possible, that is, consistent with the physical laws of nature:

‘[T]he difference between a relevant and an irrelevant alternative resides not in what we happen to regard as a real possibility (whether reasonably or not), but in the kind of possibilities that actually exist in the objective situation. Whether or not [a] bird-watcher knows that the bird he sees is a Gadwall depends on whether or not, in some objective sense, it could be a look-alike grebe (or any other similar looking creature)’ [emphasis added].

The definitions proffered by Goldman and Dretske are lacking and too permissive, respectively, although I am partial to their motivations. For I too think something is amiss with the skeptical concern, and in particular with the UP and its employment by skeptics. However, at the same time, if S claims to know that-P, then S must be able to eliminate the alternatives that serve as legitimate blocks to knowledge of that-P. Thus, RT possesses a very strong intuitive appeal, and I think is in principle correct. It certainly explains very well why, for instance, before claiming to know that Christ with the Adulteress is an authentic Vermeer, an art collector must first exclude the possibility that it is a clever forgery of Han van Meegeren. For Van Meegeren was a skilled forger who possessed a predilection for the works of Vermeer, was known to have forged Vermeer’s works before, and had access to many of the necessary conduits through which forgers peddled their works, not to mention a distinctive stroke that varied from Vermeer’s only subtly. Indeed, it seems (even before a clear definition has been formulated) RT explains quite well why a collector would be epistemically irresponsible if s/he did not first exclude the van Meegeren possibility, but not irresponsible if s/he failed to exclude the possibility that aliens from Alpha Centauri re-created the work and passed it off, via their secret liaison on Earth, as Vermeer’s.

Dretske’s definition seems to allow for the alien-alternative in the Vermeer case, which, for me, is too permissive. I suggest that an outline of a definition is here appropriate. Goldman’s definition, I think, serves as the most useful. Although, it is incomplete insofar as it does not address the problem of missing evidence; in other words, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the exclusion of some relevant alternative (although I think this criticism is itself too demanding, and in the end, I agree with Goldman almost entirely). Nevertheless, that problem may be set aside and addressed at a later time. At this time, however, I shall note two conceptual points from which I will draw a practical implication.

(i) For an alternative to be relevant it must be eliminable, both theoretically and practically. For the epistemic significance of an alternative is its manner of elimination; which is to say, if A requires S to empirically eliminate {A1, A2, A3} before being able to know that-P, S must possess the empirical means necessary to eliminate {A1, A2, A3}. If {A1, A2, A3} were so designed so as to make them uneliminable, S need not worry her/himself over the set. For example, if A claims S must first ensure that an invisible, inaudible, odorless, insipid, intangible, utterly imperceptible person was not in the room before s/he can properly know that s/he was alone, then how is S to address such an alternative? Furthermore, why should S concern her/himself over this logical possibility when it possesses no empirical import?

(i) should prove useful in setting aside the most pernicious skeptical arguments, namely the Cartesian evil-demon / perpetual dream-state argument, and the more fashionable brain-in-the-vat argument. If the skeptic wishes to participate in the epistemic debate, s/he must be prepared to do so fairly. In fact, when a skeptic poses an alternative to that-P, s/he ex hypothesi either sets forth the means by which it is to be eliminated, or eliminates it her/himself by not so doing.

(ii) It appears that if S wishes to claim to know that-P, s/he must first eliminate that not-P. The skeptic makes this point obvious and often, and we saw how it plays into (CP) failure. Therefore, even if a skeptic accepts the constraints of (i) s/he may still contend S does not know that-P because S does not know that not-P (this is due in large part to the potential for the infinitude of {R1, R2… Rn}, which I shall address next). The skeptic, however, is again, at best, being imprecise, or, at worst, dubious. To the former, if the skeptic selects a member of {R1, R2… Rn}, say, R2, and proposes that it blocks S’s knowledge of that-P, s/he may be asserting that S has good reason to suspect R2 may be true. However, at this point, the onus is now upon the skeptic to make precise what s/he means by “may… be true.” For I assert the skeptic, in postulating {R1, R2… Rn}, must do so within a framework of evidential merit. Which is to say, if the skeptic would like S to consider R2 as a potential defeater to knowing that-P, then s/he must have inferred the probability of R2 being true from some set of evidence. In brief, it is not enough for the skeptic to merely require S to have to eliminate that not-P, but rather, must offer legitimate evidential concerns to S knowing that-P. To put the matter another way, S asserts that-P and the skeptic asserts that-possibly-R2: it is incumbent upon both to provide good evidential reasons why either should be seriously considered.

(iii) The most alarming aspect of and the primary force behind UP is the (potential) infinite set of {R1, R2… Rn}. (Since {A1, A2… An} may be infinite, and {R1, R2… Rn} is a proper part of {A1, A2… An}, it seems entirely feasible that {R1, R2… Rn} may also be infinite.) Fortunately, (i) and (ii) in conjunction with one another ameliorate this concern. In brief, S need not concern her/himself with an infinite set of relevant alternatives. Rather, s/he need only concern her/himself with the set of relevant alternatives that possess good evidential reasons for their truth [I think this follows from (ii)].

To conclude, an alternative R is relevant iff R is theoretically and practically eliminable and some set of evidence warrants S in thinking R true. (I leave the question of the nature of the evidence in question for a later date.) From this, the following may be formulated: In any epistemic context, S may claim to know that-P if a belief in that-P was arrived at by reliable means inferred from reliable evidence, notwithstanding contrary alternatives that may be imagined, until further evidence justifies S in believing that not-P. But this requires further development for another time.

Fred Dretske, ‘Epistemic Operators’, 1970
Fred Dretske, ‘The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge’, 1981
Alvin Goldman, ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,’ 1976

The news is here. Being number 12 isn’t all that bad in this context.

For those in and around Jacksonville, the Jacksonville University Philosophy Club will host a philosophy slam — “Is Economic Growth Sustainable?” — featuring Elizabeth Porter (JU) on Tuesday, October 13, 2009 at 7:30 P.M. The slam will take place at London Bridge Pub: 100 East Adams Street, at the corner of Adams and Ocean, Downtown Jacksonville. For more information contact Erich Freiberger.

Neuroskeptic thinks not.

An interview with Elizabeth Anderson. Here’s the overview from Philosophy Talk:

Does the free market provide incentives for behavior that is problematic from a moral perspective? Or does the free market punish morally problematic behavior? Is respecting the free market itself moral, insofar as respecting the free market is also respecting individual freedom of choice?

“Do women shun philosophy because of its climate of aggressive argumentation?”

The New York Times “Idea of the Day” is here. (HT: Kevin Timpe)

[ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: The issue at hand in this post is whether people have positive rights. Please focus comments on that issue.]

The following exchange developed here. Since the issue deserves attention in and of itself, here it is, beginning with a proposed answer to the question “Should we let a cancer patient die just because s/he is poor?”

AARON: The answer is yes.

Doctors, lab technicians, nurses, health care administrators, the plethora of other health care professionals, and their productive actions all comprise “health care”. If you are suggesting that one has a right to health care, then you are suggesting the individuals above are obligated to provide said services. In other words, one’s need obligates another to act. I reject any conception of “rights” that obligate positive action.

What is more, saying one has a right to health care entails that someone is obligated to pay for the services. If you believe in such an obligation, then in essence what you are really saying is that some arbitrarily determined amount of my wealth belongs to someone other than myself. But since my wealth is the result of my productive labor, ingenuity, and efforts, which in turn results from my physical and mental activity, what you are saying is that some portion of my time and effort is not my own, rather, it belongs to some other person(s).

In brief, health care is a service provided by individuals- in kind, really no different than that provided by auto mechanics- and, as such, should be acquired via voluntary transaction(s) (like automotive repair services).

Having rambled on for long enough, I should point out that if you think individuals are morally obligated to provide and/or pay for health care services for another, then by all means, please do provide such services yourself. You are at liberty to do so. However, please do not think you may obligate me to your morality, and claim ownership over my person and property.

ANDREW: Aaron, I don’t wanna get into a big debate (I’m way too lazy for that), but am I reading you correctly? Do you really think you have no obligation to, say, save a drowning child when it would be very easy for you to do so and no one else is available to do the job? Presumably you believe in at least negative obligations imposed by someone’s personal rights (I can’t punch you or enslave, unless I have a morally overriding reason to do so), but do you believe in the positive obligation of others to ensure that these negative obligations aren’t ignored? (for example, would I have an obligation to help a woman being attacked by a mugger, or did the abolitionists have an obligation to end slavery?). Based on what you’ve written I’m not sure you can give answers to these questions that are at all plausible….

[ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: After, what seems to me, an unfortunate digression in the early comments, Aaron responds to Andrew's question here. ]

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Here, compliments of Inside Higher Ed.

For those in and around Jax tomorrow:

UNF’s Philosophy Club will host this year’s first ‘Philosophy Movie Night’ tomorrow. The feature will be “Monty Python and The Meaning of Life.” The event will take place in Building 57/1270 at 7:00 P.M. There will be free food and drinks and a philosophical discussion, led by UNF’s Mike Bailey, after the movie!

The Third Annual USF Graduate Student Conference

March 5th and 6th, 2010

Keynote Speaker: Colin McGinn (Miami)

Deadline for submission: December 15, 2009

We are accepting papers from graduate students working in any area of the philosophy of mind (broadly construed), with special consideration given to those papers focusing on issues in the metaphysics of mind as well as the relation between mind and world. Papers must be suitable for blind review and should not exceed 3000 words (20-25 minute reading time). Please send a file (pdf, doc, or docx only please) containing just the body of your paper with no identifying information and a separate file with a title, abstract, contact information, and your affiliation to: usfphilosophyconference@gmail.com

Conference venue: Tampa and the surrounding St. Petersburg/Clearwater areas provide a nice reason to extend your trip of Florida. Besides the conference, be ready to enjoy temperatures in the 70s, the beaches, and summer-like conditions in March.

This site might help introduce people to professional philosophical discussions. Your thoughts?