“I have not yet had a chance to carefully read all of Earman’s book, so, with all relevant caveats in mind, I think contemporary approaches to probability are simply incompatible with the system of probability Hume has in mind. Dorothy Coleman and L. Jonathan Cohen have both argued that Hume should be read as a Baconian about probability rather than a Pascalian.” … “The mere fact that Hume’s conception of probability differs from our common/dominant conception today generates textual difficulty, even though those difficulties are not the result of Hume being unclear.”

I’ve heard similar criticisms before, and here I’m just not currently capable of judging on the matter. It’s interesting to note however that people like Fogelin (2003), and many others writing on the topic, continue to write things like: “though mathematically naive, [Hume's position] is broadly Bayesian in character.” Unfortunately I can’t knowledgeably speculate about what’s causing all the confusion…

http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=4428

I have not yet had a chance to carefully read all of Earman’s book, so, with all relevant caveats in mind, I think contemporary approaches to probability are simply incompatible with the system of probability Hume has in mind. Dorothy Coleman and L. Jonathan Cohen have both argued that Hume should be read as a Baconian about probability rather than a Pascalian (Pascal’s probability is the one we are familiar with today, on which the scale runs from proof to disproof; that is to say, that a Probability of 0 on Pascal’s scale is equivalent to a probability of 1 in the negation, whereas Bacon’s approach was to run a scale from certainty at one end, to uncertainty at the other, in which case the lower limit of probability is maximal uncertainty, not maximal certainty in the negation.

But, this is complicated by the fact that proofs are not, for Hume, differing in probabilistic strength. That is to say, perhaps I have a stronger proof that objects always fall when dropped than I do that gold is soluble in aqua regia, but my experience of both generalizations has been without exception. Then, we cannot have a difference in probability (for Hume) since the two generalizations share the same ratio of positive to negative experiments (100% positive), instead, the measure of strength would have to come from something else, for instance, the sheer amount of experiments

We know that Hume wants a measure that can differentiate between the support that I have for a causal generalization G in a situation where I have a hundred experiences confirming G and no experienced exceptions to G as compared to a situation in which I have a hundred thousand experiences confirming G and no experienced exceptions to G.

The latter enjoys better support than the former for Hume, as we can see in Hume’s challenges to rationalistic accounts (i.e. the view that causal inference is a priori) and perceptualist accounts (i.e. the view that causation is observed in particular instances), which, he charges, have the failing of not distinguishing the degree of support given by 0 observed instances (for rationalistic accounts) or 1 observed instance (for the perceptualist accounts) from the degree of support given by a much larger body of observed instances (ECHU V.1, p. 42 in the Selby-Bigge edition, the paragraph starting “This principle is custom or habit…” – though the relevant thought experiment starts two paragraphs earlier).

Let me finally add that while I sympathize with your frustrations about the difficulty of Hume’s text, it is important to bear in mind that at least some of the difficulty we have in interpreting Hume comes from our being brought up with a single, dominant, coherent approach to probability that has been suitably formalized and studied for some time. While Earman does not take the radically different status of Probability in Hume’s day to justify additional charity in reading Hume (cf p. 25 of “Hume’s Abject Failure”) my point is different than the one Earman is contesting; if Hume was operating with a different conception of probability than the one we are trained in, that will result, through no fault of Hume’s, in a more difficult text for us to work through. This point is independent of whether or not the alternate conception of probability Hume adopts is viable. As a quick example; Hume’s argument that all knowledge devolves to probability and all probability is diminished to nothing if we iteratively consider our fallibility, seems to claim that the probabilities reduce to 0. However, this is not a skeptical result on the Pascalian system; it is the absurd result that we come to be certain of the negation of every claim. Hume’s argument, though, is clearly about diminishing certainty. The mere fact that Hume’s conception of probability differs from our common/dominant conception today generates textual difficulty, even though those difficulties are not the result of Hume being unclear.

A major problem here: If Hume intended what you say he may have intended here, then why does he (according to you) argue earlier that “It is never the case that one should believe in a miracle on the basis of testimony”? As Earman 2000 rightly points out, Hume can only maintain that no testimony is sufficient to establish the credibility of a miracle if the probability of the miracle’s occurrence, given our evidence from the general course of nature, is flatly 0. How then could there be miracles of graded strength?

Two other problems with this interpretation (these are minor points that, on further reflection, I’m not sure are correct. My most important criticism is the one in my previous paragraph):
1.The way Hume defines miracles seems to preclude graded probability strengths for them (“A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined”, also: “A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent”). Hume seems to assume that the laws of nature in question (those being violated) must be absolutely uniform in our past experience. There doesn’t seems to be any room left to grade miracles along a scale of improbability.

2.Your interpretation, with miracles of graded strength, also seems to nullify the distinction, which Hume apparently thought was important, between a miracle and a marvel. The difference between the two seems to be a difference in *type*, not simply degree.

While I think what I’ve just written implies that Hume couldn’t have meant what you say he meant, a counterexample has just come to my attention. In a 1761 letter to Hugh Blair, Hume writes: “The proof against a miracle, as it is founded on invariable experience, is of that *species* or *kind* of proof, which is full and certain when taken alone, because it implies no doubt, as is the case with all probabilities [to avoid confusion I should note that here, I believe, Hume is referring to a distinction between proofs and probabilities which is, for him, a difference of degree, not type]; but there are degrees of this species, and when a weaker proof is opposed to a stronger, it is overcome” (Hume 1969: 350). As ever on this topic Hume lacks clarity…

Cited:
Hume, David. The Letter of David Hume. Ed. J. Greig. Vol. 1. London: Oxford UP, 1969. Print.

On point (A) however, I think we can make more sense of Hume if we take his position to be this:
Testimonial evidence can (in principle) serve as good evidence of a miracle, in the sense that the receiving the testimonial evidence can count strongly in favor of believing the miracle. Hume’s argument is intended to demonstrate that any circumstance in which one has such good evidence of a miracle is also a situation in which one has evidence against the miracle that is at least as good, if not better (this is evidence arising from the miraculous nature of the event).

Consider the point you mention from Earman, that Hume’s Maxim is:

(1) One should only believe in a miracle on the basis of testimony if the testimony makes the miracle more probable than not.

(I’m not sure that’s the right way to read the maxim, but it works for this purpose.)

What premise would one need to add to that, in order to conclude that one should never believe a miracle on the basis of testimony? I suggest this one:

(2) No testimony can ever make a miracle more probable than not.

For the conclusion:
(3) It is never the case that one should believe in a miracle on the basis of testimony.

So, if Earman is right about the maxim, “Of Miracles (Part 1)” proceeds by arguing first for (2), then pointing out (1), to conclude (3).

This does leave the problem you raise about the miraculous event of the 8 days of darkness, but, I think the best way to understand this portion of the text is as transitioning into a more subtle discussion of the gradable strength of miracles (8 days of darkness would be less miraculous than the resurrection of the queen). The 8 days of darkness is less contrary to the usual course of nature than would be the falsity of the event attested by such a giant confluence of testimonial evidence; but even that degree of convergence would not suffice in the resurrection case. So the best case scenario for a miracle would be maximizing the credibility and number of witnesses, and minimizing the extent to which the miracle is contrary to nature. No doubt it would have been better for my interpretation (and for Hume, I suppose) to describe 8 days of darkness as a marvel rather than a miracle.

First, I apologize for taking so long to respond. I’m a very lazy person.

Also, this response will have to be brief (well… maybe not that brief), as I need to be somewhere soon. Therefore, I will not be able to examine your response in detail.
[For the benefit of those who don't feel like clicking on the link Mr.Powel has provided, he argues for a basically a priori reading of Hume. In other words Hume intended to rule out, in principle, the possibility of a miracle being well attested to by the evidence.]

All in all your interpretation of Hume’s argument is very plausible (it seems to be how most people interpret Hume’s argument). However, not plausible enough! Consider the following:

A. You write: “I interpret Hume’s argument in ‘Of Miracles (Part 1)’ to be an argument against the possibility of any testimony (no matter how strong) serving to justify belief in a miracle, and also establishing the condition which would need to be met for testimony to justify belief in a miracle: namely, for it to be sufficiently more contrary to one’s experience that the testimony is innaccurate than that the attested event occurred. As I read him, Hume clearly does not think that any testimonial evidence for a miracle can be stronger than the experiential evidence against it (evidence one is guaranteed to have in virtue of the event in question being a miracle).”

I think this actually supports my reading of Hume. In Part I of “Of Miracles” Hume argues, as you say, “against the possibility of any testimony… serving to justify belief in a miracle.” Why then does he also, as you say, establish “the condition which would need to be met for testimony to justify belief in a miracle?” If miracles could not *in principle* be well attested to by the evidence then what sense does it make to establish such a criterion, as Hume does in his “maxim” (nearish the end of Part I)? What Hume really seems to do is 1.Argue that, in principle, a miracle could never be well attested to by testimony, and then 2.Provide a criterion (the “maxim”) that lays out when we would be justified in believing testimony to the occurence of a miracle. In formulating the criterion Hume certainly seems to leave it as an open question whether or not the criterion could possibly be met. (Indeed, at Earman 2000 rightly points out, Hume’s famous “maxim” seems to amount to the claim that we should believe the testimony to the occurence of a miracle if the testimony renders it *more probable than not*! This hardly seems like a damning criticism of proponents of the miraculous).

B.Hume does indeed refer to the “eight days of darkness” scenario as a miraculous (as opposed to a marvelous) event. Thus Hume writes: “I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history.” He then goes on to describe the “eight days of darkness” scenario and endorse the fact that we would be justified in believing, on the basis of testimony, the occurence of that miraculous event.

-Andrew Brenner

Also, I am not entirely certain that the 8 days of darkness is intended as a miracle instead of a marvel, but I’d have to check the text to be sure.

I think Aquinas is really tough to get at. Looking forward to reading it.

In todays world that collective mind is created by TV.

The thus created TV mind now rules the human “world”, which in Truth & Reality is a virtual world completely at odds with, and destructive of, the natural world, and of human Culture with a capital C.

As depicted in the Matrix Trilogy.

And prophesied by Aldous Huxley in Brave New World.

Titty-tainment rules OK!

Where then does one find the RED PILL when every minute fraction of the dominant (collective) trance is reinforced by ALL of the usual “communications” and media, including all of what is usually called “religion”.

We are thus all working for Agent Smith–we ARE Agent Smith!

On the two topics raised in your comment:

(a) Gricean Conversational Implicature

Let’s talk of acceptance and rejection here rather than what we “mean”, to avoid sliding into muddles. Say you accept P and reject ~P (let the variables range over the appropriate items) and you utter u, performing the speech act of asserting that P. The dialetheist then performs the speech act of asserting that ~P. Via the standard Gricean story, you conclude that the dialetheist does not accept P, or else they would have violated a Gricean maxim.

P is in your belief box and it is not in the dialetheist’s belief box, and this fact has been successfully communicated, though nothing actually said by the dialetheist entails the non-acceptance of P. This much is common ground.

I don’t think your argument here is clear (it’s helped a but by the correction), but I think what’s worrying you is this (let me know if I have you wrong): The fact that the dialetheist doesn’t accept P doesn’t mean that the dialetheist rejects P; perhaps they simply have no opinion. Rejection isn’t simply not having something in your belief box; it’s stronger than that. The thought is that the dialetheist needs to do more because just asserting ~P allows that they are unsure about P, thus they might not *really* disagree with you.

This is one of the things I was alluding to in my first comment when I wrote:

“Regarding (i), there might be worries that we’d have to alter the Gricean story to accommodate the dialetheist, but there doesn’t seem to be an in principle objection to the possibility of doing so in a way that will serve dialetheic needs.”

(I cleaned up an infelicity in the above, but otherwise it’s as posted)

The thought is that disagreement is when one party accepts A and the other party rejects A. So, the standard conversational maxim would have to be altered. Perhaps the dialetheist would have to signal non-disagreement in order to avoid the presumption of disagreement in such cases and this signaling would be a requirement of the new maxim. That’s the kind of story the dialetheist will want to tell; I used to think that there could be a problem in telling this story coherently, but I’m less inclined to think so now for various reasons.

As I said in my original response: perhaps the biggest worry about using the Gricean strategy is that it doesn’t act on embedded sentences. And I think that this, as opposed to the above line of thought, is the best way to push a dialetheist on the need for the expressibility of notions like false-only.

And here the state of play seems to be as layed out in my first comment: A dialetheist can express standard notions of sole or simple falsehood using the truth predicate. However, the notions so expressed won’t behave as we might expect. If the dialetheist accepts the standard definition of falsity and also certain conditionals linking falsity to untruth then the notions of, e.g., falsehood and sole falsity collapse entirely. Priest can express the notions without collapse but even on his view there will be overlap. You reiterate the overlap point with the renewed liar example, but (i) you move from truth to sole truth without comment and (ii) it isn’t clear which problems you have in mind (there are several ways to go). Is your worry the one mentioned in my post, viz., the notion doesn’t “behave” properly or intuitively?

On the other hand, if the dialetheist wants a notion of the sole falsity of A that explodes with A, then they can get close but not all the way to the finish line (because of the Curry problem). This is another potential pressure point to push against.

I think we agree in general outline here but not in detail.

(b) Acceptance/Rejection & Assertion/Denial

I’m not sure what the argument in your comment is doing, but Priest clearly takes acceptance and rejection to be exclusive but non-exhaustive states. This seems like a reasonable position, but you question whether a dialetheist like Priest is entitled to the position. This is the “wackier thought” that I briefly mentioned in my original post.

We should note that utterances aren’t likely to be the occupants of belief boxes. So it’s probably better to say that someone performs a speech act of denial by making a particular utterance, or something in that ballpark. Still, I take your meaning to be clear: can we accept and reject the same thing at the same time, etc.? If not, why not?

Priest’s answer to charges like this is simple: he doesn’t believe that the behavior patterns associated with accepting P and rejecting P can hold simultaneously. He doesn’t think it’s possible to truly do both in the same way/time/etc. It would be like both catching and missing a bus in the literal sense. Surely this is open to Priest if we grant him that accepting some contradictions is to be distinguished from accepting all contradictions. One important question might be: does Priest’s answer here commit him to a kind of behaviorism?

Priest’s response isn’t about logical consistency, and we should be also clear about which notion of “logical incompatibility” is on offer. When we are discussing different logics with different understandings of negation, etc. it’s best to be fully explicit about which concepts we’re using or assuming.

It’s also important to note that Priest isn’t asking for special treatment here, he thinks that pretty much everyone agrees that the Fregean position on assertion/denial is wrong, once they think about it.

So I think Priest can answer the challenge you pose, as long as we’re fair to him. Although, once again I want to note that the denial/assertion strategy doesn’t act on embedded sentences, so it doesn’t solve all of the dialetheist’s problems.

On the general issues:

As mentioned in my initial comment, I sometimes think it may be possible to push a critical line like those that we’ve been discussing in a way that gets traction against a dialetheist. However, two points that Priest has made illustrate some of the difficulties nicely (other illustrations could obviously be constructed):

(i) Someone might argue that irony makes agreement impossible for similar reasons. You assert P and I say: “Yes, P.” It seems I agree, but perhaps I was being ironical. Anything I add about not having been being ironical doesn’t help, since it might just be more irony. Yet, I take it that we all agree that the existence of irony and the ability to express agreement are compatible.

(ii) Anything said by anyone is compatible with that person being a trivialist. So the classical logician, with a fully standard understanding of negation, can say nothing that magically differentiates him from the trivialist. Yet, we all seem able to communicate the fact that we are not trivialists to each other. Don’t we?

There are many potential ways to attack dialetheism; it seems to me that quite a few of them fail to get off the ground. The types of concerns we’ve been discussing look promising, but the dialetheist has more potentially plausible responses than it initially seems.

I’ve mainly been critical in my comments, but I’m probably more sympathetic to the spirit of your concerns than you may suspect. However, formulating the worries correctly takes care and a serious concern with potential responses.

Jared

I apologize for my belated reply. Granting I was remiss in regards to (1) – (6), I would like to address a two concerns, (a) Gricean implicature and (b) the claim that the distinction between denial and assertion of negation can help the dialetheist.

(a)

Since I know Priest accepts the existence of true contradictions, and if I utter P (and mean P and not also ~P) and he reposts ~P, I will rightly wonder whether he disagrees with me. If I knew he was using Gricean implacture to express disagreement, then I would know that if he meant (P & ~P) he would have said as much. However, I may still doubt that the dialetheist is actually disagreeing with me.

If, for instance, he proved to himself that ~P, but (a la the intuitionist logician [the analogy here is superficial]) he has not yet proved to himself that not ~P, then his assertion of ~P would not express the strongest information. Hence, ~P would in itself not be adequate to express disagreement, even under the auspices of Gricean conversational maxims.

Thus, we would be right to require of him a formulation of some statement that expresses: ‘false and not also true.’ Let us suppose the dialetheist devises one, S, such that S = ‘simply false’. Unfortunately, we now have a re-newed liar sentence:

L: This sentence is simply false.

In which case L is also true. Thus, L may be simply false and simply true. I think this poses problems for the dialetheist.

(b)

Because he distinguishes denial from assertion of negation:

(1) Priest may assert the negation of a liar sentence without denying it.

(2) And he may do so because, as a matter of fact, he does negate the sentence but also accepts it. In other words, he accepts that the liar is both true and false.

Reasoning semantically from (1) and (2), it follows that denying and accepting are logically incompatible: if one denies an utterance, then one can’t accept it. But this begs a question I am not confidant Priest can answer adequately: why can’t one at the same time both deny and accept an utterance? Surely the answer(s) will call upon notions of consistency, no?

At the end of the day, I agree with Lewis. The means by which we are to conduct the debate are so much less certain than that which is being debated. Why not simply refrain from participating?

The relevant part of (6) should say:

“Acceptance is, roughly, having something in your belief box and rejection is something like excluding something from your belief box. Assertion and denial are the related speech acts.”

Just think T(p) where “()” is the needed device.

Jared

Basically, every time that there’s a ‘T’ or ‘F’ read it as T for appropriate choice of p.

Jared

A few points of clarification should be made at the outset:

(1) Dialetheias probably shouldn’t be defined in terms of propositions or any other specific truth-bearers, rather they should be defined in terms of the truth-bearers, whatever they may be. We don’t want to give the impression that dialetheists are committed to the existence of propositions.

(2) It also might be better not to define dialetheias in terms of conjunctions of the form ‘p & ~p’. Presumably, someone might claim that a logic without conjunction was a dialetheically acceptable logic (if a sentence and its negation could be both be true).

(3) It’s misleading to call anything a “dialetheic logic” since dialetheism is a metaphysical position. One could be a dialetheist and a classical logician, it would just mean that one was a trivialist. It’s also important to draw this distinction because many proponents of FDE are not dialetheists. I take it that what you mean to suggest is that FDE is a paraconsistent logic that might be thought suitable for a non-trivialist dialetheist to adopt. It’s important to draw this distinction since many paraconsistent logics aren’t appropriate for dialetheism.

(4) We also need to be careful about saying that dialetheists reject the Law of Non-contradiction, since, e.g., the LNC (~(p & ~p)) is a logical truth in LP, Priest’s favored logic. In fact the set of logical truths of LP is the same as the set of logical truths in classical logic. FDE on the other hand, has no logical truths.

(5) It’s also perhaps better to talk simply in terms of the metaphysical claim that some statements are both true and false, or in terms of some contradictions being true, than to say that “we may, under certain circumstances, ascribe truth to contradictions” since the talk of ascriptions might suggest that we are incorrect but somehow pragmatically entitled to call a contradictions true in some cases.

(6) In the body of your post it seems that you’re mixing Priest’s claims about speech acts with semantic issues. Denial and assertion are, for Priest, sui generis speech acts. Acceptance is, roughly, having something in your belief box and denial is something like excluding something from your belief box. Frege equated denial with assertion of negation, and it is this claim that Priest and many others want to call into question.

Now, on to more substantive discussion.

At various points your post seemed to conflate speech acts, communication, disagreement, semantics, and charges of trivialism. It’s possible that some of what seems confused is just badly presented. I suggest reformulating the argument(s) you wish to make to make it clear exactly what you are and aren’t claiming. And to make clear how exactly you think untruth/falsity, etc. relate to denial/assertion, etc.

I take it that your central worries are that a dialetheist cannot communicate disagreement and that the dialetheist faces certain expressive limitations.

Taking the charges one at a time:

There are at least two ways that a dialetheist might be able to communicate disagreement:

(i) By using standard Gricean maxims.
(ii) By appealing to the speech act of denial.

Recall, denial is sui generis speech act here.

Regarding (i), there might be worries that we’d have to alter the Gricean to story to accommodate the dialetheist, but there doesn’t seem to be an in principle objection to the possibility of doing so in a way that will serve dialetheic needs.

The real worry about both of these strategies is that they don’t embed. The dialetheist should have a way to entertain the hypothesis that someone is mistaken, etc.

Another, wackier thought, is that the dialetheist should be pushed into thinking acceptance and rejection can be overlapping states, but it seems that they can resist this move.

This brings us to the second worry, that the dialetheist can’t express notions like true only and false only or even not true. This is still a concern, but it is muted somewhat by the above considerations.

Priest’s standard reply to this kind of charge is to say that of course he can express such notions, and in the very words anyone else would use. Let ‘’ be a name forming device of some kind, then Priest’s system allows him to express:

~T
T & ~F
F & ~T

(T=true, F=false) What the dialetheist can’t do is somehow guarantee that these notions behave consistently, but as Priest is fond of pointing out: nobody can guarantee consistency!

Perhaps the worry is that these notions don’t really behave like we would like them to. If one accepts that if something is false then it is not true, that is:

If F then ~T

We can see that anything that is false will also be simply false and vice versa, i.e., falsehood is equivalent to simple or sole falsehood. However, Priest doesn’t accept the above principle (though he does accept ‘If ~T then F’). So, in Priest’s system, there is a distinction between being solely false and false, since they aren’t logically equivalent notions. Although, even for Priest, some sentences, like the strengthened liar, will be both false and solely false.

Essentially the same issues arise when we try to find a way for the dialetheist to express that something is or is not a dialetheia. The obvious ways to say it: ~(p & ~p), ~(T & ~T), ~(T & F) all suffer from problems. The first two probably don’t make any distinction and the last doesn’t unless we go with Priest and drop the false to untruth principle. So Priest does have a way to express that something is not a dialetheia, but it is still true that some dialetheias will also not be dialetheias. This goes back to Priest’s point about the impossibility of enforcing consistency.

So we’ve seen that the obvious candidates for expressing some obvious notions collapse for the dialetheist if they accept certain principles concerning truth and falsity. But Priest himself denies one of the crucial principles and thus has a non-vacuous way to express some needed notions.

However, there’s still a nagging problem. It seems like many of the notions we’ve been discussing shouldn’t overlap at all. We want certain notions to exclude other notions. But what is exclusion? Perhaps it’s something that we can assert that makes it impossible to also accept p for a given p? What could this be? The trivialist thinks that everything is true, including whatever statement we suggest for the role we’re considering.

The best that can be done is to have something that if accepted along with p will lead to the acceptance of everything. The classical logician has this with ~p. But, as Priest has pointed out, the dialetheist has sentences that work like this as well:

If p then everything is true

Or:

If T then bottom

Or:

If p then bottom

Etc. Where bottom is absurdity; it entails everything. Acceptance of one of the above along with p leads to triviality. So it seems like once again the dialetheist has an escape route. Perhaps this is the right strategy for the dialetheist to use in expressing the notions of sole falsity or false only?

However, Hartry Field has pointed out that this kind of move doesn’t work in general. The statements above are a bit too strong to work like an intuitive notion of sole falsity, because of the existence of Curry sentences. There are weaker notions, like:

If p then bottom V If p then (if p then bottom)

But the problem obviously recurs. Generally, the dialetheist can approximate a notion of sole falsity using a sequence of operators defined as above, but it seems that they won’t be able to perfectly emulate the intuitive notion of sole falsity. I’m ignoring some technicalities here, but roughly this seems to be the state of play.

Perhaps it’s open to the dialetheist to claim that there isn’t a coherent notion of sole falsity that works exactly as we might have expected it to work? I don’t know how satisfying I find such a move, but others may disagree.

I’ve ignored a number of relevant issues in the above in an effort to keep this reply relatively brief. I should perhaps point out that I’m not a dialetheist. I just think that dialetheism doesn’t die easily! I’m sometimes inclined to agree with David Lewis here, but at other times I think that maybe some line like those we’ve been discussing can be made to work.

Jared