The Revised Principle of Alternate Possibilities and Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument

What follows is a work in progress, and I would greatly appreciate any constructive feedback pertaining to my argumentation and the strength of my reply to the RPAP. As stated in the body of the post, additional information on the two primary articles cited can be found in the endnotes at the end of this post.

 

Frankfurtian-style counterfactual intervener scenarios of all different stripes hold a special place in discussions of free will and moral responsibility. In some situations, they are a necessary evil with which one must contend, and in others they are an insurmountable obstacle for some theories. Many journal articles and full-length books on these topics dedicate large sections of text to attempting to reconcile Frankfurtian-style counterfactual intervener scenarios (CIS) against Frankfurt’s modification of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). I believe that, using Galen Strawson’s iteration of what he deems the “Basic Argument” for the impossibility of moral responsibility, I can at best obviate Frankfurt’s Revised Principle of Alternate Possibilities (RPAP) and at worst side-step the need for addressing the PAP/RPAP by way of positing a new principle based on Strawson’s Basic Argument, what I shall call the Principle of the Basic Argument (PBA).

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In Memoriam: Michael Dummett (1925 – 2011)

Michael Dummett, perhaps one of the most influential Anglo-American philosophers of the last half of the 20th century, died on December 27th, 2011. I would have posted earlier had I been aware, but Dummett’s death only recently caught my attention. Personally, Dummett’s work on intuitionistic logic and verificationism have greatly influenced my own thoughts on logic and epistemology and, ironically, despite his verificationism, Dummett was also a practicing Roman Catholic.

For those who may be unfamiliar with Dummett’s work, here is an informative discussion given by Graham Priest, who last year permitted the FSPB to interview him, and Alan Saunders, the host of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s programme The Philosopher’s Zone.

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Some Consequences of Perdurantism

“Not everything with banana-shaped, banana-tasting temporal parts can be a banana, however. The first month-long temporal part of the banana is not itself a banana, even though it has suitable temporal parts. It is not a banana because it is itself a proper temporal part of a banana. For perdurance theorists, sortal predicates are temporally maximal. That is to say, nothing can satisfy a given sortal predicate if it is a proper temporal part of something which satisfies that predicate — no proper temporal part of a banana can be a banana. In this respect, sortal predicates contrast with non-sortal predicates like ‘is green.’ Something can be green even if it is a proper part of a green thing.” – Katherine Hawley, How Things Persist, pg.40

Is it really true that “nothing can satisfy a given sortal predicate if it is a proper temporal part of something which satisfies that predicate — no proper temporal part of a banana can be a banana”? I don’t think so.

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An Elicitation of Opinions

Must an omnipotent and omniscient supernatural agency also be morally perfect?

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Theistic Explanatory Models Are Not Explanatory

Too many people take the so-called theory of intelligent design seriously, which is unfortunate since nobody who takes a scientific view of the world should, and everyone ought to take a scientific view of the world. As many have argued, ID theory is not, properly, a theistic explanatory model. However, I am not convinced that this is the case, and for two primary reasons. (Though, I find that insofar as ID theories are not theistic models, they actually suffer from more problems, so they really ought to welcome theistic interpretations. But this we may skip for now.) First, the correlation between theism and ID theory is too great for it to be an accident of honest inquiry. The overwhelming majority of ID theory proponents are theists, and theistic conceptions of god are, not surprisingly, suitable candidates for the intelligent designer. Second, the Discovery Institute, the main intellectual impetus behind ID theory in the English speaking world, published The Wedge, wherein they explicitly advocate for a theistic interpretation of ID theory. (FYI: One may read the document here: The Wedge.)

In any case, what is to follow is a rough and ready argument against theistic explanatory models.

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Logical Positivism and the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Before continuing, I should offer the following caveat. What is to follow is a very rough draft of a paper I threw together. The paper was inspired by another I authored on a similar theme for a PoS class. The following neglects many details and instead provides for a rough outline of a larger, much closer analyzed and ambitious paper I suspect I will write in the near future. So, this post is but an approximation of what is to come. Nevertheless, if the post engenders discussion on any topics pertaining to quantum mechanics, scientific methodology, philosophy of science, verificationism, logical positivism, whatever, and attracts critical first assessments, then it will have served its purpose.

Logical Positivism and the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

“The rise of quantum theory in the years 1900 to 1927 is surely one of the major advances in the history of science- perhaps even one of the greatest intellectual advances ever made by mankind” (Hund 1974, p. 5). The mathematical formulation of modern quantum mechanics consists of a complete and logically consistent framework of mathematical deductions (see, for instance, von Neumann 1955). However, an ordered series of mathematical deductions, no matter how complete or logically consistent, is not a physical theory. In order to obtain the status of a physical theory, the mathematical formalism or, more precisely, the mathematical representations, must be assigned certain, specifiable experimental conditions so as to allow for the determination of measurement procedures which may aid in the confirmation and disconfirmation of hypotheses and in the identification of new and fruitful avenues of investigation. Of course, the experimental data produced by the measurement procedures necessitate interpretation, and that interpretation will run up through the mathematical structure resulting in our view of the theory and its overall implications for our system of the world.

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Does God Need a “Religion,” and Religion a “God”?

Hello to All!

I must admit that there are some debates that are not worth getting into, because they’re as solvable as JFK’s assassination. Abortion is one of them. In an attempt to save myself from getting into such a debate with one of my business partners, however, I ended up finding something interesting that I figured would be worth a post here. (It’s also high time I posted something about religion, however big the trouble that I’ll get into will be.)

The title of this post is that very thing I found to be interesting. My business partner tried to get me to pull apart the idea that “God” always meant religion, or something involving religious beliefs, in order to “win me over” onto the pro-life side of the abortion debate. Now, as I said, I don’t think abortion is something worth talking about here because we could do so for hours and hours and get absolutely nowhere. But the notion between God and religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . I think that’s worth thinking about for a bit.

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Evolution & Math in Schools, Logic Is Culturally Determined, and the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy

Should students have to learn mathematics in school? A parody of the answers various Miss USA contestants gave to the question: Should students have to learn evolution in school? I agree with many of the Miss USA contestants. We should teach students both sides of the homeopathy and chemistry debate, too. I mean, like, students should have the opportunity and stuff to decide for themselves if homeopathy is true for them. I mean, like, isn’t logic culturally determined anyways and stuff?

From the blog Logic and Rational Interaction: The new Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy has initiated an iTunes channel with videocasts of lectures presented at the Center. Here is the description of the Munich Center from the iTunes channel:

Mathematical Philosophy – the application of logical and mathematical methods in philosophy – is about to experience a tremendous boom in various areas of philosophy. At the new Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, which is funded mostly by the German Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, philosophical research will be carried out mathematically, that is, by means of methods that are very close to those used by the scientists. The purpose of doing philosophy in this way is not to reduce philosophy to mathematics or to natural science in any sense; rather mathematics is applied in order to derive philosophical conclusions from philosophical assumptions, just as in physics mathematical methods are used to derive physical predictions from physical laws. Nor is the idea of mathematical philosophy to dismiss any of the ancient questions of philosophy as irrelevant or senseless: although modern mathematical philosophy owes a lot to the heritage of the Vienna and Berlin Circles of Logical Empiricism, unlike the Logical Empiricists most mathematical philosophers today are driven by the same traditional questions about truth, knowledge, rationality, the nature of objects, morality, and the like, which were driving the classical philosophers, and no area of traditional philosophy is taken to be intrinsically misguided or confused anymore. It is just that some of the traditional questions of philosophy can be made much clearer and much more precise in logical-mathematical terms, for some of these questions answers can be given by means of mathematical proofs or models, and on this basis new and more concrete philosophical questions emerge. This may then lead to philosophical progress, and ultimately that is the goal of the Center.

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Swinburne’s The Existence of God

… a summary.

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Troubled by “Spooky” Properties?

Trent Dougherty (Baylor) offers some advice:

I remember encountering as an undergrad the notion (Mackie?) that moral properties were “queer.” Then I remember reading some stuff in Phil Mind about “ectoplasm” and “spook stuff” with attributions of mental substance as “spooky.” I don’t know where this nonsense got started, but I was surprised “real” philosophers would play this kind of card. It is nothing less than a cop out. …

The appeal to “spookiness” and “weirdness” represents a failure of nerve and should be discouraged.

You can read the entire post here.

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Are Dogs Better than Humans?: Loyalty vs Betrayal

Alright — I’ll admit: the title probably has you wondering what planet I’m actually from, for it appears prima facie absurd to ask such a question in a serious way. Indeed, I even thought that to be the case until a couple weeks ago, when my mother (believe it or not) offered a consideration that changed my mind on the subject. Hopefully you’ll take the chance to read what follows and seriously consider the question, as I have, as it isn’t as absurd — and non-philosophical — as it first appears.

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“The Unity of Descartes’s Man”

… and other essays on Descartes,  by Paul Hoffman, all well worth reading.

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Provosts, Black Swans, . . . . . and Induction???

Hello to All!

Ahhh . . . . . the freedom of graduation! It feels really exhilarating. At the commencement ceremony last Friday, I couldn’t help but feel so excited for moving another step forward in my life. Three years of hard work and philosophical endeavors have led up to this moment.

[And I definitely have something to show for it: this blog (and my diploma, of course). Even though I'm only "green as grass" here, I still feel honored to be a part of the contributions and discussions that occur, both currently and in the future (as a law school student).]

One thing I wasn’t expecting, however, was that my final “lecture” as a UNF student would be so close to “home,” if you will. The school’s Provost took the opportunity at the ceremony to talk about Black Swan, a book he was reading (not to confuse it with a movie of the same name). While most of the details about the book are not important, there was one thing that caught my ear.

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Libet Revisited: Reduction and Prediction in Neuroscience

In “Agent Causation” Timothy O’Connor makes a passing assertion that there are many unresolved questions for materialist agency as he posits it, and that many of these questions are empirical in nature and can only be resolved with “extensive advancements within neurobiological science.” [1] Two particularly salient questions are (1) “Precisely to what extent is an ordinary human’s behavior directly regulated by the agent himself, and to what extent is it controlled by microdeterministic processes?”[2] And (2) whether microdeterministic processes can be predicted or not. While O’Connor may believe that advances in neuroscience will reinforce rather than call into question his theory, this is not the case. Stretching from the 1980s to a recent study in 2008, neuroscience has demonstrated that predictive brain activity can be seen to occur prior to a test subject’s consciousness of making a decision. From Libet to present, these studies provide damaging replies to the questions which O’Connor’s theory leaves unanswered.

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Nominalist Things

SCENE: BEDROOM IN AN AUSTRIAN MANSION, c.1937

GRETEL: I don’t like his manner.

KURT: His attitude worries me.

LISEL: I am troubled by a general air of foreboding.

MARIA: Yes, children: my life is also, on occasion, clouded by manners, attitudes and airs of foreboding.

BRIGITA: So what do you do about it?

MARIA: Why, I simply think of nominalistically respectable things instead.

VON TRAPP CHILDREN (together): Nominalistically respectable things? What are they?

MARIA: Well, let me explain …

Properties, counterparts, tropes and relations,
Promises, lies and confused explanations,
Numbers and rhomboids, and this very list:
These are all items which do not exist.

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Reid on “Moral Liberty”: A Real Libertarian?

Hello to all!

In a guided lecture I gave today for Dr. Vitz’s Modern Philosophy class (on Hume and Reid on freedom and determinism), there was a bit of confusion regarding how Reid’s view on “moral liberty” is different from Hume’s view, and if Reid was a real Libertarian given how he doesn’t seem to talk about a “free will” in the course of his essay on the liberty of moral agents.

While I tried to answer my fellow undergraduate’s questions, I am still left with a bit of doubt that I’ve actually answered their questions. And so I thought this might be a good topic to throw out to you guys.

Is Reid’s conception of “moral liberty” really that much different from Hume’s F/D view? And, more importantly, is Reid a real Libertarian? I mean, it doesn’t look like he’s tying “free will” into this at all. He still puts our actions as effects that have causes associated with them, with us being the cause for our actions. But does that automatically imply “free will”?

What do you guys think?

George (“The Meager Weakling”)

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“Pardon, Your Dualism is Showing”: Philosophy’s Dirty Word?

In another post, Paul pointed out an alleged bias on UNFSPB toward physicalism and against (presumably) dualism or other presuppositional positions here. This  struck me as particularly relevant given my current research into Libet for an essay I am writing when I ran across a reference to a journal article by C.C. Wood entitled, “Pardon, your dualism is showing.” Not coincidentally, in an unrelated portion of the article that cited Wood, the author was condemning Libet for attempting to find elbow room within his study in which Free Will might reside, and perhaps implicitly affirming a dualist position. And just the other day I had a vigorous discussion with a Presuppositional Apologetic  on charges similar to Paul’s, viz. that I unfairly presumed a physicalist world view that negated God in its very structure.

All of these elements lead me to wonder if dualism has become a dirty word among philosophers, theologians, or the educated in general. I am inclined to say it has, though I am interested to see whether (1) others believe this to be the case, and (2) if so, is this due to a progressive and positive development toward the elimination of antiquated worldviews, or is it merely a dogmatic assertion of a currently prevailing paradigm that unfairly presupposes its own truth?

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Experimental Philosophy of Free Will: Bootcamp and Workshop

Yale will be hosting a bootcamp and workshop on Experimental Philosophy of Free Will for graduate students and faculty:

The Experimental Philosophy of Free Will Workshop and Boot Camp is an opportunity for philosophers to gain the skills they need to conduct cutting-edge research in the experimental philosophy of free will.

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Virgil’s Lesson For Mariology: A Response to Dennett’s Physicalist Account of Mary’s First Experience of Color

This is a paper that I will be presenting soon. I would appreciate any constructive criticisms you all might have to offer.

The “‘she’ll be surprised damnit!’ intuition” is the appellation that Daniel Dennett gives to the intuitive expectation of what will happen when Mary, an neurologically omniscient scientist, has her first experience of color.[1] Dennett disparages the aforementioned intuitive response because he believes that the intuition results from a thought experiment that “encourages us to misunderstand its premises.”[2] He proceeds to “elucidate” these misunderstandings by “turning the knobs” in the thought experiment, i.e., by altering the circumstances of the thought experiment to show the folly of the intuitive response to Mary’s first experience of color.

What follows is a more precise representation of Jackson’s attempt to argue for the spurious nature of physicalism, a critical examination of Dennett’s supposed exposure of the sophistry of Jackson’s argument (via “turning the knobs” in the thought experiment), and an altered version of Mary’s first experience that shows that Dennett’s “Mariology” (a term coined to describe theoretical study of Mary’s first encounter with color) is in need of revision. Specifically, this altered Mary-esque thought experiment shows that the cause of Mary’s epistemological limitation of experience is physiological in nature. I will argue that it is physically impossible for Dennett to be correct in saying that Mary will not learn something new when she has her first experience of color. Finally, I will briefly respond to, what seems to be, a plausible objection to my argument, and conclude with some remarks on the broader philosophical significance of the argument.

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On A Weak Principle of Sufficient Reason

The title of this post is misleading. The principle I’ll talk about here isn’t really a principle of “sufficient” reason, but I can’t think of a better name for it. I’m not really sure what to make of all this.

Consider the following proposition:

(P) – For every contingent state of affairs, there is another state of affairs that partly explains why that contingent state of affairs obtains rather than any possible alternatives

Consider a possible world w in which P is true, and the conjunction of all contingent propositions in w (the BCCF). In w there is some state of affairs (A) that partially explains the BCCF. This state of affairs cannot be contingent, or it would be part of the BCCF and provide a partial explanation of its own obtaining, which I take to be impossible. So A obtains necessarily. But if A is necessary, then A obtains in the actual world. Thus, from the supposition that P is true in some possible world, we can derive the conclusions that there is a necessary state of affairs that in some possible world(s) partially or wholly explains the whole of contingent reality. It is compatible with this conclusions that A does not explain the obtaining of contingent states of affairs in the actual world.

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Paranoid Schizophrenics: A Problem for Immaterialism?

[A BIG thanks to Stephanie and Paul, contributors to this blog, and Michael, all fellow undergrads, for the inspiration for this post!]

——————–

Hello to All!

In Dr. Vitz’s Modern Philosophy class earlier today, we discussed the 4 major objections offered against George Berkeley’s Immaterialism found his “Dialogues” between Philonous and Hylas. The objections, generally speaking, are as follows:

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Moral Responsibility vs. Moral Judgement

Aaron requested a more full-blooded iteration of my stance on morality for consideration and I thought I would oblige, as it is something on which I would certainly like feedback. In what follows I would like to first address why I do not believe human beings are morally responsible for their behavior in the manner commonly thought necessary, and second posit that the moral responsibility of human beings is not necessary for possessing judgements as to what actions are right or wrong.

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On Plantinga’s Retirement

Comments by C. Stephen Evans (Baylor).

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CFP: Calvin College 3rd Annual Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

Calvin College 3rd Annual
Undergraduate Philosophy Conference
April 29-30th, 2011
Keynote Speaker: Alvin Plantinga

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Intuitions On Contradiction

I was wondering what the intuitions of the blog readers are regarding the familiar example of Schrodinger’s cat.

Here are several regarding whether or not the cat is alive or dead.

1) The cat is either alive or dead by metaphysical necessity.

2) It is a meaningless assertion because we can’t assert anything because we have no empirical verification.

3) It is unassertable but still the cat is still necessarily either alive or dead.

4) The cat is alive and not alive.

5) The truth of whether or not the cat is alive or dead is indeterminate, dropping bivalence here.

I think most people would fall under 1, but I’m leaning towards 5.

Readers?

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