Neuroscience and Free Will

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Neuroscience and Free Will

November 14, 2011 by Jon

A nice and interesting piece here.

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Posted in General Interest | 18 Comments

18 Responses

on November 14, 2011 at 1:57 pm | Reply Susan

Nice article. THANKS!
Some of my favorite parts of the article:
“These discoveries about how our brains work can also explain how free will works rather than explaining it away. But first, we need to define free will in a more reasonable and useful way. Many philosophers, including me, understand free will as a set of capacities for imagining future courses of action, deliberating about one’s reasons for choosing them, planning one’s actions in light of this deliberation and controlling actions in the face of competing desires. We act of our own free will to the extent that we have the opportunity to exercise these capacities, without unreasonable external or internal pressure. We are responsible for our actions roughly to the extent that we possess these capacities and we have opportunities to exercise them.”
end quote
Plus I particularly liked the last two lines of the article….it reminded me of Daniel Dennetts’ book: ‘Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting’
on November 17, 2011 at 12:09 pm | Reply Tim

I’ve been waiting for an article like this. It seems that the discourse on free-will has become largely a game of semantics.

I might add though, that Will Provine makes an interesting case against free-will; here are some of his thoughts from an article that appeared in The Cornell Daily Sun:

“Choices are not fee will. I make choices all the time. I like doing things my way. It’s not about choices. It’s about the procedure. The procedure is not free. Nothing about it is free,” said Provine.”

Provine argues that, from an evolutionary standpoint, genetic traits and environmental influences determine the actions of an organism. In the book he is currently writing on the topic, he cites factors including heredity, uterine environments, parental influences and peer influences as factors that affect an individual’s free will.”

If, according to Provine, the procedures involved with a notion of free-will are, in fact, not free, then how can we have free-will? I am not entirely convinced but it is interesting….any thoughts?
on March 18, 2012 at 2:11 pm | Reply Steven

I really believe the debate about free will needs a spiritual and theological perspective. God is imminent in the world, and permeates every part of the cosmos, including the human mind and body. Neuroscience will never get a grip on the mind, or consciousness, without an appreciation that God is in control of all things. It may be hard to prove scientifically that God exists, but it is also hard to prove consciousness exists. It doesn’t mean God or consciousness don’t exist. In my opinion, God clearly exists, and is more real to me even than my own body. Don’t ignore God!
- on March 18, 2012 at 6:35 pm | Reply Aaron
  
  I have no idea what you just said. ‘God’, ‘God permeates’, ‘God is in control of all things’, and so on, are nonsensical utterances.
- on March 20, 2012 at 7:22 pm | Reply Jared
  
  Also, Steven, I neglected to mention the following:
  
  There are an abundance of theological and spiritual perspectives on free will and human action, but they are usually quite impoverished. From Calvin to Augustine, and Hick to Frame, I have yet to read a compelling, theologically based theory of agency which does not turn on absurdities or blind articles of faith. If you know of one you find particularly compelling I would be interested in reading it.
  - on March 21, 2012 at 11:00 pm Andrew Brenner
    
    Jared,
    
    “From Calvin to Augustine, and Hick to Frame, I have yet to read a compelling, theologically based theory of agency.” I’m not really sure what you mean by “theologically based theory of agency.” It follows that I’m not sure what exactly is alleged to “turn on absurdities or blind articles of faith”…
on March 20, 2012 at 7:17 pm | Reply Jared

Steven wrote: “In my opinion, God clearly exists, and is more real to me even than my own body. Don’t ignore God!”

On what grounds do you base this opinion? E.g. what is so clear about God’s existence other than your opinion regarding it?

Also, while we are on the topic, are you aware of the evolutionary mechanisms at work in human beings, such as perceived agency, that lend themselves quite well to religious explanations of the world?

A short but excellent primer on this topic is “Why We Believe in God(s): A Concise Guide to the Science of Faith” by J. Anderson Thomson. I have a short review of the book on my personal blog, and can provide a link should you wish to read it.
on March 21, 2012 at 8:00 pm | Reply Aaron

Jared,

I simply fail to understand how people could think ‘God’, ‘a soul’, or ‘an immaterial mind’ could better explain consciousness.

The hard problem of consciousness (which I happen to think is not a philosophical problem at all but rather a scientific one) turns on a supposed difficulty of materialism to account for consciousness. Even granting this, it is not at all clear how postulating an immaterial mind, etc., does any better. In fact, I would argue, it does a fair bit worse:

Dualist: “How could a complex material object obtain consciousness?”

Materialist: “Not sure. There is some pretty good scientific work being done in this field. Thus far, we can identify brain operations which control- indeed, constitute- much of what is commonly included in ‘consciousness’, such as sense of identity, personality, ability to empathize, love, etc. That aside, I have to ask: how could a non-physical thingamajig (whatever the hell that is) account for consciousness?”

Inevitably the dualist’s response amounts to this: “Well, I have no scientific research program. No testable hypotheses. So, I guess it just does!”
- on March 21, 2012 at 11:20 pm | Reply Andrew Brenner
  
  Aaron,
  
  These sorts of emotionally charged attacks on substance dualism are so odd. They’re so common, yet so inept, you have to wonder if anything other than emotion drives the widespread antipathy towards substance dualism among most philosophers (if this is the case it doesn’t follow, of course, that substance dualism is correct). But in any case, the important point to note here is that your rejection of substance dualism trades on a mischaracterization of that position. I grant that substance dualism doesn’t provide a better response to the hard problem of consciousness than property dualism does. But this is beside the point, as the hard problem of consciousness isn’t the only thing motivating substance dualism. Moreover, I’m not sure how the fine work done by scientists does anything whatsoever to undermine substance dualism. The alleged features of consciousness you cite (“we can identify brain operations which control- indeed, constitute- much of what is commonly included in ‘consciousness’, such as sense of identity, personality, ability to empathize, love, etc”) are all cases of cognition and/or functional features of the brain rather than phenomenal consciousness, and substance dualism isn’t generally offered (by philosophers anyway) as a competing account of how these sorts of mental processes work. The crudest part of your characterization of substance dualism, however, is your snide suggestion that substance dualism undermines or somehow doesn’t mesh with neuroscience, or some such nonsense as this. Why would substance dualism have that result? Do you have something specific in mind, or is this just the oft repeated (and rather childish) suggestion that substance dualism is somehow behind the times, unscientific, or whatever?
  - on March 21, 2012 at 11:31 pm Andrew Brenner
    
    Btw, on a totally more friendly note, did you apply to any grad programs this year? If so, did it turn out well?
  - on March 22, 2012 at 1:06 am Aaron
    
    Andrew,
    
    I offered no emotionally charged response: In all honesty, I could not care less about substance dualism as I find it a remnant of a pre-scientific past, falling ever out of favor amongst philosophers.
    
    Re: Phenomenal properties.
    
    That there are such properties is not at all clear. That aside, via manipulating (mechanically or electro-chemically) brain areas, we can: destroy one’s ability to see colors, hear sounds, identify one’s own limbs, create dissociative personality disorders and similar pathologies, destroy one’s olfactory and gustatory abilities, make someone more ‘religious’ and ‘spiritual’, desire to have sex with children and members of the same sex, and so on.
    
    This all follows strictly from the physicalist thesis. That is, if the physicalist thesis is true, we must observe what we do observe.
    
    It does not, however, follow from the substance dualist hypothesis. Indeed, we have no reason whatsoever to expect to be able to destroy one’s sense of self or alter one’s sexual attractions, e.g., if substance dualism is true. As Descartes noted, we could have just as easily expected to be to our bodies and brains as a captain is to his ship: he sees damage, but does not feel it.
    
    Therefore, it seems to me that the neuroscientific evidence is much likelier under the physicalist hypothesis than under the substance dualist alternative. (I would like to continue and argue that the substance dualist alternative is sufficiently incoherent so as to warrant no serious consideration. Certainly too opaque to permit testable deductions.)
  - on March 22, 2012 at 1:13 am Aaron
    
    Re: Grad school.
    
    Yes, I did apply and it has turned out well. Accepted: Johns Hopkins, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and Wayne State. Wait listed: Indiana, Bloomington.
    
    Ideally, I Indiana will make an offer. Realistically, I am leaning toward Missouri, Oklahoma, and Utah. James Hawthorne is at Oklahoma and Jonah Schupach is at Utah. Missouri has a wonderful program. Hard choices.
    
    As for the rest, I doubt I will accept.
  - on March 25, 2012 at 9:38 pm Andrew Brenner
    
    Hi Aaron, Jared
    
    You seem to think substance dualists are committed to there being some sort of immaterial brain that handles various psychological, cognitive, and other purely functional features of our mental lives. Obviously this sort of thing would be redundant, because we have every reason to think our brains (material brains) handle these aspects of our mental lives just fine. But we’ve known for literally thousands of years that certain cognitive defects and changes in character result from injuries to different regions of the brain. Substance dualists are not committed to the obviously false thesis that we require immaterial information processing units to handle any of the cognitive or psychological features of our mental lives. Nor need substance dualists be committed to the view that substance dualism better accounts for the existence or persistence of phenomenal consciousness. You will notice that I didn’t claim otherwise, despite your (Jared’s) characterization of my remarks. Again, the extent to which these sort of objections to substance dualism come up leads me to think that much of the contemporary antipathy towards substance dualism is the result of a mischaracterization of that view and what it entails. For what it’s worth, I think substance dualism provides the best account of personal identity, and that is the sole reason I think it is a viable view to hold.
    
    Here’s one concession, however. The fact that an immaterial brain would be redundant in accounting for cognitive/functional aspects of the mind is some (fairly weak, I would think) evidence against substance dualism, as materialism entails that this would be the case, while substance dualism does not (though note, again, that substance dualism does not entail that this would *not* be the case). (You make a point like this, Aaron, though you seem to think it has more evidential weight than it does.)
  - on March 25, 2012 at 9:42 pm Andrew Brenner
    
    Aaron,
    
    Re: Grad School
    
    Congrats, that’s quite a lineup of programs. I’d be very interested to know where you eventually decide to attend (and especially if you get an offer from Indiana).
  - on April 1, 2012 at 3:22 pm Jared
    
    Hey Andrew,
    
    Sorry if I mischaracterized your position, although the descriptions of substance dualism I am familiar with are those traditional viewpoints which seek to usurp or explain much of human behavior, let alone subjective experience, in terms of “immaterial substances” (one of many terms I find lacking meaningful content). These include the mind, the soul, some iterations of the “self”, etc. You write:
    
    “Again, the extent to which these sort of objections to substance dualism come up leads me to think that much of the contemporary antipathy towards substance dualism is the result of a mischaracterization of that view and what it entails. For what it’s worth, I think substance dualism provides the best account of personal identity, and that is the sole reason I think it is a viable view to hold.”
    
    Perhaps you could expound upon the proper view of what substance dualism entails, and why you see the problems attendant to such a view (as there are surely many) as outweighed by its utility in appropriately describing personal identity. For, there exist materialist alternatives that bypass the problem of interaction and the much larger issue of what exactly such an immaterial substance would be and how we come to know about its existence if it does not exist in the sense as all other objects in the universe.
- on March 24, 2012 at 1:28 pm | Reply Jared
  
  Aaron,
  
  I hope you know, from what you may have read of my posts here and on Philosophy & Polity, that you and I share much common ground with regard to views of substance dualism. I would also echo your charge that, despite the alleged inability of materialism to provide a ‘concrete’ answer to the problem of consciousness, the issues attendant to a dualist’s worldview far outweigh any immediate lack of explanation for the materialist. Especially given that, as you rightly point out, we can expect further clarification as studies in this area mature and develop. No such hope appears to exist for dualism, unless Mr. Brenner can share some studies which point to the necessity of an immaterial substance at work in human consciousness.
  
  RE: Andrew’s response
  
  I do not find Aaron’s characterization above to be inept, childish, populist, crude, emotionally charged, etc. In fact, I would counter that your own use of such ascriptions reflects more upon your own emotional response to attacks against dualism than any on Aaron’s part.
  
  Further, it ought to be immediately apparent to all but the most casual thinker that the perception of a phenomenon does not in any substantial way provide evidence for the existence of that phenomenon. Subjective perception of consciousness as a function/property of some metaphysical agent is as weak a justification for substance dualism as a perception of freedom is for belief in freedom of the will in any robust sense.
  
  Substance dualism clashes with findings in neuroscience in a similar way as the old view of emotions being seated in the heart clashed with findings in basic physiology and biology. As we came to understand more about how the human body functions, this view of emotions fell away in all but colloquial use. Why should substance dualism be any different?
on March 21, 2012 at 8:06 pm | Reply Aaron

P.S.

Whenever I listen to substance dualists argue for their thesis (which, I should add, I think is not sufficiently cogent), I am reminded of a Bertrand Russell quote (made in quite different context):

“The method of ‘postulating’ what we want has many advantages; they are the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil. Let us leave them to others and proceed with our honest toil.”

The dualist simply postulates that an immaterial mind, soul, or ‘God’ accounts for consciousness. I say let us leave them to their empty, postulatory mental masturbations and proceed with our neuroscience.
on March 24, 2012 at 11:56 am | Reply susaninflorida

I enjoyed the philosophy slam. Aaron seems kinder live than he does on this blog. I am not sure why it feels that way to me. Aaron (as the speaker) seemed quite kind to all questioners. Aaron seemed (at the slam) genuinely in search for truth not bent on being right.

I am reading a book by Popper. Here is a quote that seems appropriate here:
“The wrong view of science betrays itself in craving to be right; for it is not possession of knowledge, of irrefutable truth, that makes the man of science, but his persistent and recklessly critical quest for truth”

I like Aaron’s definition of atheist as he offered it at the slam. If I understood him correctly, he didn’t say he was 100% sure there was no God. He said that the atheist simply believes that it is more probable than not that there is no God. My boyfriend is the president of the FCFS(an atheist group). He agrees with that definition except he would say there are other varieties of atheism. One other kind is the person who has never been exposed to theism. BUT I liked the succinct definition that Aaron offered.