Aaron requested a more full-blooded iteration of my stance on morality for consideration and I thought I would oblige, as it is something on which I would certainly like feedback. In what follows I would like to first address why I do not believe human beings are morally responsible for their behavior in the manner commonly thought necessary, and second posit that the moral responsibility of human beings is not necessary for possessing judgements as to what actions are right or wrong.
For ease of conversation, and to keep the topic centered on morality instead of determinism vs. agency, I would like to presuppose the truth of determinism. This is not to make my stance de facto correct, rather to guide any critiques to be against determinist moral theory instead of determinism in general. I understand there are few who accept determinism, but I do see the conversation of agency and determinism as being separate to considerations of what morality and moral responsibility would look like if determinism is true. One need not affirm determinism to argue for the consistency of a view within that framework.
Moral Responsibility
Below is a general outline of my position on moral responsibility, upon which I will then expand:
(1) One conception of moral responsibility requires the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) to be true. According to Frankfurt, the PAP claims that “a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.”
(2) The truth of determinism, on the common reading, would mean that every outcome that obtains is the only outcome that could have obtained given the state of the universe and the laws governing that universe.
(3) This would mean that, if determinism is true, it is never the case that I could have acted other than how I have.
(4) On this account, I cannot ever be morally responsible for my actions because I cannot ever do otherwise.
In “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” Frankfurt introduces the concept of a counterfactual intervener and gives a thought experiment (which will not be reproduced here) that calls for the revision of the PAP to say that “a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise.” Frankfurt believes this allows for moral responsibility as well as determinism in certain special cases. While this iteration of the PAP is certainly an improvement, I believe it is slightly misleading, especially depending on how causal reduction is explained. For I can claim that I possessed 100, well-deliberated reasons for acting in a certain way and that I am morally responsible because my actions did not obtain in that way simply because it was determined. However, this is exactly what universal causal determinism entails; all of the 100 reasons I can summon, including all desires, motivations, etc. to act in such a way are only so because of the state of the universe and due to its laws, etc. So, at the immediate level it might seem in all cases (except for coercion) that if I have so many reasons, or even one, for making a specific choice then I am morally responsible for that choice because there were more elements at work than just my inability to do otherwise; I wanted to perform just that action and no other action for a specific set of reasons. However, this is undermined by the determination of those desires, motivations, etc. that lead to the formulation of those reasons. For this reason it would seem that, even with the reformulated PAP, if determinism is the case then it can never been that I did something not only because I could not have done otherwise.
I do not mean this to be a knockdown argument against counterfactual intervener scenarios, I only mean to draw attention to the difficulties associated with the definition, since I do not understand what it would mean for there to be other, non-determined, reasons for behavior such that determination of my behavior was not the sole “reason” for my acting that way. In this way I do not think that Frankfurt’s point undermines my postulation that if determinism is true, we are not morally responsible for our actions if, to be morally responsible, we require alternate possibilities.
Moral Judgements
As for moral judgements, my position is similar to Honderich and Smilansky in that I do not believe the removal of our moral responsibility necessitates the destruction of what is right and what is wrong. While I agree with their position, and offer an example in #7, I believe there is also an alternate way of viewing this problem that accounts for both metaphysical notions of right and wrong as well as relative definitions.
(5) If we do not have moral responsibility in this sense, some have claimed that moral judgements about right and wrong must also be tossed out. As the criticism goes, there can be no morality if there is no one to be held morally responsible.
(6) However, removal of our ability to be morally responsible does not appear to necessitate the disappearance of moral judgements themselves.
(7) For example, if killing another person regardless of motivation is considered morally wrong, the determination of my behavior such that I could not have done otherwise but to murder does not necessitate that murder itself can still be classified as wrong.
The first of my own examples I would like to offer concerns metaphysical notions of right or wrong, i.e. those that stem from some enduring truth or stem from an enduring metaphysical entity (God). If, by edict of God, murder is considered morally wrong, then regardless of whether human beings can be held morally responsible for any murder they commit, it is still the case that murder is wrong. All that has changed is that human beings cannot be blamed for instances of murder; their actions can still be considered morally wrong. In a metaphysical model where God created the universe, it is conceivable in some iterations that God would be morally responsible, since one could argue that God would need to have the ability to do otherwise, even if he never would. In a relative moral system, where we define right and wrong based on cultural and societal norms, this would still be the case. So, as a society, we agree for whatever reason that murdering another person is wrong, it would still be the case that murdering is considered wrong whether anyone can be held morally responsible for any murders they commit. In this way, there must be a distinction made between moral responsibility and morality itself. I am dimly aware, by way of Derk Pereboom’s response, that Haji believes moral judgements concern “ought” statements, i.e. claiming murder is wrong is the same as claiming that ”one ought not murder other human beings” and that the nature of “ought” judgements requires the possibility that it be in one’s power to do otherwise. I am not so positive that “ought” statements are the case for every moral claim. It is certainly possible that, given the nature of morality itself, it must be possible to formulate an “ought” statement for any given moral judgement, i.e. “it is morally wrong to eat ripe fruit” must be able to be expressed as “one ought not to eat ripe fruit” but I am skeptical of the idea that “ought” statements require the ability to do otherwise for them to exist.
Conclusions
On this explanation it seems at least plausibly consistent for me to hold the view that determinism is true, we are not morally responsible for our behavior in that we cannot do otherwise, and that our lack of moral responsibility does not necessitate a lack of moral judgements regarding right and wrong. Again, I welcome any and all questions or criticisms, though I am less interested in discussing why it is that I affirm determinism in this post, although I am certainly open to doing so in a different post. I thank you all for the opportunity to strengthen my understanding of the problem as well as to make my views as internally consistent as possible.
Somehow you have determined that murder is wrong.
Person A kills someone. Person A lacks the empathy gene and someone psst her off. She could not have done otherwise. Murder is still wrong. We would still lock her up because she will most probably kill again if she is left to freely roam about.
“…. removal of our ability to be morally responsible does not appear to necessitate the disappearance of moral judgements ….”
That makes sense to me….if I properly understood you.
Wow, Jared, this is an amazing post. I have to say: I learned. It was clear, concise, cohesive, informative and enjoyable.
The distinction between moral responsibility and morality itself gave me allot to think about. I’m going to spend some time thinking about it. Although, I don’t think there can be such a distinction. If it is wrong to murder because God has declared it, so it is in some sense objective, then how does it have any meaning if created beings cannot have have moral responsibility. God would have to be able to be morally responsible in this case, but he sets the moral code in eternity. So, it seems odd to say that the one who makes morality objective is also the only one able to defy it. It seems that the moral definitions would break down in the face of God. If God existed could he murder qua murder, or rape qua rape, or commit genocide qua genocide? This doesn’t seem to make sense. Even if God could always do otherwise—which doesn’t make sense—and then it doesn’t seem to follow that he could have moral responsibility.
Moral and moral responsibility seem seem tied to require one another. I don’t think this distinction can hold. But, it’s such a nice distinction I’m going to give it allot more thought.
Also what is going to motivate your right and wrong? You seem to hold some sort of social contract theory, but what motivates this social contract theory? Are we to use our already present evaluative drives, which when used are now consider moral judgment, and understand them as pragmatic drive that allow for a unity of multiple individuals interacting despite competitive interest? Are we suppose to find out what things are most often associated with wrong or right in these drives—like murder—and make those, we are driven to comply to those plus understand intuitively and hook those up to our social contracts?
Anyhow: Great post.
Joel,
I am glad you liked my post!
As the traditional argument goes, if God does it then it isn’t immoral, because God is perfectly moral. So, when God orders the Israelites to destroy all of Canaan, this is not genocide. When God impregnates Mary without her permission, this is not rape. When God strikes down a sinner, this is not murder. I suppose all of this revolves around whether you believe conceptions of God being all powerful must entail that God can perform contradictory actions. So, though murder is immoral, can God, who is perfectly moral, ever murder someone?
I agree that the God example is fairly weak, but I am OK with this since I do not believe in God, nor do I find many arguments associated with God to be all that strong anyway.
You say several times that you do not think morality and moral responsibility can be seperated, but you only make reference to the example of God. To put it bluntly, how exactly is not just not possible that there can exist at least one definition of an action being wrong regardless of whether any person, when given a choice between right or wrong, could not choose other than how they would have chosen? I believe an inability to see how these can be disconnected is due to an overwhelming emphasis in our culture on both our ability to do otherwise as well as moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness associated with the ability to do otherwise.
As for what motivates MY right and wrong, I am a product of a certain generation in a certain era within a certain society. What I consider right and wrong is just as much a product of these factors as I am. While I am certainly willing to concede that there is strong evidence that certain attitudes seem to grow out of genetic predisposition, i.e. a sense of fairness in primates, I believe the large majority of what people consider moral and immoral to be culturally relative. It is also possible that earlier or later generations did/will not have the same dispositions. Your question seems to be mixed between what I find moral and how society should best decide what is moral. The first is easy to answer, since I could give a range of things I find morally offensive and a range of things I find morally benevolent, but I do not see the point in creating such a list, since as I said, it is reducible to the values with which I grew up, the society in which I grew up, and the time period in which I was born. I believe women’s suffrage is morally right, but some of the harshest sharia regimes do not, nor would the Romans, the Greeks, etc.
**not possible**
Did not intend the double negative.
As a further example, taking a page out of Nagel’s book, even placing myself in those societies or time periods with differing values does not demonstrate or prove how my own values should prevail. For, I can never fully imagine what it would be like for me to be a completely different person than I am not, or to be a full-blooded Roman citizen; I can only imagine what it would be like for me to be myself as a Roman citizen, presumably with at least similar personal values.
In the military, we are told and convinced murder is okay in a specific context -when enemies are attacking Americans for example. But it goes further and the military demands blind obedience – to kill by order and without conscience. So right and wrong are distorted using deception and manipulation on young and impressionable victims trusting their leaders. The leaders pardon themselves since they did not commit the act. So murder becomes justice or self defense or something heroic. But deep inside of every person that has killed anyone no matter how justified, they still feel guilt knowing they killed someone. But do they? It depends on conscience. Our internal beliefs concerning murder. Even with self justification, there is something in a person that knows killing other person harms us inside. Compare a police officer to a school teacher to a terrorist to a bum to a crazed person trying to kill your children. We value people differently. So we weigh the act of murder based on the value we place on the person murdered. Often value is placed by the state.
Greg,
First, we should be careful with our terms. Killing does not entail murder, though murder entails killing. E.g., if a man broke into your home and attempted to murder your child and you killed the intruder, while you have killed him, you did not commit murder. Even if you felt unnerved, and perhaps mournful, after killing the would-be child murdered, it does not follow that the act was unjustified: Emotions neither grant nor detract moral justification.
Second, I served in the military and NOT ONCE were we ever ordered to kill indiscriminately and without conscience. In fact, if a soldier or sailor were to kill indiscriminately, and in so doing fail to abide by the rules of engagement, s/he would be held on murder charges, given a fair trial, and, if convicted, punished accordingly.
Jared,
As I understand it, your argument is the following:
(P1) If S is morally responsible for his actions, then the strengthened PAP is true. [Assumption]
(P2) If determinism is true, then it is not the case that the strengthened PAP is true. [Assumption]
(P3) Determinism is true. [Assumption]
(C1) It is not the case that the strengthened PAP is true. [From P2 & P3]
(C2) It is not the case that S is morally responsible for his actions. [From P1 & C1]
However, you provide the following: ‘removal of our ability to be morally responsible does not appear to necessitate the disappearance of moral judgements themselves’ because ‘[a]ll that has changed is that human beings cannot be blamed for instances of murder; their actions can still be considered morally wrong.’
In writing ‘human beings cannot be blamed’ I presume you meant ‘it is not the case that it is rational to blame human beings’ (or something to that effect) since the former is an obviously false statement: Humans beings can be, as a matter of fact, be blamed for murder (it happens all the time).
I presume a set of rational norms such that one ‘ought’ to believe only in that for which there is sufficient evidence on pain of holding false beliefs: That is, * if * one’s aim is to hold true beliefs, then one * ought * to apportion their beliefs according to the evidence. I take it, then, that in asserting something similar to the effect of ‘it is not the case that it is rational to blame human beings,’ you are asserting that human beings ‘ought’ not to blame human beings.
However, if one were to refuse to accept your argument, e.g., though they accepted P1 – P3 above, I am confident you would hold them rationally responsible for their irrational belief. That is to say, you would cease further intellectual interaction, refuse to grant their views and opinions epistemic weight, neglect to provide a recommendation for an academic position, etc. In short, you would punish them accordingly *because* they were irrational.
I take rational norms to be analogous to moral norms in that, as one ought to hold rational beliefs on pain of holding false beliefs, one ought to act morally on pain of acting wickedly. In fact, I take the analogy to be precise in that if determinism is true, then one cannot be rationally responsible for one’s actions. The argument:
(P1) If S is rationally responsible for his actions, then the strengthened principle of alternate beliefs is true. [Assumption]
(P2) If determinism is true, then it is not the case that the strengthened principle of alternate beliefs is true. [Assumption]
(P3) Determinism is true. [Assumption]
(C1) It is not the case that the strengthened principle of alternate beliefs is true. [From P2 & P3]
(C2) It is not the case that S is rationally responsible for his beliefs. [From P1 & C1]
C2 entails that, though the beliefs may be irrational, one cannot be held responsible for holding irrational beliefs. However, as I noted above, in all likelihood you *do* hold people responsible for their beliefs. (In fact, on pain of holding false beliefs, you *must* hold them rationally responsible (no pun intended).) Likewise, then, on pain of being wicked, you must hold people morally responsible. That is, per the severity of their indiscretions, you must refrain from interacting with them, you must verbally chastise them, perhaps end their lives, impose punitive remunerations, etc.
In the end, two options are available to me: (1) deny P1 or (2) turn the argument on its head.
I am comfortable in doing (1) but perhaps (2) is preferable (though I understand we have assumed determinism true):
(P1*) If it is not the case that the strengthened PAP is true, then it is not the case that S is morally responsible for his actions.
(P2*) If is determinism is true, then it is not the case that the strengthened PAP is true.
(P3*) It is the case that S is morally responsible for his actions.
(C1*) Therefore, it is the case that the strengthened PAP is true. [From P1* and P3* and double negation]
(C2*) Therefore, it is not the case determinism is true. [From P2* and C1* and double negation]
One man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens, no?
Aaron,
Thank you for the reply, especially for your attention to detail. I’d like to respond to your four major criticisms as I understand them: (1) it is clearly not the case that human beings cannot be blamed for their actions, (2) rationality appears to suffer the same fate as moral responsibility given the structure of my argument, which then results in the seemingly distasteful conclusion that I cannot hold persons responsible for their irrationality, (3) My argument presumes an “ought” statement, and (4) by changing the structure of my argument from modus ponens to modus tollens it would appear that affirming the rephrased PAP necessitates rejecting determinism.
(1) I fear your first criticism is due to my vague phrasing. You are indeed correct that human beings obviously can, and are, blamed and praised for all manner of things in moral, rational, and many other realms. I should draw a distinction between blame and blameworthiness. On this account, a person can surely be blamed for their actions, but their actions can still not be blameworthy due to my argument. Thank you for the clarification!
(2) I will need to think on your substitution of rational for moral, but on the face of it I would say you are also correct, though I do not see this necessarily as a point scored. This is because blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are at the heart of the matter. Surely if a persons actions can never be morally praiseworthy or blameworthy then I would not be surprised that they can not be rationally praiseworthy or blameworthy. Following 1, this does not mean I must altogether cease making distinctions between rational and irrational action – rather, simply note that the belief that persons are responsible based on the ability to do otherwise is faulty. I am open to other formulations of moral responsibility that attempt to avoid this problem.
(1-2a) Following these two points, it seems lurking in your post is the assumption that any subjective affirmation of moral/rational praise or blame on my part (or on the part of any person I suppose) undermines the argument that such attitudes are invalid. For example, you say:
I find this criticism to be incorrect on two levels. The first is that it places the efficacy of my argument upon my perception and behavior rather than the logic of the argument. It might very well be that my argument is logical and correct, yet I still praise and blame persons for their behavior. While this would make me inconsistent to a degree, it would not damage my argument. Simply because we blame and praise persons for their behavior, as (1) demonstrates, does not mean that such praise and blame is merited in the sense that the refined PAP entails. Like the Muller-Lyer illusion, I could know rationally that no person merits blame in a true sense, yet nevertheless be powerless toward feelings of indignation. I might also praise and blame persons in order to condemn or reinforce behavior in the hopes that my actions play a small causal role in future behavior (since I prefer that people not be murdered and that rational arguments prevail over irrational arguments) but this does not mean I must also accept that these very same persons are responsible in the sense we have defined.
The second is that your criticism assumes that all responsive behavior to immoral or irrational behavior, such as quarantine, chastising, etc., implies blameworthiness and not just blame. Could I not, in all consistency, quarantine a deadly murderer without upholding that he is morally responsible? What if I simply seek to remove him from society, as Susan’s first response says? Similarly, my desire to not address irrational arguments does not automatically result in affirming that the person is responsible for the irrational argument in the way the refined PAP entails. I may have misunderstood these elements of your argument, so forgive me if I have.
(3) “ought” statements are tricky in that they are commonly assumed to be moral yet are only normative. So, as Haji has argued, some “ought” statements could be used to demonstrate that the very formulation of morality as an “ought” statement demands there be a possibility to act in accordance with the statement. If I “ought” not to murder then there is some sense in which it must be up to me to decide whether I murder or not for the statement, and according to Haji any moral sentiment, to have any content. I disagree. There is a sense in which “ought” statements can represent moral sentiments but this is simply because moral sentiments are often normative; I ought to do one thing or another because it adheres to an ideal or a standard of behavior. Surely we can say that people ought not to murder without holding any person morally responsible for whether they murder or not. This is because such an ought statement is merely a declaration of the ideal standard. You said:
I am not; as I have said above, it seems open to me that praise and blame can play a role seperate from moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. I apologize again for my muddled use of the terms. Similarly I do not think my argument entails the statement “Human beings ought not find other human beings morally responsible” because this implies a some sort of normative standard, whereas I believe it is just simply not logical (assuming determinism) to affirm both determinism and moral responsibility in the way required by the refined PAP. Again, if this does not get at your argument then I apologize.
Once I have a little more time, perhaps later today, I would like to respond to (4).
Thanks for being patient, Aaron!
(4) Though I find switching to modus tollens to be a sharp tactic, there are three points I find problematic. The first is that you change the argument in order to disprove one of the premises. In your first iteration of my argument, P3 is the assumption that determinism is true, whereas in your final iteration of the modus ponens form, P*3 assumes the moral responsibility of S. The second is that, upon our assumption of the truth of determinism, I presume all this would do is turn your modus tollens formulation into a valid but unsound argument, since it demonstrates a premise we agree is true to be false. Further, even if this were a sound argument, the conclusion from your modus tollens formulation merely demonstrates the incongruity of moral responsibility from the PAP and determinism, a position with which I clearly agree. So if I understand your criticism correctly, I am unsure of how turning the argument on its head demonstrates that we can affirm both the PAP and determinism. I see it as far more preferable to reject that the PAP is necessary for moral responsibility. In fact, if we desire moral responsibility then we must do so, or argue that in fact there are some instances where the refined PAP can be true and yet determinism prevails. As my post goes, I do not think this is possible, but I could certainly be wrong.
Jared,
I was unclear when I provided the alternate (A2) to the original argument (A2). If we presume the truth of determinism, then A2 is certainly unsound. However, I meant to offer A2 without the presumption of determinism; apologies for the inprecision. I think that, within the lively debate over free will and determinism, both A1 and A2 are viable arguments. (Though, I am partial to accepting determinism as true.)
I have a question for you: How do you understand ‘moral responsibility’?
Sorry: ‘the original argument (A1).’
As it is used most frequently, I understand moral responsibility to include some rich sense of the blameworthiness and praiseworthiness of individuals based on the outcome or intention of their actions, most often accompanied by a sense that these intentions or actions stem from a free choice on the part of the person.
Many people make statements such as, “If I could go back I would have done things differently.” but this, obviously, presumes knowledge of the future outcome. Surely, should we go back in time and keep all factors constant, any person would make the exact same situation they made before.
My companion question is: Are my choices still free if, given the same situation, I would only have chosen what I did?
Perhaps an example is in order.
I am faced with a decision of purchasing a red sports car or a black sedan. I am quite partial to red, and I feel that choosing the red sports car will garner attention from the opposite sex, whereas the black sedan will not. However, upon purchasing the red sports car, I find that I am frequently pulled over by police whether I am speeding or not. Now, were I to go back to the moment of choice with this knowledge, it certainly would change my choice. But, if I went back without any of this knowledge, how could I have made any other choice than the red sports car? Simply because I wouldn’t have made another choice unless the situation were different, is it fair to say that my choice was not freely made?
Correction in paragraph 2: “would make the exact same choice“
Jared,
Nice post. I think that your argument can be bolstered even further by considering more moral theories. Think about what act consequentialists, virtue theorists, and even Kantians will say. Each has an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a morally impermissible action but none of them say anything about having free will.
I think your view is a pretty standard one that traces back to Aristotle, but people tend to blur moral blameworthiness with moral wrongness. A better view (an extension of yours perhaps) is that you are blameworthy for doing something wrong unless you have an excuse. There are two possible excuses: being forced to do it, and being non-culpably ignorant of what you did. If determinism is true, then it seems we all have the first excuse.
Aaron,
While ethics and epistemology are both normative, they seem to involve different kinds of normativity. I don’t think your Moorean shift on Jarod’s argument will work since it seems that we can be ‘blameworthy’ (or at least unjustified) in our beliefs even when we have no control over them, whereas the same is not true of moral blame and our actions.
Consider someone who cannot psychologically come to stop believing p, even though her evidence overwhelmingly supports not-p. her belief is unjustified, yet she cannot control it. I still wouldn’t consider her blameworthy (even epistemically), blameworthiness seems to require some kind of control. You seem to think that consistency requires you to see the conflicting beliefs of others are blameworthy, but I don’t see it. You have to see them as false, but that’s it.
So, you don’t have to give up on epistemic indictments if you take on Jarod’s distinction.
Jon,
I am glad you liked my post!
I think a distinction should be made between not having the ability to do otherwise, and being forced to do something. Determinism does not entail coercion, in that presumably the actions I choose are based on my desires, deliberations, etc. It just so happens that, given the state of the universe et al, that is the only choice I would have made. I see this as being quite different from coercion, where some Mad Scientist or Devil intervenes on our thought process and makes it such that we do something which we would not otherwise do. For, on a positive gloss of determinism, it could be that I always behave in a manner consistent with my desires, and thus not ever forced to act in a certain way, but also that I could not have acted otherwise given my desires and other factors.
Jared,
Right, I was wanting the account I gave to be acceptable to a determinist as well. A libertarian will think that determinism isn’t relevantly different than coercion, but that’s another debate.
Jared,
I find your position compatible with moral accountability (and, I would argue, moral responsibility, but, as you note, my understanding of moral responsibility is not the concept against which your view is opposed).
If S knows A is morally impermissible, intends to commit A, and is not coerced / forced to commit A, then S is morally accountable for A.
However, I do not see that your position necessarily entails a turn from punishment toward rehabilitation since your position is quite compatible with deterrence which in turn may reasonably justify punishment (though, not retribution, which you may have meant when you wrote punishment).
Aaron,
You are right, punishment is not the most precise term I could have chosen. I only meant to say that there is a sense in which many punishments, whether deterrence, retribution, isolation, quarantine, death, etc. carry a sense of ‘just deserts’, in that this person is deserving of pain or punishment due to the free choice of their behavior. This is the sense which I believe, given an idealistic shift in perception, rehabilitation would prevail. Often in particularly brutal crimes there is a sense that the criminal is not simply being removed from society, but rather the person themselves is being punished for their choice in a more robust sense than simply that the choice (1) accorded with their desires and (b) because the action stemmed from them, they are responsible for it.
Jon,
I do not see how rational norms differ from moral norms here. If one asserts otherwise, I would like to see the argument for that.
As to your example, if one suffers from a neurological condition which compels her to accept p even though p is blatantly contrary to the evidence, then I agree, we would not hold her rationally blameworthy. But this case is precisely analogous to one where one suffers from a neurological disorder which compels one to perform immoral actions: Just as in the previous case, we would not hold him morally blameworthy.
Such cases, however, differ from the cases which would likely engender Jared’s argument. According to him, *all* humans, whether neurologically normal or not, are not to be held morally blameworthy for anything. In fact, I suspect Jared’s conflation between the two cases should count as a weakness of his position.
But, while being not blameworthy, that person’s belief is bad — it is unjustified. Similarly, even if determinism is true, and we aren’t blameworthy for our actions, some of them can still be bad — morally wrong. That’s the parallel.
Jon,
I understand that Jared’s position can account for unjustified beliefs and immoral actions while abstaining from blaming agents for holding the former and performing the latter.
The point is this: We currently *do* and *should* continue to hold agents rationally responsible. (Note the fifth paragraph from the top in my initial reply to Jared.) Thus, given that holding rational agents rationally blameworthy is permissible, by analogy holding moral agent morally blameworthy is permissible.
Aaron,
Jarod’s view can allow for that too. It’s consistent to think that S is not blameworthy for doing moral wrong A, but that it is morally permissible to punish S for A-ing. Consequentialists have to endorse a principle like that.
Yes, I understand that, as well. Consequentialists of certain varieties can justify punishment on the grounds that it will contribute to future (determined) actions which are not immoral. But we often take actions against agents not in order to contribute to future moral activity on their part, but rather to compensate those who may have been wronged. I think we are just in taking actions because those agents are morally responsible; indeed, we must take such compensatory actions on pain of being immoral.
Apparently, the question must be asked: What, exactly, does it meant to hold an agent morally responsible for his actions (similarly, what does it mean to hold an agent rationally responsible for his beliefs)?
I contend that to hold one morally responsible is to do no more than to take certain actions with respect to that person *because* they acted in a particular way. (Again, note the fifth paragraph of my initial reply to Jared and the seventh paragraph in that same reply.)
Aaron,
If you believe moral responsibility to be nothing more than holding a person accountable for the actions that flow from them (regardless of alternate possibilities) then this is a different manner of viewing moral responsibility than my post concerns. I also would think it to be in line with my above correction that a person can certainly be blamed for the actions that flow from them without us needing to affirm any form of the PAP.
Jared,
Yes, I suspected as much. If S may be held accountable (required to pay compensation, imprisoned, socially rebuked, etc.) for his immoral actions, then I wonder what one means to assert when one says S may not be held morally responsible if determinism is true? In what non-trivial sense can one not be held morally responsible?
In precisely the sense that the refined PAP entails: the inability to have done otherwise.
Perhaps I was unclear. What practical difference does rejecting moral responsibility entail?
Rejecting this form of moral responsibility, at least on my account, demonstrates the possibility that free will has been unfairly inserted into moral considerations. This makes determinism appear to run counter to many more of our intuitions than it actually does. For, on your definition, there can certainly be moral responsibility and determinism. I have no problem with this, and in fact, find your definition far more appealing (though one might need to admit that counterfactual intervener scenarios carry some weight).
Also, another practical result is that attitudes toward behavior and punishment could change for the better. Should our society agree that human beings are not responsible in the sense that they could not have done otherwise, this would seem to require changing consequences for immoral behavior to be less around punishing a person for their choice and more around rehabilitation to see if the person can cease the behavior society views as damaging. I wonder if this position is undermined by the move that, whatever actions I take (except when I am coerced) are the actions I wanted to take, and so in some sense it might be alright to punish someone for wanting to kill. I am not sure – I have to think on it.
Aaron,
Compensations are consequences too.
Jarod’s view can allow for everything you just said except, “we are just in taking actions because those agents are morally responsible.”
The only problem for the view can come from claims that link moral responsibility and moral wrongness in certain ways. The view on offer can claim that it is morally wrong not to punish those who do moral wrong (even if they are not morally blameworthy).
So, your objection must endorse both of the following:
A. it is morally wrong to punish someone for an action that he/she is not morally responsible for.
and,
B. it is not morally wrong to punish some people for their actions (even granting the assumption of determinism).
That package is suspect at best.
Jon,
Above, you wrote:
‘While ethics and epistemology are both normative, they seem to involve different kinds of normativity. I don’t think your Moorean shift on Jarod’s argument will work since it seems that we can be ‘blameworthy’ (or at least unjustified) in our beliefs even when we have no control over them, whereas the same is not true of moral blame and our actions.’
I would like to see an argument for that. I find the analogy between rational norms and moral norms to be perfect (differing only in their subject matter, though, even then not entirely) and if under determinism one cannot be morally responsible for one’s actions, then one cannot be rationally responsible for one’s beliefs.
Aaron,
The claim is motivated by the case I gave above. The person whose evidence supports p, but psychologically cannot believe p, still epistemically ought to believe p.
The epistemic ought does not imply can. I think the moral one does.
Please help me understand. It is not the case that a serial murderer who has a psychological compulsion to kill, and thus cannot not kill, ought not to kill?
It seems to me that, though he cannot, the murder ought not to kill.
I am inclined to side with Aaron, since the moral dictate can stand regardless of whether it is possible for anyone to follow it.
Also, see Richard Feldman’s “The Ethics of Belief” for a good discussion of this.
Aaron,
If the moral ought entails ability, then there won’t be the distinction between moral normativity and epistemic normativity.
But, that the moral ought entails ability is a view with a lot of friends. In your case there are surely some sense of ‘ought’ according to which the killer who literally can’t help but kill ought not kill — i.e. the ought of proper function, the ought of things would be better otherwise.
I don’t think that it is true that he morally ought not kill if he truly cannot refrain (though killing may still be morally wrong).
Think about why it is not the case that you morally ought to save 15 children about to drown in different parts of a lake at the same time — you just can’t. Morality doesn’t require us to do more than we are able to.
Likewise, though we ought to believe all the logical consequences of the beliefs for which we have good evidence, we simply cannot: we are not logically omniscient; our cognitive-neurological framework simply cannot do it. I see this as being exactly analogous to cases in which we ought to do something morally, but cannot due to physical limitations (one before 15 drowning children).
I just don’t see how ought entails can. Take the Law of Moses as an example. According to Paul, the Jews ought to have fulfilled its dictates, but they couldn’t (no man save Christ could).
Well, either they *could* have followed the laws, or it’s not the case that they morally ought to have followed all of them. I find no discomfort in either option. If you want me to pick, I’ll say they could.
So, I admit you have an intuition pulling in your direction, I think I also have an intuition pulling in mine (drowning children).
The difference is I think I can explain away your intuition: there’s another relevant sense of ‘ought’ that we are thinking about (proper function, things would be better if).
Do you have a way of explaining away mine?
I think there are extenuating factors at play in the case of the drowning children. If the lifeguard desired to save all the children, made efforts to save as many as possible, then, even though he ought to have saved all of them, we understand why he did not (and we act accordingly relative to him).
If we apply this to the case of the psychopathic murderer, if the psychopath desired not to kill, made every effort available to her not to kill, but killed anyways, I would say she is less culpable than otherwise, though she ought not to have killed.
Moreover, if it is not the case that the psychopath shouldn’t kill, then it follows that he should kill, since either he should kill or he should not kill.
No that dilemma is certainly false. Take a simple case: It is not the case that I should put my left shoe on first, but it doesn’t follow that I should not put my left shoe on first. Perhaps I should put on some shoe first, but it’s not the case of either shoe that I should put it on first — I can pick.
Or think of nonmoral agents, or even non-agents. It’s not the case that my pen shouldn’t give to charity, so my pen should give to charity?
Jon,
The dilemma had an enthymematic premise: or the act of killing is non-moral, that is, one is neither morally required not to do it nor required to do it. However, as I found that premise unnecessary, I did not include it: killing is either morally required or is it not; never neither, never both.
Right, and not morally required when you can’t help it.
Notice morally required or not is different that morally should or morally should not.
The correct disjunction is morally should or not morally should.
And in the outlined case, it’s not morally should.
But I’ve got nothing left but my strong intuition (though the same is true for you). I’m happy with saying “show’s how important intuitions are for philosophy.”
I do not see how ‘should,’ ‘required,’ ‘ought,’ etc. are not perfect synonyms in moral and rational normativity. How do following differ, in any way, from another: One, morally, ‘should’ do x :: One, morally, ought to do x :: One, morally, is required to do x.
As for intuitions, philosophy would do well to efface itself of intuitions (I am not sure they can be differentiated from one’s mere prejudices) for the sake of clarity.
The issue is with where you are placing the negation. Should or should not is simply not the same as should or not should.
Required or required not to is simply not the same as required or not required. Ought to A or ought to not-A is simply not the same as ought to A or not ought to A.
That was my point. No point about how those terms relate to one another.
On the second point, efface your intuition that ought does not imply can, and what are you left with to justify your belief? Or are you happy with agnosticism?
Jon,
I made no blunder in my initial dilemma (save for omitting the enthymematic premise): Either it is the case that I am morally required to kill or it is the case that I am morally required not to kill. To say it is not the case that I am morally required to kill is consistent with saying it is the case that I am morally required not to kill (which was expressed in the dilemma) and saying it is the case that I am neither morally required to kill nor morally required not to kill (which, as noted, was suppressed in the dilemma).
It is not an intuition which I have but rather an understanding with how ‘ought’ is commonly employed to express certain moral and rational normative relationships.
Right, and I opted for you ‘enthymematic’ horn of your dilemma/trilemma. That’s all my response was doing.
An ‘understanding’ might sound better than an ‘intuition’. I’m happy to change my language.
OK, that’s a little unfair, but isn’t there a question as to whether the folk are correct in at least some of these judgments?
If you are just concerned with how people use language you don’t need intuitions, but your not doing (at least much) philosophy either.
and didn’t I give a type of case where ordinary fluent English speakers are clearly on my side?
Further, how often do these speakers make ought claims when the person in question really is literally incapable of doing otherwise? Or better, when the speaker even believes that the person is literally incapable of doing otherwise?
This is perfectly natural:
Lifeguard: I should have saved them all
Observer: C’mon now, don’t be ridiculous. You couldn’t do that . . . no one could.
Lifeguard: Yes, you’re right.
p.s. dialogues always let you win.
Jon Jared & Aaron, why should you take up this space here by your personal dialogues ? To me one affirmative consistent opinion is enough and makes this page reader-friendlier!
In my opinion, one should differentiate between G-d’s laws and secular laws when considering morality and moral issues.
Sometimes the two types of laws overlap, but often they do not.Not to mention that there are some differences in the different types of religions, regarding the discussed here laws.
Then one should question him/herself about his/her behavior – the secular one or the religious one -which he/she clings more to.e.g (murdering had already been discussed, I will point out other vices)For the secular world smoking is not a problem since the smokers does it at the allowed for the aim place,while according to G-d’s laws smoking is not only harmful but not allowed , not moral , not only not moral but offensive -one offends G-d ‘s view and idea for life by killing him/herself.Smoking is equal to attesting in front of G-d’ that one wishes not the precious gift given to him/her,which Life is.
Not to mention the laws about stealing, adultery , lying etc.
Sometimes we humans tend to justify ourselves if we commit any of the mentioned immoral acts by finding excuses or direct or indirect motives to obscure the lack of moral responsibility -we may obscure ourselves as well by admitting we are committing our job/duties. But what if those are in contrary to the universal/G-d’s values and moral laws? then we begin to realize…
All that depends on if we are active and seeking the truth and if we really find the right people to educate us in what or how G-d views morality. His morality is unconditionally and objectively the true one! And we should learn to judge according to it, not to any secular value system.Only when we learn this, then we can be considered to be happily acting morally and with moral responsibility. And yes, it is true that we humans in contrast to the animals we have this ability to differ good from bad, to control our choices as well. We need only to pray for the G-d’s help when we want to make the right ones.
we also should not stop deeming on that issues and further explore them.
Success!
regards,
Mari
Editor’s Note: edited for spelling mistakes.
Mari,
First, I apologize if the different threads of conversation between Aaron, Jon, and myself were difficult to follow. I recognize that they certainly could be, and I will make an effort in future posts to avoid complicating the comment section. However, I do believe all of said conversations were appropriate and relevant. Also, I believe the spirit of the blog is not to post a single ideology, but for contributors to pose philosophical issues or stances and then to discuss them with those who reply.
That being said, I had a number of questions about your comment:
Referring to God’s morality you say,
(1)What do you take to be the manner of revelation for God’s objective moral law? Further, on what grounds is it objectively true? i.e. is it true because God says so, or does God merely affirm based on some other principle that it is true?
(2) What do you believe the content of God’s objective moral law is? You say smoking is against such a moral law and yet I am unaware of any dictate in the Bible (forgive me if this is not the standard you are using) that would ban smoking. It seems you believe any behavior that contributes to our own death is immoral based on the assumption that it is immoral to take our own life, yet I think these are not only different (since then riding a bike without a helmet could be immoral) but also I wonder where you believe God tells us we should not take our own life.
(3) Lastly, you say we should judge behavior based on God’s morality and not secular morality. However, it seems to me that in day to day situations, aspects of God’s moral law have little to do with morals (that is, if we are talking about the 10 commandments, which you seem to reference). For example, it seems to matter very little in my day to day life whether God says I should not worship graven images or hold other gods above him. These dictates seem religious and not moral, and so again I wonder what their use is. Further, following from (1), why is adultery immoral? Because God says so? Or because it violates some other principle?
Mariyana,
You are right in that the exchange grew convoluted, but I am not sure how that could have been avoided.
As for your plea for a DCT, review my post here: http://unfspb.wordpress.com/2010/04/04/the-moral-trilemma-of-the-omnibenevolent-abrahamic-god/
Also, check out the penultimate reply in the comments section. Hope you enjoy.
[...] post can also be found here at the Florida Student Philosophy [...]
Thanks Aron for your concised and meaningful reply. I will check the link in some minutes.
Thank you Jared for your attepmt to right in a short ( only 3 paras!) and meaningful manner as well.
That is the style I adore- lots of meaning transferred via small content or even better by a body language- with “0″ word at all. The latter in the sense of a joke of course as with philosophy I know it is impossible to be achieved.
Jared,
Great questions for which I thank again.
But I will try this time to reply with questions may be to you:
1. How do yo ufeel inside you? I am sure if you believe you were made by G-d’s image , you will be able to feel the truth inside your heart (sorry for the intuitive approach, but sometimes it is essential as well)
2. & 3.Have you ever read anything from the Holy Book/the Bible?
there are the answers to all your questions and yes, G-d had very long ago replied to all our questions there in this book!There he said that we schould apprecuate our lives , how we schould behave towards the outer world what to be watching out for, about our roles in the family about the sense of living ( the great reason is to obey him!), about adultary I cannot remmeber if in right context or indirectly as a sub categorized analysis..but yes all of those topics are inside there!
Whenever you seek you will find. You may find different replies at different places and sources and it is up to your decisions what philosophy and which one to follow/to become a follower to!It sometimes also depends not only on you yourself but the appropriate environment of people /society who you can belong to and can guide you through !
Hope to have been clear !
Regards to both of you!
Mari.
Mari,
First, I do not believe posing questions as answers to questons is an effective method of reply, since it often indicates an unwillingness to directly address the issues at hand. However, I will reply to your questions, and I will do so with concrete answers.
(1) Intuitive responses are not equivalent to reasoned explanations. While utilizing intuitive responses in thought-experiments can often demonstrate some evidence for a given position, philosophers like Kant were highly suspicious of intuitive responses, since often they are inconsistent. I may have been ever so vague in my request for justification and so I will clarify. What I would like to hear is an a priori argument, without a baseless appeal to the truth of some text, for the content of God’s law. I do not accept the belief in a deity as proper philosophical proof of the truth of some objective moral law – that is an a posteriori argument, since it requires that your interlocutor have or gain some sort of experience (or even weaker, some sort of faith) in order to confirm your position.
I do not believe, nor have I ever felt in my heart, that I was created in the image of a deity.
Your answer to (2) and (3) smacks of an argument from authority and is a fallacious form of argumentation. To answer your own question, yes, I have read the Old and New Testament in their entirety two times on two seperate occasions. I grew up hearing many Christian sermons delivered by those well-versed in such topics, and have taken many theology courses. Never (in the Bible) was the question of how the commandment against false idols is a moral law answered, except for the implicit argument (as in Divine Command Theory) that whatever God dictates is immoral simply because he says so. I have sought for such answers in the Bible in the past and have found none that stand up to any level of scrutiny.
It is the same method by which with installing other programs.
Is always it Possible in watch Fox, NBC, CBS TV function online?