Submitted for your consideration, a hastily written polemic. I would like to see what others think of this situation.
David Hume begins Part X of his “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,” the famous “Of Miracles,”by noting, and showing his approval of, an argument against transubstantiation propounded by Dr.Tillotson. Hume writes:
“Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane” (Hume 1974: 387)
Was Hume’s argument a success? Well, that depends: which argument? There has been perhaps as much contention and debate surrounding the correct interpretation of Hume’s “Of Miracles” as there has been of its merit or lack thereof. One of the main interpretive controversies: is Hume’s argument a priori, ruling out in principle the evidential identification of miracles, or a posteriori, simply maintaining the thesis that in fact no miracle reports enjoy strong evidential support (for an example of the former view see Earman 2000; for an example of the latter view see Fogelin 2003). Which, if either, of these views is correct?
My thesis: both these views are correct. There is so much confusion on the topic simply because Hume contradicts himself. Is this reading of Hume uncharitable? Consider:
“But in order to increase the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvelous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist.
A miracle is a violation of a law of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined” (Hume 1974: 391)
What is Hume saying here? In the first part of the quote he seems to concede that, in principle anyway, testimony to the occurrence of a miracle could amount to a proof (note that, for Hume, the term “proof” simply denotes “such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition” — Hume would never say that the epistemic probability of the occurrence of some matter of fact, as opposed to some logical or mathematical demonstration, was strictly 1), but that this proof would encounter an opposite proof, also deriving from our experience, of the hitherto observed course of nature (dead men don’t rise, etc.). But then Hume moves on to say that this opposite proof, derived from the “firm and unalterable experience” of the conformity of the world to some law of nature, is “as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.” The proponent of some miraculous event will have to maintain then that the evidence for the occurrence of some miraculous event surpasses the opposite proof from our past observations of the course of nature – which, I reiterate, is supposed to be “as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.” But how, if this kind of evidence can be marshaled for a purportedly miraculous event, can this event retain the appellation “miracle”? By definition the evidence against the occurrence of any miraculous event is as strong as can be imagined.
This a priori reading of the text follows fairly naturally from many parts of “Of Miracles” (“This may, indeed, be the majority view” – Fogelin 2003: 34). Unfortunately, other parts of Hume’s essay are not amenable at all to this reading of the argument. Take, for example, the following, from Part II of “Of Miracles”:
“In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that the testimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy. But it is easy to show, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence” (Hume 1974: 393)
“Upon the whole, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavor to establish” (Hume 1974: 401)
These quotes seem a bit more reserved than the one I cited earlier. In fact, they seem to have dropped the a priori nature of the argument entirely, retreating to the simple claim that in fact no miracles have been supported by such testimony as to render them probable (that the several alleged miracles Hume examines are all straw men shouldn’t be too surprising – after all, how could Hume, in a mere 17 or so pages, argue that no miracles have ever been well attested to by the evidence?) Regarding the second quote, Earman notes that editions of Hume’s Enquiry published prior to 1768 read that “no Testimony for any kind of miracle can ever possibly amount to a Probability, much less to a Proof” (Earman 2000: 45; emphasis added). Note the change from “can ever possibly amount to a probability” to the more reserved “has ever amounted to a probability.” This change is just, I suppose, more obfuscation on Hume’s part. Indeed, Hume can’t seem to stick to a single thesis. Soon after the second quote above Hume writes:
“When, therefore, these two kinds of experience [that testifying to the general reliability of human testimony and that testifying to the laws of nature] are contrary, we have nothing to do but subtract, the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the principle here explained, this subtraction, with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion” (Hume 1974: 401)
“No human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion” (emphasis added). The a priori reading of Hume’s argument is back in full swing. Yet, later in Part II, Hume proceeds to describe a scenario in which we would in fact be justified in accepting, on the basis of testimony, the occurrence of a miraculous event (the eight days of worldwide darkness). We’re back at the a posteriori reading of Hume.
Has Hume contradicted himself? Very probably. At any rate I should expect more clarity from such a celebrated philosopher and such an oft cited essay.
Works Cited
Earman, John. Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000. Print.
Fogelin, Robert J. A Defense of Hume on Miracles. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003. Print.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. The Empiricists. Anchor Books, 1974. Print.
I think your interpretation of the second to last passage you quoted is uncharitable to Hume. Hume is clearly not retreating from his earlier thesis, but pointing out that, he has previously been arguing against the credibility of a miracle on the best testimonial evidence imaginable. The point of the “retreat” is that, this was, in his view, a pretty generous thing to grant the defender of belief in miracles, since no miracle was ever attended by testimonial evidence of such strength.
Also, I am not entirely certain that the 8 days of darkness is intended as a miracle instead of a marvel, but I’d have to check the text to be sure.
My thoughts on this were a bit more involved than would be suited for a comment thread, so I just made it a post on my own blog: http://horselesstelegraph.blogspot.com/2009/11/hume-on-miracles.html
Lewis,
First, I apologize for taking so long to respond. I’m a very lazy person.
Also, this response will have to be brief (well… maybe not that brief), as I need to be somewhere soon. Therefore, I will not be able to examine your response in detail.
[For the benefit of those who don't feel like clicking on the link Mr.Powel has provided, he argues for a basically a priori reading of Hume. In other words Hume intended to rule out, in principle, the possibility of a miracle being well attested to by the evidence.]
All in all your interpretation of Hume’s argument is very plausible (it seems to be how most people interpret Hume’s argument). However, not plausible enough! Consider the following:
A. You write: “I interpret Hume’s argument in ‘Of Miracles (Part 1)’ to be an argument against the possibility of any testimony (no matter how strong) serving to justify belief in a miracle, and also establishing the condition which would need to be met for testimony to justify belief in a miracle: namely, for it to be sufficiently more contrary to one’s experience that the testimony is innaccurate than that the attested event occurred. As I read him, Hume clearly does not think that any testimonial evidence for a miracle can be stronger than the experiential evidence against it (evidence one is guaranteed to have in virtue of the event in question being a miracle).”
I think this actually supports my reading of Hume. In Part I of “Of Miracles” Hume argues, as you say, “against the possibility of any testimony… serving to justify belief in a miracle.” Why then does he also, as you say, establish “the condition which would need to be met for testimony to justify belief in a miracle?” If miracles could not *in principle* be well attested to by the evidence then what sense does it make to establish such a criterion, as Hume does in his “maxim” (nearish the end of Part I)? What Hume really seems to do is 1.Argue that, in principle, a miracle could never be well attested to by testimony, and then 2.Provide a criterion (the “maxim”) that lays out when we would be justified in believing testimony to the occurence of a miracle. In formulating the criterion Hume certainly seems to leave it as an open question whether or not the criterion could possibly be met. (Indeed, at Earman 2000 rightly points out, Hume’s famous “maxim” seems to amount to the claim that we should believe the testimony to the occurence of a miracle if the testimony renders it *more probable than not*! This hardly seems like a damning criticism of proponents of the miraculous).
B.Hume does indeed refer to the “eight days of darkness” scenario as a miraculous (as opposed to a marvelous) event. Thus Hume writes: “I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history.” He then goes on to describe the “eight days of darkness” scenario and endorse the fact that we would be justified in believing, on the basis of testimony, the occurence of that miraculous event.
-Andrew Brenner
I stand corrected with respect to point (B). And that definitely causes trouble for the interpretation I was suggesting.
On point (A) however, I think we can make more sense of Hume if we take his position to be this:
Testimonial evidence can (in principle) serve as good evidence of a miracle, in the sense that the receiving the testimonial evidence can count strongly in favor of believing the miracle. Hume’s argument is intended to demonstrate that any circumstance in which one has such good evidence of a miracle is also a situation in which one has evidence against the miracle that is at least as good, if not better (this is evidence arising from the miraculous nature of the event).
Consider the point you mention from Earman, that Hume’s Maxim is:
(1) One should only believe in a miracle on the basis of testimony if the testimony makes the miracle more probable than not.
(I’m not sure that’s the right way to read the maxim, but it works for this purpose.)
What premise would one need to add to that, in order to conclude that one should never believe a miracle on the basis of testimony? I suggest this one:
(2) No testimony can ever make a miracle more probable than not.
For the conclusion:
(3) It is never the case that one should believe in a miracle on the basis of testimony.
So, if Earman is right about the maxim, “Of Miracles (Part 1)” proceeds by arguing first for (2), then pointing out (1), to conclude (3).
This does leave the problem you raise about the miraculous event of the 8 days of darkness, but, I think the best way to understand this portion of the text is as transitioning into a more subtle discussion of the gradable strength of miracles (8 days of darkness would be less miraculous than the resurrection of the queen). The 8 days of darkness is less contrary to the usual course of nature than would be the falsity of the event attested by such a giant confluence of testimonial evidence; but even that degree of convergence would not suffice in the resurrection case. So the best case scenario for a miracle would be maximizing the credibility and number of witnesses, and minimizing the extent to which the miracle is contrary to nature. No doubt it would have been better for my interpretation (and for Hume, I suppose) to describe 8 days of darkness as a marvel rather than a miracle.
“This does leave the problem you raise about the miraculous event of the 8 days of darkness, but, I think the best way to understand this portion of the text is as transitioning into a more subtle discussion of the gradable strength of miracles (8 days of darkness would be less miraculous than the resurrection of the queen).”
A major problem here: If Hume intended what you say he may have intended here, then why does he (according to you) argue earlier that “It is never the case that one should believe in a miracle on the basis of testimony”? As Earman 2000 rightly points out, Hume can only maintain that no testimony is sufficient to establish the credibility of a miracle if the probability of the miracle’s occurrence, given our evidence from the general course of nature, is flatly 0. How then could there be miracles of graded strength?
Two other problems with this interpretation (these are minor points that, on further reflection, I’m not sure are correct. My most important criticism is the one in my previous paragraph):
1.The way Hume defines miracles seems to preclude graded probability strengths for them (“A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined”, also: “A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent”). Hume seems to assume that the laws of nature in question (those being violated) must be absolutely uniform in our past experience. There doesn’t seems to be any room left to grade miracles along a scale of improbability.
2.Your interpretation, with miracles of graded strength, also seems to nullify the distinction, which Hume apparently thought was important, between a miracle and a marvel. The difference between the two seems to be a difference in *type*, not simply degree.
While I think what I’ve just written implies that Hume couldn’t have meant what you say he meant, a counterexample has just come to my attention. In a 1761 letter to Hugh Blair, Hume writes: “The proof against a miracle, as it is founded on invariable experience, is of that *species* or *kind* of proof, which is full and certain when taken alone, because it implies no doubt, as is the case with all probabilities [to avoid confusion I should note that here, I believe, Hume is referring to a distinction between proofs and probabilities which is, for him, a difference of degree, not type]; but there are degrees of this species, and when a weaker proof is opposed to a stronger, it is overcome” (Hume 1969: 350). As ever on this topic Hume lacks clarity…
Cited:
Hume, David. The Letter of David Hume. Ed. J. Greig. Vol. 1. London: Oxford UP, 1969. Print.
“As Earman 2000 rightly points out, Hume can only maintain that no testimony is sufficient to establish the credibility of a miracle if the probability of the miracle’s occurrence, given our evidence from the general course of nature, is flatly 0. How then could there be miracles of graded strength?”
I have not yet had a chance to carefully read all of Earman’s book, so, with all relevant caveats in mind, I think contemporary approaches to probability are simply incompatible with the system of probability Hume has in mind. Dorothy Coleman and L. Jonathan Cohen have both argued that Hume should be read as a Baconian about probability rather than a Pascalian (Pascal’s probability is the one we are familiar with today, on which the scale runs from proof to disproof; that is to say, that a Probability of 0 on Pascal’s scale is equivalent to a probability of 1 in the negation, whereas Bacon’s approach was to run a scale from certainty at one end, to uncertainty at the other, in which case the lower limit of probability is maximal uncertainty, not maximal certainty in the negation.
But, this is complicated by the fact that proofs are not, for Hume, differing in probabilistic strength. That is to say, perhaps I have a stronger proof that objects always fall when dropped than I do that gold is soluble in aqua regia, but my experience of both generalizations has been without exception. Then, we cannot have a difference in probability (for Hume) since the two generalizations share the same ratio of positive to negative experiments (100% positive), instead, the measure of strength would have to come from something else, for instance, the sheer amount of experiments
We know that Hume wants a measure that can differentiate between the support that I have for a causal generalization G in a situation where I have a hundred experiences confirming G and no experienced exceptions to G as compared to a situation in which I have a hundred thousand experiences confirming G and no experienced exceptions to G.
The latter enjoys better support than the former for Hume, as we can see in Hume’s challenges to rationalistic accounts (i.e. the view that causal inference is a priori) and perceptualist accounts (i.e. the view that causation is observed in particular instances), which, he charges, have the failing of not distinguishing the degree of support given by 0 observed instances (for rationalistic accounts) or 1 observed instance (for the perceptualist accounts) from the degree of support given by a much larger body of observed instances (ECHU V.1, p. 42 in the Selby-Bigge edition, the paragraph starting “This principle is custom or habit…” – though the relevant thought experiment starts two paragraphs earlier).
Let me finally add that while I sympathize with your frustrations about the difficulty of Hume’s text, it is important to bear in mind that at least some of the difficulty we have in interpreting Hume comes from our being brought up with a single, dominant, coherent approach to probability that has been suitably formalized and studied for some time. While Earman does not take the radically different status of Probability in Hume’s day to justify additional charity in reading Hume (cf p. 25 of “Hume’s Abject Failure”) my point is different than the one Earman is contesting; if Hume was operating with a different conception of probability than the one we are trained in, that will result, through no fault of Hume’s, in a more difficult text for us to work through. This point is independent of whether or not the alternate conception of probability Hume adopts is viable. As a quick example; Hume’s argument that all knowledge devolves to probability and all probability is diminished to nothing if we iteratively consider our fallibility, seems to claim that the probabilities reduce to 0. However, this is not a skeptical result on the Pascalian system; it is the absurd result that we come to be certain of the negation of every claim. Hume’s argument, though, is clearly about diminishing certainty. The mere fact that Hume’s conception of probability differs from our common/dominant conception today generates textual difficulty, even though those difficulties are not the result of Hume being unclear.
Lewis, I apologize again for being lazy and waiting until now to respond. Unfortunately I don’t have much in way of response. You write:
“I have not yet had a chance to carefully read all of Earman’s book, so, with all relevant caveats in mind, I think contemporary approaches to probability are simply incompatible with the system of probability Hume has in mind. Dorothy Coleman and L. Jonathan Cohen have both argued that Hume should be read as a Baconian about probability rather than a Pascalian.” … “The mere fact that Hume’s conception of probability differs from our common/dominant conception today generates textual difficulty, even though those difficulties are not the result of Hume being unclear.”
I’ve heard similar criticisms before, and here I’m just not currently capable of judging on the matter. It’s interesting to note however that people like Fogelin (2003), and many others writing on the topic, continue to write things like: “though mathematically naive, [Hume's position] is broadly Bayesian in character.” Unfortunately I can’t knowledgeably speculate about what’s causing all the confusion…
“Remarkably, the discussion of Hume on miracles has not been confined to, or even principally concerned with, whether or not Hume was correct in his argument against justified belief in miracles — and/or the possibility of justified belief in miracles. Instead, philosophical discussion has focused on exegetical issues concerning exactly what Hume was arguing. There is, for example, still no generally accepted view on the fundamental points of whether his argument (Part I of his essay) against the justified belief in miracles on the basis of testimony is (i) meant as an a priori or a posteriori argument; (ii) if that argument can be, or is meant to be, generalized to include first-hand experience of an allegedly miraculous event; or indeed, (iii) if his argument, whether regarded as a priori or a posteriori, is meant to establish that one can never be justified in believing in a miracle on the basis of testimony.” – Michael Levine, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/miracles/