Society is the complex interaction of many and various groups, institutions, and disciplines (here to be understood as professional fields). While the configuration of the various social groups varies from one particular society to another, all are amalgams of participating, that is, acting, individuals. Actions, however, are the exclusive domain of individuals. An aggregate entity qua an aggregate entity cannot act. When one speaks of an aggregate entity as “acting”, “thinking”, or, “being responsible for something,” one necessarily speaks of individuals as acting, thinking, or being responsible for something. For example, when the State executes an inmate it is not the State who administers the poison; rather, the executioner does so. During a football game, a team never scores a touchdown; instead, an individual scores touchdowns.
It should be noted that the football player never acts in complete isolation either. When the player scores a touchdown to win the game, it is the team that is victorious and not solely the player. In a like manner, the executioner is an executioner and not a murderer only insofar as he acts within a certain, specified role that receives and retains meaning only in and through the institution of the State. It may further be noted that all roles, whether father, friend, or lover, doctor, pilot, or artist can maintain meaning only within some formal (in many cases informal) social relation. This, unfortunately, does not annul the fact that only individuals act. For, in the case of the executioner and the football player, there is a similar, common psychological orientation shared between themselves and the other individuals in their group. The commonality is not real, though. Rather, it is a construct that serves as a facilitator for individuals in attaining a desired end or ends.
I define the division of labor as the specialization of co-operative, concerted action non-centrally distributed among numerous individuals for a desired end(s). Invariably, the division of labor increases productivity per unit of labor exhausted. This insight has led to the alleviation of many heretofore-insoluble human hardships. Without the division of labor, each man himself is compelled to produce each one of his many wants and needs. It is a fact, however, that not all men are equally productive in their natural abilities. That is, there are men who are more gifted, more skilled, and harder working than others, and men who are less gifted, less skilled, and not as hard working as others. Furthermore, it is an unfortunate fact that one’s environment does not equally possess any one (or more) commodity in universal abundance. It is a fact that since Adam’s fall men are destined to inhabit environs that are not equally rich in natural and artificial resources. In most cases, an agent discovers that, because of a lack of resources and natural talent, many of the particular commodities that he desires are inaccessible. These natural inequalities compel agents to co-ordinate their productive efforts for their greater benefit. The individuals involved in co-operative labor will soon conclude that, overall, it is in their best interests to do so. In this sense, then, the division of labor is a tool, if only a complex tool, utilized for value acquisitioning. It is imperative for the value acquisitioning process that agents communicate and co-ordinate their productive actions accordingly. Society is just such a coordinated division of labor.
One may only speak coherently of group action if one first recognizes that it is an amalgam of individual action. Groups act only insofar as the individuals who comprise them act together to achieve a common goal or end. To reconsider again group action, say, the American military occupation of Iraq, we must understand that it is merely the actions and the common psychological orientation of a certain number of individuals. To conclude otherwise would be to assert that every American is currently in the military and physically occupying Iraq at this very moment.
Of course, a commentator may note that the American military presence in Iraq is not merely (even though empirically it is) a group of individuals acting in concert for some end. This is true. Yet, this is also to assume that there is a meaningful entity called, “The United States of America,” and that its military is (if only partially) occupying a foreign country. This entity, while certainly possessing a type of existence- let us call it a contingent existence-, is merely a construct of individuals who share a common psychological orientation. (Indeed, the urge to point out that the concept “The United States of America” only exists in the brains of individuals is overwhelming.) To use the military example again, it is a fact that whenever a soldier is awarded a medal, given a bonus, or rewarded in some other fashion, the awarder, the presentator, and the awardee are all and only individuals. Any connection to a group is solely and merely psychological.
In no way do I intend to denigrate or devalue social interaction. It is an undeniable fact that society is the great wellspring of many of our sweetest pleasures. To be sure, by participating in society and not removing to a more private location, I declare as much. Perhaps, though, it is best to be cautious and speak not of society but of the psychological orientation of its constituent members. For it is far too easy to ascribe to a linguistic construction a signification not supported by external fact, and thus we often find ourselves in questionable moral situations.
Take, as an illustration, the idea of the “social good”. It is often used to justify a great number of actions, such as, but not limited to, the involuntary redistribution of wealth. It is said that by doing so, the “greater good of society is being served.” However, as there is no embodied entity to which we may impute the term “society”, what exactly is accomplished by involuntary wealth redistribution is the sacrifice of some individuals for the benefit of other individuals. (I use the term “involuntary” because wealth redistribution is not necessarily involuntary in nature. Indeed, wealth is voluntarily redistributed rather frequently through the trading of a medium of exchange for commodities.) To use individuals in this manner, I assert, is to use some individuals as mere means for the certain ends of others, and is thus immoral.
Furthermore, the individuals sacrificed must recognize that the initial benefit that they were to receive by participating in the group has disappeared and that what remains now is a coercive construct that penalizes productivity. Now, one of two things are likely to follow: (1) the sacrificed will refrain from his productive efforts and maintain or approach, in relation to his fellows, some level of marginal utility; or (2) the sacrificed will conclude that his current inclusion in the group is not cost effective and will thus leave for a more appealing situation, or endeavor to change the status quo in the current situation. Of course, after saying this, I must offer the following caveat. The level of marginal utility in (1) and the likelihood of relocation in (2) are directly proportionate to the amount and frequency of the involuntary wealth redistribution. What should be clear now is that involuntary wealth redistribution is a logically inconsistent practice.
The difficulties directly derivable from such notions as the “good of society” are many; however, I felt it necessary to mention only two. In fact, the two that I did mention, I must admit, deserve a longer, more systematic treatment than I have afforded them here. Nevertheless, I feel the examples to be adequate.
Aaron,
I think that this is a great post, and it definitely forces me to rethink my own view. However, there were two points which I feel inclined to push you further on. The first one is about the way you define existence for concepts like country, and the second is in regards to your description of “involuntary wealth redistribution.”
This first point is not really an objection- it was just a question I had in the back of my mind as I read your paper. As I understand from your post (and from conversations with you), a group is merely an aggregate of individuals. And furthermore that, “any connection to a group is solely and merely psychological.” You describe America as a “contingent” entity, and I would take that to mean an abstract entity that does not necessarily exist (instead of abstract entities which do, like numbers). So, given this view, how are we to understand terms referring to groups, and more specifically the meaning of those terms? I think that a common way of ascribing meaning to terms would be the referential model, where the meaning of a word comes from what the word physically refers to. Given your view of existence, could the referential model of meaning still be used in defining words like America. Or could the referential model be used to refer to ideas? This, to me, seems problematic because the strength of the referential model seems to come from the fact that an empirical referent makes meaning clear. Even in paradigm shifts it allows individuals to know that they are talking about the same stuff. On the one hand I think that it is okay if America has no real referent because that sort of captures the fact that it is difficult to define America, and words like it. However, I do think that such a view would have implications, say for territory or legal issues, which may be worth avoiding. Anyway, this may not even be your view on meaning…but I think it would be interesting to hear how you define America and what you think the implications of that would be.
To the second point, I think it is correct to say that wealth redistribution is involuntary, or that individuals are more or less forced to do it. I think you are also right to assert that this makes society more difficult for them to conduct business as they would want to. One the other hand, I think that your characterization of the relationship of these individual’s to society is not totally accurate.
“Furthermore, the individuals sacrificed must recognize that the initial benefit that they were to receive by participating in the group has disappeared and that what remains now is a coercive construct that penalizes productivity.”
Has the benefit totally disappeared? In some respects (such as the high tax rate on stock dividends) the benefits of a productive company are penalized. And it is probably true that these people would like the keep more or all of their profit. However, it is also true that in hard economic times those same people are glad that their bank accounts have FDIC insurance, or that the fed is either giving them low interest loans (bail-outs) or helping them find buyers for their companies (like how an English bank is buying parts of Leman Brothers). My point is not that one of these views or the other is the right way to approach the situation, but rather that those whose wealth is being redistributed do not necessarily have coherent views on the situation and that those views do not really justify any position. As in a lot of other areas, people tend to like something when it is working and hate it when it is not. Additionally, I think a closer look at the situation shows that it is not the case that one group is clearly disproportionately negatively effected by wealth redistribution. For example, while a lot of less-wealthy people receive Medicaid, WIC, and unemployment benefits, publicly traded companies and their shareholders are given loans over 10 billion dollars which may not be able to be paid back (like in the savings and loans crises where debt was just forgiven). My over all point is this: People may feel angry about not being treated fairly, but I think that what it means to be treated fairly in this case is perhaps too complex to be quantified and thus it is not really justified to claim that all of the benefits to one group have disappeared.
Amy,
When you ask, “how are we to understand terms referring to groups, and more specifically the meaning of those terms,” I am inclined to answer: very carefully.
I do not intend to sound trite, Amy, but my point is precisely because aggregate entities do not possess an external, mind-independent existence, it is prudent to tailor our actions accordingly. For when agents act on behalf of an aggregate entity, the recipients of such actions are always persons who themselves possess an inviolable and universal right to life, liberty, and private property.
If people (and please do suffer me this absurd point) opted to take actions on behalf of a non-contingent abstract entity, say, the number 7, I would also, and for the same reason, preach a certain prudence of action.
Now, to address the second portion of your reply. I understand and made note of the fact that I too briefly presented some of the difficulties associated with taking action on behalf of the “the greater good of society” (and similar motivations). I also admit that I (somewhat) oversimplified the cost-benefit analysis an individual makes in relation to his participation in society. There are, of course, a great many concerns, many of which are themselves not rational, e.g. sentimental ties, love, a need to “belong, etc., at play in an agent’s thought process. Nevertheless, I do think my analysis was basically sound and, what is more, correlates very well to the available economic data on immigration and emigration.
That aside, I think you missed and thus failed to address the moral point that I made. Therefore, I shall reiterate it: “However, as there is no embodied entity to which we may impute the term ’society’, what exactly is accomplished by involuntary wealth redistribution is the sacrifice of some individuals for the benefit of other individuals.” Thus: “To use individuals in this manner, I assert, is to use some individuals as mere means for the certain ends of others, and is thus immoral.”
I really must emphasize the “involuntary” in “involuntary wealth redistribution”. For when a person (A) is forced or coerced through the threat of force to give a portion of his rightfully acquired private property to fulfill some other individual’s end, (A) is reduced to the status of a tool; similar to, but much worse than, say, a paint brush.
(I realize that I am making certain meta-ethical assumptions. However, I feel my position has a very strong intuitive appeal.)
There is, perhaps, an avenue of response that one such as yourself could take. You could contend that when one’s wealth is involuntarily redistributed one is, or eventually is, justly compensated. Thus, we may say that “just compensation” is when P is given remuneration R for Q’s initial action A, such that R makes P as well off had Q not committed A.
Prima facie, this concept of “just compensation” is rather uncontroversial and possesses some utility. For instance, if I steal your can of RC cola, I can justly compensate you by justly acquiring another can of RC cola and transferring it to you.
There, however, are difficulties. The first and most glaring problem is with the counterfactual: “as well off… had Q not committed A.” How precisely are we to determine the truth of the counterfactual statement? What if, in the above example, the can of RC cola that I initially relieved you of was never intended to be consumed by yourself? Rather, what if the can of cola possessed some subjective sentimental value- let us pretend it was given to you by your dear and dying mother while she was on her death bed, and she implored you never to part with it- to you that the newer can of RC cola could never replace? How, then, exactly are we to quantify the value of the RC cola and thus the remuneration in any future compensation?
With these (and more) concerns, I find it impossible to devise a truly just system of compensation.
Aaron,
I hope that my post did not make it sound like I was asserting that people would ever do something on behave of an abstract entity like a number. I do however think that people do things on behave of other abstract entities, or at least ones which are not clearly empirical- perhaps like God or rights. God is not a contingent entity like society, but my point is that something does not have to be robustly empirical to be something which ought to influence people, or to be something which is worth sacrificing for. Your argument makes me wonder why it is that rights, which seem like they could also be considered contingent abstract entities that only exist in people’s minds, are worth protecting and society is not? You said that, “I do not intend to sound trite, Amy, but my point is precisely because aggregate entities do not possess an external, mind-independent existence, it is prudent to tailor our actions accordingly.” What does it mean to tailor our actions accordingly? Why should these two abstract entities (society and rights) be treated differently? Like I said before, I think there needs to more discussion on this issue. Moreover, I don’t think that you have shown that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are necessarily opposed to an aggregate social entity. It is possible for them to be, but I do not think that you have proven anything more than that.
This post seems to indicate that society is stifling the full benefit of human rights. But I think that in your view of the individual as opposed to society you have ignored the fact that the rights of individuals will conflict with each other. A point which you do not mention, but which I think is relevant here would be how should we deal with conflicting rights? Someone’s right to the pursuit of happiness could undermine another person’s claim to that same right. If it is true that rights, like society, limit liberty then maybe those could just be done away with too?
To the second point, it was not my intention to try to undermine your ethical claim directly; rather I was just trying to argue that any cost benefit analysis of an economic/political system is not able to create a perfectly accurate picture of who is and who is not benefiting. And without such a picture, I don’t think that your premise is strong enough to move forward to the ethical issue. If the claim about one group benefiting at the cost of another was true, then your conclusions are reasonable (at least for those who are sympathetic to Kantian Ethics). However, you keep claiming that, “what exactly is accomplished by involuntary wealth redistribution is the sacrifice of some individuals for the benefit of other individuals.” How do you know how to quantify exactly who is benefiting and who is not in a wealth redistribution system? Even in the case where something like that could be figured out, how I could calculate my benefit (or burden) as an individual? Given that what happens in one country effects lots of other countries, and consequently their societies, this cost benefit analysis could never be totally accurate.
Also, I am not arguing for just compensation. My claim was that people want two non-compatible things: to be excused from participating in wealth redistribution and when they have problems they want someone to help them. Thus, any appeal to what people want, what they voluntarily do or don’t do, is going to be confounded by the same people’s actions or desires at another time. This does not have anything to do with rights, but rather just the fact that people don’t really know what they want. And to use their desires at one time does not justify anything. For example, someone may not want to pay taxes, but when a hurricane comes they expect and want the federal government to help them. When should we listen? Should we only value freedom-from X (say, taxes) and not freedom to Y (have basic living necessities)?
Amy,
I think there are some issues here that should not be run together.
(1) You are correct in pointing out that agents’ actions are often motivated in some way or another by an abstract concept. You are also correct in noting that there is nothing necessarily wrong with being so motivated. I admit that I was unclear about this point in my initial post, and then later in my response to you.
(2) My point is rather simple. Society is necessarily a collection of individual entities that we call persons. As such, there is no “social entity” to which a “social good” could apply. Instead, when a person(s) is used against his will (without his consent) to benefit “the greater good of society,” what necessarily ensues is the sacrifice of one person(s) for the sake of another person(s).
I think this is obvious and incontrovertible- at least descriptively.
(3) You say: “To the second point, it was not my intention to try to undermine your ethical claim directly; rather I was just trying to argue that any cost benefit analysis of an economic/political system is not able to create a perfectly accurate picture of who is and who is not benefiting.”
Fair enough. I will reconfigure my argument.
I think a simple analysis will elucidate who does and who does not benefit from any instance of involuntary wealth redistribution. However, before the analysis can be conducted, its parameters must first be laid out.
(I) The concept of private property is essential. If the legitimacy of private property is doubted, then that issue must first be resolved. I accept the legitimacy of private property, and will thus assume (until told otherwise) that you do, too.
(II) For the purposes of this argument, let us presume that all private property has been justly acquired via either trade, gift, or original appropriation.
(III) If (I) and (II) are accepted, then the concept of ownership is the next logical step. To own private property, is to have the exclusive right to use, dispose, and otherwise use it as one sees fit, just so long as the ownership rights of another’s private property are not physically violated.
If the above parameters are accepted, we may proceed. If, however, any one or more of them is not, then what is to follow will be utterly immaterial, and we will have to begin the discussion anew and from a different starting position.
Now, as previously noted, the argument is surprisingly simple.
I am secure in my person and private property. I have acquired my private property through my own productive efforts, i.e., by utilizing my labor and ingenuity on the natural environment, by voluntarily trading my previously justly acquired private property with other persons, or have received it as a gift from another person. I am the sole owner of my private property.
The same follows for you.
Now, here we are, you and I, two agents equally secure in our ownership over our justly acquired private property. What is likely to follow is that we, both you and I, will find that we desire certain other goods and services that we do not currently have proper ownership over. In your instance, an iced coffee or hot cup of tea from Starbucks, and in mine, a hot chocolate or an old copy of “A Shropshire Lad”.
If the price is cost effective and agreed upon, both you and I will trade a portion of our wealth (the price) P for the property or service that we desire G.
In any given economic exchange, the subjective value SV of G = (or) > P. That is, the SV that we place on G is at least equal to or greater than P. If we did not place a higher SV on G than P, then we would not effect the transaction. Thus, when we voluntarily trade P for G, we ipso facto assert that we are benefiting from the transaction.
Before continuing, however, I should offer the following caveat. The above analysis does not exclude the possibility that an agent, in this case, you and I, will not regret his economic decision ex post facto. And this possibility does not mean that he did not benefit from the initial transaction. Rather, saving the instance of receiving faulty merchandise or services, it would indicate only a change in our value priorities. Besides, in order to gain any traction here all I need is for an agent to act willfully under the belief that he is benefiting from the transaction.
Now, to consider instances of involuntary wealth redistribution. When wealth is taken from one agent O and given to another agent(s) R, then R benefits at the expense of O. For if O thought he would have benefited from the involuntary transaction, then O would have consented to it, thus taking the “involuntary” out of involuntary wealth redistribution.
As an aside, the point must be made that if one group of agents P feel another group of agents Q should receive benefits in the form of material wealth and services, then P himself ought to provide Q with those benefits rather than expropriating them from some other agent(s).
(4) I agree when you state that agents who approve of involuntary wealth redistribution in one form, namely, corporate welfare, FDIC, etc., and disapprove of it in another, e.g. WIC, social welfare, socialized healthcare, etc., are in a position of hypocrisy. This, however, is not a criticism that my position should suffer from. When taken consistently, my position eschews all forms of involuntary wealth redistribution, to include, for instance, corporate bailouts from the federal government. I believe I am consistent in my position.
(5) While “rights” are indeed abstract concepts, I feel that they are necessary abstract concepts. Any social interaction of agents must have rules of conduct and general guidelines. Rights, moral imperatives, and customs are precisely those rules of conduct and general guidelines. Thus, I wish to divorce the concept of the rights to life, liberty, and private property (not the vague “right to the pursuit of happiness”), from any political origin. I am also prepared to argue that precisely, and only, these rights are necessary and desireable.
(6) You ask a very important question: “A point which you do not mention, but which I think is relevant here would be how should we deal with conflicting rights?”
There will undoubtedly be legitimate disagreements and conflicts concerning rights between agents. I am rather confidant, though, that any disagreement between agents that may arise can and will find proper adjudication through some system of arbitration, e.g. the law of an ultra-minimal state, a private arbitration service, etc.
(7) I think that any system that permits involuntary wealth redistribution must develop a robust notion of just compensation. Moreover, a system of compensation will be required for incidents of accidental wrongs. For if an agent is not justly compensated for any wrongs committed against him, then he is quite unabashedly being used as a means for another agent’s end.
I hope I have clarified my position a little bit.
P.S. I do not think “God” is a necessary abstract concept.
Aaron, I agree with you on almost all points, but wouldn’t morality be a social good based on your observations? Devil’s advocate I know, but certain things are good for everyone. Rights, as i know you view, are inalienable are these not “social good” irreguardless ( kidding, not a word) of their endowment by our creator? Which opens the door to absolute or relitive truth. Any comments Aaron?
Colin,
If you care to interpret “social good” as that which is “good for everyone,” then you may do that, but such a turn would, I think, incite confusion. People often make the argument that the forcible re-allocation of wealth “makes everyone better off” because it “spreads the wealth around” (See the political designs of Barack Obama or John McCain for a case in point).
Needless to say, I have issues with such arguments.
You ask, “[W]ouldn’t morality be a social good?” First, I ask,
“Who’s morality?” Second, the intent of my initial post is to show that such phrases as the “social good,” etc., are meaningless.
I tend to shy away from equating the right to life, liberty and private property to any “Creator”; if for no other reason than I would like to avoid the metaphysical commitments that such an equation would compel me to make.
Aaron,
The nature of your motive for avoiding metaphysics in this context is unclear — to me, at least. Your commitment to natural law seems to entail certain metaphysical commitments. How are those commitments different from the ones you want to skirt here? (Alternatively, why doesn’t your commitment to natural law entail such commitments?)
Dr. Vitz,
I have some particular concerns here.
(1) In order for one to assert that God is the progeniture and guarantor of the right to life, liberty, and private property, His existence must first be established; unfortunately, I think such a task is impossible. (This is not to say, however, that arguments for God’s existence cannot be rationally coherent.)
(2) I am not entirely sure one needs God in order to establish the right to life, liberty, and private property on a natural law position. Take, for example, Murray Rothbard’s conception of natural rights or, for that matter, Hugo Grotius’, Thomas Hobbes’, Ayn Rand’s, or Samuel von Pufendorf’s. All developed coherent conceptions of natural rights without any recourse to a deity in particular, and without making any strong metaphysical claims.
(3) I believe the right to life, liberty, and private property can be established on deontological foundations rather than on a natural law position (See Robert Nozick).
I will admit that I have certain, positivistic philosophical predispositions that bias me against metaphysics. This is not to say that I dismiss it out of hand; instead, I approach all things metaphysical cautiously.
When I say, “This is not to say, however, that arguments for God’s existence cannot be rationally coherent,” I should also note that I believe many such arguments are sufficient for a rational belief in God’s existence. But such beliefs are something akin to measured certainties and thus on my account insufficient to anchor the right to life, liberty, and private property.
I don’t wish to redirect this discussion to some more general point, but I’m not sure how adequate this conception of society is. You assert that we must take care when speaking of the action of some thing — that individuals are the ones who engage in identifiable manners of conduct, and that when we speak of group action we really mean the action of the individual in the context or on behalf of the group; so the football player, not the team, scored the touchdown. However, because winning is also an action, and the team won the game, you defend your assertion by claiming the team is a construct that organizes the efforts and ends of individuals. But it begins to seem awkward here because if this group is just an amalgam of individuals who all have the same individual goals, and who employ themselves in concert with each other to achieve these individual goals, then the team didn’t win the game; each individual won the game. This seems awkward at best, but at worst it seems incorrect. To rephrase and say that this collection of directed individuals won the game is a trick because what is really meant by that is ‘team’, and generally the interaction of all members is more important than the action of any member in particular. So it’s clear to me that groups can act.
If groups can act, then it seems that there can be both goods and bads for the group. If the team wins then this is good for the team, and if it loses then this is bad. True, it is bad for the individuals on the team, but it is also bad for the banner under which those individuals have arranged themselves. Winning six Super Bowls in a row is a good for the team, even if all original players have retired by the 6th SB, because in many ways the team is still qualitatively the same.
I think you’re right to point out the psychological undercurrent in a group, because this is the defining quality of what is meant by a group or team or ‘professional field’. A number of people standing in close proximity will be identified as a group, but this is merely a problem of multiple meanings — in the sense it’s being used here, ‘group’ entails this psychological undercurrent (a football tossed into a room does not make a team of the people standing around).
So too does a society, particularly because it is, as you’ve mentioned, a complex arrangement of groups or fields. This is certainly not to say that societies are as myopically focused as a team is on its victory, or that societies are defined by singular goals or belief sets, but they are defined by the manner in which they are arranged; however that may be. The difficulty in identifying a ’society’ is possessed with the same difficulties in identifying a team with no original members left. Any team in existence now is not numerically identical to it’s incarnation 50 years ago, but it is still the same team. Gesticulating to a society is more difficult because the banners that unite them are often intangible or conceptual (thus the prevalence of symbols which aim to capture or at least represent these elusive characteristics). Societies are infused with various elements or norms which enable them to be classified as a society to begin with. This could be an acknowledgment of the authority of a king, deference to some deity, the securing of prosperity, ad infinitum. Even if the society is defined by its deference to the individual — if the common ground among those individuals is an acknowledgment of the primacy of each individual’s interests and ends — there is still a group good; and that is whatever allows the individuals to seek their ends. An individualistic society then could be met with some malady that sought to impede this collective end.
So if the goal of a society is to allow for the flourishing of individuals, and that society has become deformed in such a way that this goal is vanishingly unlikely to be attained by a vast majority of the individuals in that society, then is that not bad for the society? That is to say, an individualistic society comprised of men and women collaborating to allow for the possibility of individual end-seeking would need to be concerned with this *as a society*; and they are a society precisely because they subscribe to the same doctrine of individual end-seeking. That said, when someone suggests that something is for the ‘good of society as a whole,’ it very well may not secretly mean ‘for the good of those less fortunate,’ but may actually mean ‘for the good of the organizing goals that this society is infused with.’ If a society is arranged in such a way that its organization contradicts the foundational underpinnings of that society, then that social state is self-defeating and incoherent. If individual end-seeking is the psychological undercurrent of this society, then this principle is always operating in the background of actions taken by individuals, and the ability to engage in commerce or trade hinges on this assumed commonality. There is an implicit procedural obligation not to undermine this undercurrent and to make adjustments when it is undermined; for in order for the structure to function optimally members must be able to function economically, and when they can’t the undercurrent which made the interaction of individuals possible begins to dissipate.
Thanks, Aaron. That is helpful.
Two further thoughts, briefly:
(1) I suspect you would grant that making strong metaphysical claims is quite different from implicitly relying on strong metaphysical claims. If so, a discussion of whether Grotius, Hobbes, Rand, Pufendorf, and Nozick can avoid both the former and the latter would be interesting — possibly in a separate post, when time permits. I’m doubtful that they can. (If not, I’d be interested to hear your reasons why.)
(2) Do we really need more than measured certainties to “anchor the right to life, liberty, and private property”? Why can’t we get by with highly (epistemically) probable beliefs on these matter, as we do on most other matters in life?
My previous offensively long post was directed at Aaron, just so it’s clear.
Dr. Vitz,
(1) Yes, I do recognize the difference between making strong metaphysical claims and relying upon certain metaphysical claims. Do I think one can avoid both the latter and the former? I am inclined to say yes. However, I say this with the understanding that my initial inclination is tentative. Your question turns on the particular definition we are to give to “metaphysics”. If we define “metaphysics” to mean the branch of philosophy that aims to explain reality prior to any particular science, then I should like to maintain my initial answer.
It is my position that the natural sciences (and their corollary in philosophy, epistemology) are the fields of inquiry that best reveal reality to the human understanding. (Of course, against my pleas, you may say that I am here making strong metaphysical claims.)
(2) As far as an individual acts upon his beliefs, then no, we do not need more than measured certainties: Highly probable beliefs should and- as you noted- do suffice for meaningful action. Nevertheless, the criteria that I have for establishing the right to life, liberty, and private property are more demanding, more philosophically exacting- at least to me they are.
I not only hold that the rights to life, liberty, and private property are merely pragmatically optimal for bringing about material well-being, rather, I hold that they are necessary and sufficient for meaningful, peaceable human interaction.
Thank you for pushing me on my presuppositions.
P.S. Dathan, I am preparing a response to your reply; I am not ignoring you- yet, at least. I reserve the right to ignore you if your criticisms become to incisive!
Thanks, Aaron. Those clarifications are helpful … and interesting. We may, yet, have some disagreements. However, since they would likely take us away from the main line(s) of thought relevant to this post, they can wait for future conversations.
I’m looking forward to your next post!
Dathan,
I apologize for the belated reply. Thank you for pressing me on the perceived difficulties in my post. I hope I am able to abate some of them with this response.
(1) You say, “However, because winning is also an action, and the team won the game, you defend your assertion by claiming the team is a construct that organizes the efforts and ends of individuals.”
In the sense that you and I are using the word “winning”, it seems difficult to describe it as an action. To “win” a game, say, a football game, certain, arbitrarily constructed and mutually agreed upon criteria must be met, i.e., a certain score achieved in a delimited period while within the bounds of the prescribed rules. In other words, “winning” is a resultant state obtained via the concerted (at least in a football game) actions of individual agents. Of course, you are correct in saying (as I noted in my initial post) that “teams” win and not solely the constituting individuals; although, individuals themselves are victors, too. We see this dual fact manifestly in ordinary language: “Mom, we won our football game today,” and, “Mom, I won my game today.” I do not see the awkwardness in this conception.
(2) You say, “[T]he interaction of all members is more important than the action of any member in particular.”
Insofar as a group is constituted to achieve a certain end, Dathan, you are correct. For it often happens that an injured player is replaced by a teammate and the team is still able to achieve its goal, namely, winning. (It is also interesting that the injured player still “wins” insofar as he is still a member of the team.) But the fact remains that at every twist and turn of the game, at every score and penalty, individual players- in concert or independently- are responsible for every action. Thus, while the team is more important than any particular individual action, it is not more important than individual action per se.
(3) You say, “Winning six Super Bowls in a row is a good for the team, even if all original players have retired by the 6th SB, because in many ways the team is still qualitatively the same.”
You are correct in saying the team is the same only insofar as the banners that represent the team remain relatively unchanged. However, I cannot agree with you when you assert that the team remains “qualitatively the same.” This point, again, is obvious in ordinary speech when referring to particular teams. For instance, “The 1991 Miami Hurricanes team was better than the 1984 squad.” Interestingly, on your account, it would seem odd- if not impossible- to make such a distinction, for how can we compare a qualitatively identical entity to itself? Perhaps I will permit a superficial likeness between the two different teams, but nothing stronger.
(4) You say, “I think you’re right to point out the psychological undercurrent in a group, because this is the defining quality of what is meant by a group or team or ‘professional field’.”
Quite right. My point exactly.
(5) You say, “This is certainly not to say that societies are as myopically focused as a team is on its victory, or that societies are defined by singular goals or belief sets, but they are defined by the manner in which they are arranged; however that may be,” and onward, “An individualistic society then could be met with some malady that sought to impede this collective end.”
As you note, at this point our discussion of teams ceases to be useful. All teams- for that matter, most social groups- are teleological in nature, and their raison d’etre is rather easy to determine. (Social groups usually openly declare their purpose for existing.) Societies, however, are another issue. In fact, I should like to say that if viewed from a methodological holistic perspective, a particular society’s reason for existence is undetectable.
Even if we consider a mechanical society of the most primitive sort, its raison d’etre might be impossible to ascertain fully. Through a close examination of the behaviors and symbols of the group (how we do this outside of examining individual agents is beyond me), we may conclude that it is goal oriented towards serving, say, their Sun God. But we may also identify- and it seems to me accurately so- their goal as the mere survival and propagation of their persons, the domination of neighboring peoples, the avoidance of being subjugated by other peoples, or all of the above, or any combination of any amount of the above or of the other motivations not specified here, etc. We are unlikely to find the principle goal- if indeed there is one- of the group.
It seems to me that we would have to investigate the motives and actions of the individual agents that comprise the social group- if not simply ask them, “Why do you participate in this group?” or “Why do you perform that task?”- in order to find out why the group exists.
(6) The above leads us to: “That said, when someone suggests that something is for the ‘good of society as a whole,’ it very well may not secretly mean ‘for the good of those less fortunate,’ but may actually mean ‘for the good of the organizing goals that this society is infused with.’”
From (5) I would contend that a complex society possesses no “organizing goals” per se. Rather, individual agents themselves each possess- usually divergent- motivations for group participation. With that said, however, it is safe and uncontroversial to conclude that society is not a “suicide compact”. That is, most if not all people participate in society because they desire to obtain a more pleasurable existence- an agent possesses a value orientation that directs and determines his actions. Many agents undoubtedly possess similar value orientations- this is precisely what I mean by a “common psychological orientation.” In this sense, then, we may speak of a society being orientated toward certain goals. But, I think, only in this sense.
To conclude, I must still refrain from using such terminology as the “social good”, etc., particularly as it pertains to justifying certain actions, e.g. involuntary wealth redistribution, anti-drug laws, seat belt laws, anti-pornography laws, public indecency laws, etc.
Aaron, What I meant was that intangible things like individual standards of living can be shared by groups of people. This is a shared idea of how to live. People need not agree or care inorder to share an idea. They don’t even need to have the same reasons for beleiving their shared beliefs. People may not fully understand an idea, but they are choosing to not fully understand together. The best example is a congregation. Since the mortal mind cannot comprehend the immortal, they are piecing together a common belief from their individual views. Does this not make a community idea/ thought? Wouldn’t this make the fact that as individuals require another person to develop our ideas about our selves as well as others. That would not make us as individual as it would apper at first glance. With out we, the people who have hear your blog, would you have the refined incite of society. Would you have had these incites without the influences of Ayn Rand et,al who’s works have shaped your “individual” incites?No one acts as an individual. People have influenced our live and have therefore changed us. Every individuals thought has an influence or inspiration that is not of their own creation.
Aaron,
Thanks for the reply. While there are several points of contention between our positions, I want to leave the discussions concerning the identity of teams aside, because although this has purchase here, the principle divide seems to be the potential for a societal telos. I understand your point that winning is not an action, but is rather the achievement of some, “arbitrarily constructed and mutually agreed upon criteria”, but this label can be applied to many ‘actions.’ ‘Rioting’ is essentially an arbitrary term with very little specificity, but it is an action, and one I might add that for all its arbitrariness still requires the participation of more than one person (how many? this is where the arbitrariness enters.).
If it can be agreed upon that proximity or geography aren’t the defining characteristics of a society (just as the presence of a football is not the defining feature of a football team), but rather the ‘psychological undercurrent’ is, and we agree that it is at least coherent to speak of group action, then the issue becomes focused on the current that underpins a society. While I acknowledged earlier that societies of people have a different degree of organization in terms of purpose than a sports team, that current (however varied) still points toward some things and away from others. The goals of any society very well may not be announced explicitly, but the term ’society’ entails some general telos, or at the very least, an orientation. When the commonalities among people in terms of their goals, ideologies, etc., are greater than the differences, and when those people have entered into some state of affairs where they seek out the interaction of other people in the context of this commonality, then we may speak of it as a society. I’m fine with the classification of ‘aggregate of individuals’, but this includes a lack of the very undercurrent that we’ve both agreed is necessary for a ‘team’, and even if the telos is more elusive or less expressed in a society, the it is still present in the undercurrent that unites them as a society. That undercurrent could be the equal treatment of all persons, the primacy of the individual over the group, the importance of the group over any individual, the deference to Zeus, the reverence of animal spirits, ad infinitum; each of these undercurrents contains a telos dedicated to the maintenance or protection of that particular undercurrent.
With that said, we may be at a impasse of foundational conflict that perhaps should continue in person so our avalanche of words doesn’t crash the blog.